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ABSTRACT

In this high school U.S. government and U.S. history curriculum unit, students examine in depth the establishment of the state of Israel. Detailed activities are provided to teach students about the role of the United States in the creation of the nation of Israel. The materials include informational handouts for students, background information for teachers, lesson ideas and outlines, black line masters, rubrics, applications to civics and history standards, and primary source documents, including correspondence and diaries of key figures in the creation of Israel, newspaper articles, and official documents from the United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations. (RJC)

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

SO 031 826

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Teaching **American Diplomacy** Using Primary Sources



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CENTER FOR TEACHING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Teaching American Diplomacy

The Creation of Israel

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Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources

The curriculum series *Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources* is a collaborative project of the Center for Teaching International Relations (CTIR) and the Una Chapman Cox Foundation. Through a generous grant from the Cox Foundation, Ms. Karen Volker, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State, compiled the documents that make up each of the units in this series. Ms. Volker also wrote the introductions and commentaries for the document sets. In an effort to make these documents more readily accessible to classroom teachers, the Cox Foundation engaged CTIR to create standards-based curriculum units to accompany the documents. These assessments and their accompanying activities were developed by classroom teachers of history and civics.
CTIR has drawn upon the standards outlined by the Center for Civic Education and the Mid-Continental Regional Educational Laboratory. Ms. Linda Bongiorno edited the series for CTIR.

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Creation of Israel

Using Primary Sources

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Primary Source Documents

Primary source documents are organized numerically according to document number.
For a list of primary source documents included in this packet, a timeline, and an annotadated document list please see the beginning of the document section.

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RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

President Truman's recognition of the provisional government of Israel shortly after 6:00 p.m. on May 14, 1948 caught many people by surprise, both inside and outside the U.S. Government. Indeed, the U.S. representatives to the United Nations were actively pushing for a truce and trusteeship plan on the floor of the General Assembly when the announcement was made.

A look at the year preceding the creation of the State of Israel demonstrates that there was not always harmony between the State Department and the White House on the subject of Palestine. While the State Department officials tended to look at the issue as one of international affairs, the White House always had one eye on the domestic political situation. After all, 1948 was an election year.

CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

- To what extent did the 1948 election influence President Truman's decision to immediately recognize Israel?
- How important was it for Israel that the United States recognized the new Jewish State immediately?
- If security of the Middle East was vital to U.S. security, why did President Truman recognize Israel knowing full well that Arab countries would oppose it?

Nevertheless, there was general agreement that the Middle East was of strategic importance to the United States. In particular, policy-makers were concerned that the Soviet Union would take advantage of unrest in Palestine to establish a foothold in the Middle East.

Background

As early as 1897 Zionists made known their goal of creating a Jewish State in Palestine. In November 1917, the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration favoring the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In 1922, the League of Nations ratified the Balfour Declaration and appointed Britain to rule Palestine as a mandatory power. The Mandate called for Britain to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people without prejudicing the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

Throughout the 1920's and 1930's there was frequent unrest in Palestine. Over the years, various solutions were suggested and rejected. In 1945, an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was appointed to study the problem of Jewish immigration to Palestine. This committee recommended, among other things, that government of Palestine continue under mandate until a trusteeship agreement could be executed under the United Nations.

Finally, in February 1947, facing increased fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, continued illegal Jewish immigration, and growing restiveness in neighboring Arab states, the British Government announced its decision to refer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations. (See document 1 for a summary of the British proposals.)

In April 1947, the British Government called for the creation of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). This committee, composed of representatives from 11 UN member states was charged with proposing a solution to the situation in Palestine. On August 31st, UNSCOP issued a report in which the majority of the committee called for partition of Palestine with an economic union. This was accepted by the Jewish Agency (representing the Jews in Israel) but rejected by Arab governments and the Arab Higher Executive. A minority of the special committee (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) opposed partition, favoring instead an independent federal state with separate Arab and Jewish states and Jerusalem as the capital. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution endorsing the UNSCOP report on November 29, 1947. The resolution also called for the British Mandate to terminate as soon as possible, but no later than August 1, 1948. During the interim period, a commission was established consisting of one representative of each of five UN member states elected by the General Assembly. This commission was

charged with carrying out measures to implement the General Assembly's plan of partition with economic union. This resolution was supported by both the United States and Russia, but opposed by Britain.

Meanwhile, in Palestine, the security situation continued to deteriorate. By early 1948, it had become clear that partition would not be possible and the search began for another situation. In addition to the State Department, newly-created entities such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council each drafted their own reports on the situation in Palestine. (See documents 16, 17, and 20.)

On March 19th, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations gave a speech in the Security Council proposing a UN-enforced truce in Palestine and creation of a UN trusteeship following the end of the British mandate, which was now set for May 15th. (See document 23.)

There was much controversy surrounding Ambassador Austin's speech. President Truman, who had been a strong supporter of the partition plan, stated at the time as well as later that he had not authorized the shift in the U.S. position (from partition to trusteeship.) State Department officials, however, argue that the President had approved the policy change. (See document 24.)

On March 30th, the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations submitted two resolutions in the Security Council calling for an immediate truce in Palestine and establishment of a UN-administered trusteeship. Two weeks later, on April 12th, the General Zionist Council in Tel Aviv issued a declaration stating that upon the end of the mandatory regime, a governing body of the Jewish state would come into being.

Nevertheless, in New York, the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations continued to press for the establishment of a trusteeship in Palestine. In mid-April, members of the U.S. Delegation met with Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the Zionist Movement, to discuss the situation in Palestine. During the conversation, Weizmann admitted that if certain conditions (related to immigration, land settlement, and economic development) were met, the Jews could possibly accept a trusteeship arrangement. (See document 30 for a report on this conversation.) On April 16th, a Special Session of the General Assembly was convoked to discuss the situation in Palestine and, in particular, the trusteeship arrangement.

Meanwhile, in Washington, officials began to face the reality that the Jewish Agency planned to create a Jewish State upon termination of the British Mandate on May 15th. The State Department's Legal Advisor prepared a memorandum discussing the legal arguments for and against recognition of the new state and contingency drafts of press releases recognizing the new Jewish State were prepared.

The State Department, however, still believing that no final decision had been made regarding recognition, instructed its officers at the United Nations to continue pushing for trusteeship.

Things came to a head on May 14th when it became clear that a Jewish State would be proclaimed that evening at 6:00 p.m. Washington time (midnight in Israel). There were meetings and calls all day between State Department and White House officials discussing the pros and cons of immediate recognition.

The State Department argued that the President should await the outcome of the ongoing debate in the General Assembly, which was expected to wrap up that night. What's more, the State Department believed that U.S. recognition should be delayed until we had had a chance to inform our embassy officials in Arab countries (who might be placed at risk with the announcement) and to consult with major allies.

The President's Special Advisor, Clark Clifford, argued that recognition should be immediate in order to avoid creation of a power vacuum in the Middle East as well as for domestic political reasons. The President, he told State Department officials, had always favored the creation of a Jewish State. In fact, Clifford had managed to convince the President that if the President received a letter requesting recognition, then he should recognize the new state immediately. Then, according to notes made by George Elsey (a colleague of Clifford's at the National Security Council), Clifford spent the afternoon arranging for Eliahu Epstein to send in the request for U.S. recognition.[1] (See document 41.)

[1] Elsey Papers, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume V, page 989

President Truman's recognition of Israel amounted to a reversal of U.S. policy. At the time of recognition, the United States was – literally -- promoting the idea of a trusteeship in the United Nations. According to the account of the Head of the Office of United Nations Affairs Dean Rusk, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who had left the floor of the General Assembly to take Rusk's call, decided not to return to the floor after being informed a few minutes before 6:00 p.m. of the President's imminent recognition of the new Jewish State. Department officials in Washington and New York felt that the President's action had undercut U.S. credibility in the United Nations and throughout the Middle East.



This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the Provisional government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of

Approved
May 14, 1948

6:11

The Documents

The documents selected for this module demonstrate the many actors involved in formulating the U.S. Government's Palestine policy in the mid-1940's. Although the main actors can be counted on two hands, behind every major player were several people who helped to formulate policy by drafting memoranda etc. The documents cover the period from early 1947 through recognition of the provisional government as the *de facto* government of the new Jewish State. (*De jure* recognition was extended on January 31, 1949.)

An Annotated Document List is provided to help teachers better understand the documents. We have purposely not annotated each document separately in order to allow the students to be their own "student historians."

The U.S. Foreign Service:

- The number of Diplomatic Posts and Consular Posts has grown from 4 and 3 respectively in 1781 to 74 and 179 respectively in 1950 and 162 and 75 respectively in 1997.
- There have been 64 Secretaries of State since Thomas Jefferson was appointed to the position on September 26, 1789.
- Benjamin Franklin was the first U.S. diplomat. He was appointed in 1776 as part of a commission charged with gaining French support for American independence. Later, he was appointed Minister to France in 1778 with double accreditation to Sweden in 1782-1783.
- The rank of Ambassador was first used by the United States in 1893; prior to this date the highest-ranking U.S. diplomats were Ministers.
- The last U.S. Legations (a legation is the office of a Minister) to be elevated to the status of Embassy were in Bulgaria and Hungary in 1966.
- Students wishing to learn more about the State Department and the U.S. Foreign Service are encouraged to visit the State Department's web site at www.state.gov

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CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
A CIVICS UNIT
Using Primary Source Documents

Overview:

The conflict in the Middle East is constantly in the news. Recent changes in the politics and governments of the region underscore the importance of understanding the role of the United States and the foreign policy of the region. It is impossible to understand US policy in this region without an understanding of the role of the United States in the creation of the state of Israel over 50 years ago. The creation of the state of Israel provides a unique opportunity for students to develop an understanding of the formation of foreign policy. Using primary source documents the students will discover what is meant by 'public agenda', and how that agenda is set. The understanding of the 'public agenda' helps prepare students to fully understand the primary standard - the formulation of foreign policy.

Inquiry Question:

How did the United States establish the policy to support the United Nations partition plan and the creation of the state of Israel?

Grade level: 9 - 12

Time Allotment: The assessment will require at least one 50 minute period, during which the students will prepare and write the memorandum to President Truman. Prior to the assessment the students will have spent seven 50 minute class periods completing the activities which will prepare them for the final assessment. Teachers with block schedule classes of 90 minutes will be able to complete the activities in 4 to 5 class periods.

Standards being assessed: This assessment evaluates student proficiency in the following standards for civics and government.

The formation of foreign policy

Students will be able to describe the process by which US foreign policy is made. Students will be able to evaluate, take and defend positions on foreign policy issues.

The ends and means of foreign policy

Students will be able to explain the idea of national interest and evaluate the use of the national interest as a criterion for American foreign policy.

The Public Agenda"

Students will understand what is meant by "the public agenda", how it is set, and how it is influenced by public opinion.

Additional related standards:

- Students will be able to explain how nation-states interact with each other.
- Students will be able to explain the historical context of United States foreign policy and evaluate its consequence
- Students will understand the impact of significant political and nonpolitical developments of the US and other nations.

Students will be prepared to perform this assessment and meet the standard when they are able to do the following:

- understand the background issues surrounding the Palestine situation
- understand the concept of national interests with its components of security, ideological and economic interests
- make inferences by analyzing historical data.
- analyze public policy issues.
- understand the role of the President and his advisors in developing foreign policy
- identify the main issues for the Palestinian Jews, Palestinian Arabs, Zionist/American Jews, the Arab states, United States, Great Britain
- evaluate various influence on the public agenda
- analyze primary source information
- make inferences by analyzing documents and analyze public policy issues
- interpret data
- communicate ideas in writing andcommunicate ideas persuasively, verbally

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ASSESSMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEACHERS

Students will write a memorandum to President Truman supporting or challenging the efficacy of creating an independent state of Israel and the foreign policy which should be adopted by the United States. The memorandum should present all of the pertinent perspectives for this foreign policy. The students must include the following perspectives for the 1914 to 1948 time period: Palestinian Arab; Palestinian Jew; Zionist/American Jew; Arab states; United States; Great Britain; and France.

Note to instructors: This assessment is adaptable to a student debate, a roundtable discussion, a research paper of other assessments designs as they relate to the needs of your class.

Students should be given the assessment rubric before they begin the assignment.

Assessment Instructions For Students

In order to aid President Harry S. Truman in the formulation of the United State's foreign policy, you as an Under Secretary of State must write a memorandum to persuade the President of the efficacy of creating an independent state of Israel. You are aware that other members of the State Department disagree with you and are at the same time writing to the President. Therefore, you must contradict the view points that these other memos will present to President Truman. Your memo must include details as to the foreign policy which should be adopted by the United States. The memorandum should present all of the pertinent perspectives for this foreign policy. You memo must also include the following perspectives for the 1914 to 1948 time period: Palestinian Arab; Palestinian Jew; Zionist/American Jew; Arab states; United States; Great Britain; and France.

Memorandum

DATE:

TO: President Harry S. Truman

FROM:

RE: The United States Position on the Creation of the State of Israel

CC: Secretary of State

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Rubric for Creation of the State of Israel Civics Unit Assessment

Criteria weight	Pre-basic (1 point)	Basic (2 points)	Proficient (3 points)	Advanced (4 points)
National interest, security, economic, and ideological concerns as criteria for foreign policy are explored. *x3*	The perspectives' national interest, security, economic and ideological concerns, are not addressed.	The perspectives' national interest, security, economic and ideological concerns, are addressed but are inadequately explained with little support.	The perspectives' national interest, security, economic and ideological concerns, are addressed with adequate explanation and support.	The perspectives' national interest, security, economic and ideological concerns, are carefully and extensively explained, supported or illustrated.
Understands historical information as it related to the stated foreign policy. *x3*	Historical background is lacking or explained minimally and not related to issues of foreign policy.	Historical background explained minimally and/or not related to issues of foreign policy or national interest.	Historical information supports the policy presented.	Pertinent historical information clearly explained.
Justification is provided for the stated foreign policy. *x3*	No justification of foreign policy.	No justification of foreign policy and/or few specific foreign policy goals are stated and supported.	Justification of foreign policy and specific foreign policy goals are not adequately explained and/or not persuasively supported	Justification of foreign policy and specific foreign policy goals are clearly stated and supported.
Use of documents to support stated foreign policy. *x2*	No use of documents to support ideas or arguments.	Minimal use of documents to support ideas or arguments.	Specific arguments supporting the foreign policy are alluded to but not clearly and specifically stated.	Specific arguments supporting the foreign policy are clearly and specifically stated.
Arguments to support policy and refute those who oppose the stated policy. *x2*	Specific arguments supporting the foreign policy are omitted.	Minimal arguments supporting the foreign policy are presented.	Specific arguments opposing the foreign policy alluded to but not clearly and specifically stated	Specific arguments opposing the foreign policy are clearly and specifically stated.
Use of documents to refute those who would oppose the stated policy. *x2*	No documents are used to support specific arguments opposing the foreign policy or specific arguments opposing the foreign policy are omitted.	Minimal use of documents to support specific arguments opposing the foreign policy.	Some arguments to refute those who would oppose the stated policy are supported by references to documents.	Arguments to refute those who would oppose the stated policy are clearly supported by references to documents.
Writing skills. *x2*	Writing lacks organization with numerous spelling, grammatical and syntax errors.	Writing needs proofreading and editing for spelling, grammatical and organizational errors.	Writing has few editing, spelling, grammatical and organizational errors.	Writing exemplifies craftsmanship with correct spelling, dynamic verbs and coherent organization.

Activities

Activities to prepare for the assessment are provided below.

Suggested Activity 1
Historical Background: To fully understand the historical time period in which the question of the creation of the state of Israel was being discussed the students should have read the Historical Background Handout.

Distribute Historical Background Handout (Handout #1) for students to read as homework. Students may be required to complete the worksheet (Handout #2) over this reading.

Suggested Activity 2
Making inferences by analyzing historical data: The purpose of this activity is help students understand the role of national interests. To understand the formulation of foreign policy the students must understand the 3 components of national interests which drive foreign policy.

Begin the class with a discussion of self interests. You might ask the students what considerations or influences they have when making a decisions. The following questions may provide a jumping off point for this discussion: What types of considerations or influences help you decide whether to buy a Lexus or an old Volkswagen bug? Whether you are going to help a friend by loaning money or helping a friend steal it? Would you chose to walk home alone in a dim, dark alley or a well lighted street with which you are familiar?

Divide the class into small groups. Each of the groups will be given questions on **one** of the following components of national interests: economic, security, or ideological interests. The Historical Background Handout will provide some of the information students will need to answer these questions. You should also have on hand books with information about 20th century history, the CIA Factbook, The World Almanac, or books of this nature for the students to refer to quickly.

- **Security Interests**

Security issues concern the physical safety of a place and its people. How do nations protect their safety? The students should be able to answer the following questions concerning security.

What do you predict will be security concerns for the newly created state of Israel? Be sure you consider both internal and external security concerns? What suggestions would you give to the government of the newly created state to meet these concerns? What security concerns do you foresee for the United States with regard to the creation of the state of Israel? What suggestions would you give to the government of the United States to meet these concerns?

- **Economic Interests**

Economic interests concern the state's need to provide for the economic prosperity and well being of the citizens; however, resources and technological developments vary among nations. The students should be able to answer the following questions concerning economic interests.

What would you predict are the economic concerns for the newly created state of Israel? What countries would likely be trading partners with this new state? What trade relations would need to be established? What economic concerns do you foresee for the United States with regard to the creation of the state of Israel? From the viewpoint of the United States hat economic interests are

of concern in this region of the world? What suggestions would you give the government of the United States to meet the economic concerns?

♦ Ideological Interests

Ideology is the combination of beliefs, values, culture, religion, and history of a nation's people. The ideology of a people affects their national interest, goals, and strategies. The students should be able to answer the following questions concerning ideology.

How does your ideology affect your attitude about maintaining your culture, your way of life? What different ideological viewpoints will need to be addressed in a newly created state of Israel? What different cultural groups are present, how are they different? How are they similar? From the viewpoint of the United States what problems to these different ideological groups present? What suggestions would you give to the government of the United States to meet these problems of concerns?

When the students have finished discussing: Discuss these questions and formulate their answers and bring the students back together as a class of the whole. Allow each group time to report to the class on their answers. The students can write their answers on the board, use flip charts, etc., so that the entire class has a visual overview of all three areas of concern.

When the groups have finished reporting back to the class: Indicate that these 3 components make up national interests. Ask the question - What is the difference between national interest and self interest. As the students discuss this question, they will soon come to the realization that there is no difference.

Continue this discussion: ask the students - Can national interests vary in time? Can they vary in relationship to different countries? In terms of different events? (For example you might pose a question concerning the difference in trade policy with China and Cuba?)

Suggested Activity 3

Tools of Foreign Policy Implementation: To understand that once policy is made it must be implemented the students need to know the tools of foreign policy implementation. Explain to the students that there are basically four types of foreign policy tools available to all nations of the world - propaganda, diplomacy, trade relations, foreign aid, and military force.

Distribute Handout #3. Discuss with the class the tools which nations use to implement foreign policy.

Distribute Handout #4 and explain the collage assignment to be completed as a homework assignment.

Note to instructor: A quiz is included as Optional Handout #1 which may be used if the instructor so desires.

Suggested Activity 4

Analyzing public policy issues and making inferences by analyzing historical data:

To understand the formulation of foreign policy the students must understand that the United States does not make foreign policy decisions in a vacuum, upon completing activity #4 the students will understand that the concerns and reactions of other nations are taken into consideration when making policy.

Activity #4 consists of 3 parts:

Hand out Document 5 and allow the students time to read the document.
The following questions are designed for an in class discussion on this document.

1. How do the statements of the delegates reflect the role of the United States as a superpower at the beginning of the Cold War?
2. What are the major interests of the United States in this region of the world?
3. Compare and contrast the interests of the United States with those of the United Nations.

When these questions have been thoroughly discussed, have the students speculate as to what the Secretary of State will say in his speech. On the board, write an outline for this speech.
Instructions for students:

> Based on the information presented in the minutes of the meeting of the United States delegation, outline the speech the Secretary of State will deliver Wednesday.

Handout Document 6 and allow the students time to read the document.
As a whole class discuss: How does the actual speech of the Secretary of State compare with your outline?

Divide the class into 4 groups (or discuss as a whole class). Assign each group one of the following roles:

- Palestinian Jews
- Palestinian Arabs
- American/European Zionist Jews
- Arab States - Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia

In groups or as the whole class, predict/speculate on the reaction to the Secretary of State's speech. Either have the groups report back to the whole class or use jigsaw method to place a student representative from each group in a different grouping to share information.

Suggested Activity 5

Understanding the role of the President and his advisors in developing foreign policy: To understand the formulation of foreign policy the students must understand that the President of the United States has a great many advisors when working on the development of foreign policy. Upon completing activity #5 the students will know some of the key advisors to the President and their role in helping decide foreign policy.

Handout Documents 17, 19, 22, 23, 24 and assign these as homework reading.

The following questions should serve as the basis for an in-class discussion:

Document 17

1. What is the role of the National Security Council in helping the President establish foreign policy?
2. What position does the National Security Council recommend for the United States?
3. What are some possible reasons why there would be differences in opinions between the civilian and the military staff of the National Security Council?

Document 19

1. What is the role of the Secretary of State in helping the President establish foreign policy?
2. What position does the Secretary of State advocate for the United States?
3. Why is Secretary Marshall concerned about the confusion between Ambassador Austin and himself?
4. How does the position advocated by Secretary of State Marshall compare with the position recommended by the National Security Council?

Document 22

1. What is the role of the President's Special Counsel in helping the President establish foreign policy?
2. What position is Clifford advocating for the United States?
3. Compare and contrast the recommendations of Clifford, Secretary Marshall and the National Security Council?

Document 23

1. What is the role of the U. S. Representative to the United Nations in helping the President establish foreign policy?
2. What position does Representative Austin announce for the United States?
3. How does the statement by Representative Austin compare with the positions advocated by Special Counsel Clifford, Secretary Marshall and the National Security Council?

Document 24

1. Explain the sequence of events which created the necessity for the exchange between the Secretary of State and Humelsine.
2. Speculate on the reasons as to why this exchange was necessary.
3. What does this exchange say about the way foreign policy is made and implemented?

Suggested Activity 6

Background for public agenda: To understand the formulation of foreign policy the students must understand that not only does the President have advisors when working on the development of foreign policy but that there is a vested interest in foreign policy by special interest groups. Upon completing activity #6 the students will know the agenda set forth by the Zionist group.

Handout Document 30 and allow the students time to read the document. Using this document and previous documents ask the students to identify three essential points for Jews in the discussion about the creation of the state of Israel. (Students should identify immigration, land settlement and economic development as the main issues.) A teacher led discussion should encourage students to understand **why** these three issues emerge as primary concerns.

Suggested Activity 7

Foreign policy decision making: The President and Department of State: This activity will allow the students to gain additional understanding of the way foreign policy is formulated. Upon completion of activity #7 the students will know that not only were there many different players in the formation of the policy but also many policy options were put forth for discussion.

Handout copies of documents 37 and 38 to read as homework.

Written assignment: Identify 4 policy options for resolution of the Palestine issue. For each option write a paragraph explaining/justifying the option. (Students write 4 paragraphs.)
OR
Students should write a letter to the editor taking a position supporting one of the options and critiquing the other options.
OR
Students may construct a political cartoon depicting their position or the conflict between the positions.

In class, when the students have turned in their papers, spend a few minutes in class discussing the four policy options and the rationale for each option. You may want to have the students vote on their choice of which option the United States should pursue.

To Extend the Unit:

Handout documents 41, 48 and 50 and allow the students time to read these documents. Note to the students that both of these documents were written in the days following the formal recognition of the State of Israel by President Harry S. Truman.

Using these document and previous documents ask the students to discuss: Why despite the advice of many of his advisors the President recognized the State of Israel almost immediately after the proclamation of the state? The students should be able to offer hypothesis about the President's decision. Follow up with a discuss with the students as to potential problems for the United States and the state of Israel. You could include in your discussion the beginnings of the Cold War and the result of the creation of the state of Israel in regard to the Cold War and subsequent events in the Middle East. A final question to be put to the students should be: Were the national interests of the United States served by the creation of the state of Israel and the diplomatic recognition of that country by the United States?

Historical Background: Significant Agreements

The region of Palestine evokes many emotional responses. Jews tend to emphasize Palestine as their original homeland but bring attitudes and viewpoints more closely representative of western civilization, whereas Arabs' long historical association with the area center around their emerging nationalistic attitudes and their religious ties to Islamic holy places in Palestine. Jews trace their historical roots to centuries of occupation prior to 70 CE when the Romans ended Jewish control of the region after centuries of conflict. The Romans destroyed the second temple and dispersed the Jews (the Diaspora) from the region. However Judaism survived in locations around the Mediterranean and in Europe. The Palestinian origins in the geographical area are less clear and lack the historical documentation of Jewish occupation provided by Roman historians but clearly they have inhabited the region for at least seven centuries and made up the dominant demographic group in recent centuries. At the time of World War I, Arabs comprised 90% of the population of Palestine.

From 1916 to 1939, different groups and countries perceived the importance of Palestine in quite different ways with varying motivations for determining its future. During World War I the British/Allies fought the Ottoman Turks/Central Powers in the Middle East. The world viewed the Ottoman Empire as the "sick, old man of Europe" and the British sought allies during the war by promising parts of the soon to be destroyed empire to countries for their support. However they implied to the Arabs who helped the British and the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to defeat the Ottoman Turks that they would receive the right for political self-determination and thus land in a treaty to end the war. In the 1918 armistice ending hostilities with the Turks this promise was honored and Arabs believed independence was imminent.

Sykes Picot Agreement - 1916

Based on the strategy of promising future land acquisition in the region of the Ottoman empire, Britain made several agreements to gain allies in World War I. In 1915 a secret treaty with Russia promised to support the Russian claim to control the Bosporus Strait and the Dardanelles in Turkey. At the same time, Italy demanded large parts of southwest Anatolia and Greece also desired parts of Turkey. France had historic ties with Syria, located within the Ottoman empire, and did not want to give up these claims which also included parts of Lebanon and Palestine. Thus in May of 1916, France, Britain and Russia signed the Sykes Picot Agreement in which France would gain direct rule in northern and western Syria plus a sphere of influence around Damascus.

Britain acquired an area in lower Iraq and the "right" to advise Arab governments located between the Egyptian border and eastern Arabia, effectively giving Britain control of the region from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. Russia wanted influence in controlling Christian holy places so a compromise placed Jaffa and Jerusalem under international control. Thus the only living space left for Arabs was located in the Arabian desert.

Balfour Declaration - 1917

Prior to 1917, a nationalist movement called Zionism emerged in Europe. The underlying belief for Zionists centered around the idea that Jews are a nation and need a homeland. Thus this concept of a Jewish homeland did not have a religious base but a political one. With similar motivation as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British sought Jewish financial support for the war effort. The Balfour declaration appears in a letter written by the British foreign secretary, Lord Balfour, to Lord Lionel Rothschild, honorary president of the Zionist Federation of Britain and Ireland.

Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have such pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour

The British believed they could deliver on this promise at the end of the war with conquest of the Ottoman Empire. This declaration alarmed the Arabs even though the British implied that Jewish immigration would be limited. Arabs protested further Jewish settlement and refused to cooperate with the British as long as they maintained this policy. An issue never effectively dealt with concerned defining legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs. Almost immediately Jewish immigration increased. The Jewish population in Palestine grew from 56,000 in 1920 to 180,000

by the end of the 1920s. Arab population was about 750,000. By 1948 ,with the increased immigration due to the Holocaust during World War II, the Jewish population rose to 650,000, comprising about 40% of the total population.

San Remo meeting - 1920

When the triumphant powers in World War I began to write the Treaty of Versailles, the agreements concerning the former Ottoman empire made by Britain and France for expedient purposes during the war had to be addressed. An American commission, the King-Crane Commission, was formed to resolve Arab, Zionist, British and French claims in the Middle East. Neither Britain nor France wanted the commission to survey the inhabitants about their wishes for the future of the area, although each country was willing for the other's territory to be surveyed. A stalemate resulted and they abandoned this idea. The commission learned that Arabs wanted independence under Faysal's provisional government in Damascus. Arabs were very suspicious of British and French motivations by this time and insisted that they would only accept advice from the Americans who had not participated in imperialism in the Middle East. Originally Americans had been sympathetic to Zionist claims and had expressed support for them. However upon hearing Arab viewpoints, the commission realized serious Jewish Arab conflict would be the result. Therefore the commission recommended a reduction in the Zionist program, a limit on Jewish immigration into Palestine and to abandon the plan to make Palestine a Jewish homeland. Arabs had high hopes for dreams for independence based on this report and the idealism of President Wilson's 14 Points, especially concerning the idea of self-determination. However Wilson's emphasis on the creation of the League of Nations led to a sacrifice of the points dealing with the idea of self-determination.

The result allowed Britain and France, at San Remo, to resolve their claims on their own. A mandate system was created to please President Wilson. Supposedly this system would train the territories to govern themselves. The Mandates would be supervised by the League of Nations to prevent exploitation by Britain and France. Thus the territory in the Middle East was split between Britain and France. France received Syria and Lebanon while Britain acquired Iraq and Palestine which also included Jordan. Only the Arabian peninsula achieved independence.

Suggested teacher discussion questions over background reading in addition to the questions on Handout #2.

Sykes-Picot:

Whose needs primarily were met by this agreement?

How might Jews and Arabs have viewed this agreement?

Balfour Declaration:

How can anyone create a home for one group of people in a land inhabited by another? Should the local residents agree to this before it occurred?

In addition to Muslim rights, what would be the political status of Arabic speaking Christians?

Historical Background worksheet

1. Explain the motivations behind the Sykes-Picot agreement. What role did the Ottoman Empire play ?

2. Explain the promises made in the Balfour Declaration. What future implications could arise from these promises?

3. How does the San Remo Agreement alter Palestine's situation in comparison to the Balfour Declaration?

4. Why would Britain and France desire control over these areas in the Middle East?

5. Why did Jews and Arabs have so little influence on the decisions made about Palestine?

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♦ Security Interests

Security issues concern the physical safety of a place and its people. How do nations protect their safety? The students should be able to answer the following questions concerning security.

What do you predict will be security concerns for the newly created state of Israel? Be sure you consider both internal and external security concerns

What suggestions would you give to the government of the newly created state to meet these concerns?

What security concerns do you foresee for the United States with regard to the creation of the state of Israel?

What suggestions would you give to the government of the United States to meet these concerns?

♦ Economic Interests

Economic interests concern the state's need to provide for the economic prosperity and well being of the citizens; however, resources and technological developments vary among nations. The students should be able to answer the following questions concerning economic interests.

What would you predict are the economic concerns for the newly created state of Israel?

What countries would likely be trading partners with this new state?

What trade relations would need to be established?

What economic concerns do you foresee for the United States with regard to the creation of the state of Israel?

From the viewpoint of the United States hat economic interests are of concern in this region of the world?

What suggestions would you give the government of the United States to meet the economic concerns?

♦ Ideological Interests

Ideology is the combination of beliefs, values, culture, religion, and history of a nation's people. The ideology of a people affects their national interest, goals, and strategies. The students should be able to answer the following questions concerning ideology.

How does your ideology affect your attitude about maintaining your culture, your way of life?

What different ideological viewpoints will need to be addressed in a newly created state of Israel?

What different cultural groups are present, how are they different? How are they similar?

From the viewpoint of the United States what problems to these different ideological groups present?

What suggestions would you give to the government of the United States to meet these problems of concerns?

Foreign Policy Tools

Propaganda

- one sided information spread by the media

Diplomacy

- diplomatic recognition - allows a government to exchange ambassadors, and implies support for that nation's government
- recalling diplomats - allows a government to show displeasure of another nation's policies
- expelling diplomats - since diplomatic immunity prevents diplomats and their families from being arrested and tried for a crime a nation may expel them
- cultural and scientific exchanges - allows governments to establish goodwill relationship between countries
- negotiations and treaties - allow governments to talk to exchange information and attempt to reach solutions to conflicts
- summits - allow heads of state to meet face to face to discuss important issues

Trade Relations

- establishing trade relations - allows nations to open communications and establish a cooperative relationship
- restrictions on trade - two types, tariffs, and quotes to prevent foreign competition or to discriminate against a nation's products
- trade agreements - treaties or agreements to enhance access to markets and stimulate trade

Foreign Aid

- economic aid - used to aid a nation to rebuild or deal with long term problems such as famine or disease
- military aid - used to develop a strong defense and purchase weapons to keep a friendly government in power

Alliances

- agreements to provide defense or protection against an attack (NATO)

International Organizations

international organizations, United Nations, World Bank, IMF

Regional Organizations

- European Union, OPEC, Organization of American States

Boycotts and Sanctions

- boycott - allows nations to suspend trade with a country attempting to force a nation to change its policies (Cuba)

sanctions - an action to force a nation to comply with international law or change its policies (Iraq)

Military Force

- show of strength - nations maintaining military forces and placing them strategically on borders
- terrorism - violence undertaken by non-governmental groups to gain attention for their cause
- limited military response - short term military actions to force a nation to back down on a specific issue and encourage the nation to resolve the conflict through diplomacy (Kosovo)
- war

Foreign Policy Collage

Use newspapers or news magazines to find articles illustrating the different tools of foreign policy. Attempt to find as many different types as possible. Using the articles make a collage of your findings and plan a 5 minute presentation explaining the use of foreign policy tools on your collage.

Complete the following chart to attach to your collage.

Tools of Foreign	Article Headline	Explanation

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Optional Handout 1

This quiz could be used after Activity #3 to check for understanding of the role the key players in formulating and implementing foreign policy.

Quiz

Describe the role of each of the following in formulating and implementing foreign policy.

- The President of the United States
- The Secretary of State
- The National Security Council
- The President's Special Council
- The US Representative to the United Nations

Reading Documents and Using Primary Sources.

Before reading a document or primary source, determine several key pieces of information that will allow you to understand the document/source in its correct time and place in history which can indicate both perspective and bias.

1. Note the date for the document/source.
2. Note the author.
3. Note any governmental relationship or geographical location being represented.
4. Read the document carefully being aware of the probable perspective of the author/location .
5. Look carefully for loaded words which bias the reader to a pre-determined conclusion. Additionally note the publication and whether it tends to represent a certain viewpoint. (Examples include the journals, The Nation versus National Review.)
6. When using multiple documents, compare and contrast the date of the documents, author and geographical locations. This can help determine similarities and differences between time periods, locations and sources of information.

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Summary of Documents

Document 5, Excerpts from Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the US Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly in New York on September 15th: This document reflects the debate that took place within the US Delegation to the United Nations regarding what the US position should be on the UN Special Committee on Palestine's report calling for partition, which had been issued on August 31st. Results of this discussion would shape the Secretary of State's address before the United Nations General Assembly on September 17th. Main issues discussed included probable Russian, Arab, and Jewish reactions to possible US support of the majority report (calling for partition with an economic union), the importance of supporting the report for the sake of supporting the United Nations as a new institution, and proper timing of the announcement.

Document 6, Excerpts from the Secretary's statement before the UN General Assembly on September 17, 1947: In this statement, the Secretary announces that the United States supports the views reflected by the majority in the UNSCOP report, i.e., that the United States supports partition with an economic union.

Document 17, Draft report on the position of the United States with respect to Palestine: In mid-February, the newly-created National Security Council provided the State Department with its own draft report on the Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine. The conclusions of this draft report are provided in Document 17. The NSC report's conclusions coincide with those of the State Department's report in most areas. You will note, however, that some elements of the National Security Council staff felt that the United States should continue to support the partition plan "by all measures short of the use of outside armed force." The NSC memorandum, however, more clearly proposes creation of a UN Trusteeship in Palestine if the UN General Assembly reconsiders the Palestine problem.

Document 19, Message to the president, February 26, 1948: Secretary of State Marshall was asked about Palestine at his press conference. The text of his statement was sent to the US Mission to the United Nations (USUN) on February 27th for its information. Page 2 of this document is an earlier version of the same cable showing the penned-in changes.

Document 22, Memorandum by the president's special counsel Clark Clifford March 8, 1948: The President's Special Counsel Clark Clifford wrote a memo to the President outlining his views on the Palestine issue. Among other things, this memo provides interesting background information about how the Palestine question had been dealt with domestically up until that point. Clifford points out twice on page 4 that the adoption of the partition plan by the General Assembly was in large part due to pressures brought to bear by President Truman himself. Abandonment of the partition plan, he argued, would cause a serious loss of American prestige and moral leadership.

Document 23, Statement made by the United States Representative at the United Nations before the Security Council on March 19, 1948: Paragraph four contains a reference to a temporary trusteeship. This speech was the source of much debate at the time with President Truman stating that he had not given the approval for a shift in policy from partition to trusteeship.

Document 24, A memo to the Secretary forwarding a statement drafted by Undersecretary Lovett, March 22, 1948: The memo indicates that he believed that Truman had approved the policy change from partition to trusteeship. Lovett's statement was apparently prompted by a statement Clark Clifford made to Lovett to the effect that the President had never approved the speech given by Ambassador Austin on March 19th (Document 23). Lovett's recollection coincides with Department telegram sent out on March 8 informing USUN that the text of the statement on the Situation in Palestine after the Withdrawal of the British had been approved by the President.

Document 30, Telegram from USUN to the State Department April 15, 1948: The telegram to the State Department reported on a conversation Ambassador Austin had with Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the Zionist movement. In the conversation, Weizmann indicated for the first time that the Jews might accept a trusteeship arrangement if certain requirements (namely immigration, land settlement, and economic development) were met.

Document 37, Memorandum May 4, 1948: Mr. John E. Horner, Adviser to the US Delegation at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, drafted a memorandum on the Future of Palestine. In his memo, Horner points out that many delegations were distrustful of the US, fearing that because of domestic political reasons the United States might commit an about-face, leaving them in an untenable position. More importantly, Horner proposes a third solution: annexation by the Kingdom of TransJordan of that part of Palestine which the UNGA November 29, 1947 resolution had intended to be a separate Arab state. This, he argues, is the only solution that would effectively keep the Soviet Union out of the region while at the same time being satisfactory to both the Jews and the Arabs.

Document 38, Memorandum by the Legal advisor, May 13, 1948: By mid-May, the Department of State's Legal Advisor was considering legal issues surrounding recognition of a new state in Palestine. On May 13, 1948, the Legal Adviser wrote to the Undersecretary of State on Recognition of Successor States in Palestine. In his memo, the Legal Advisor points out that proclamation of a state and government by either community during the special session of the General Assembly would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 (d) of the Security Council truce resolution dated April 17, 1948. As a result, the Legal Advisor concludes that the United States "probably should not recognize the existence of any new state in Palestine during the special session, unless the Security Council should repeal its April 17 resolution."

Document 48, Memorandum of Conversation drafted by Under Secretary of State Lovett, Monday, May 17, 1948: Undersecretary Lovett drafted a Memorandum of Conversation regarding conversations that took place regarding recognition of Israel on Friday, May 14, 1948. In his memo, Lovett recalls that he had urged the President to hold off on recognizing any new state in Palestine for a day or so until the US Government could confirm the details of the proclamation. In addition, Lovett felt that it was important to notify key US allies, in particular the British, French, and Belgian Governments in advance as well as to advise US Embassies in the Middle East. And finally, Lovett argued that the President should at least wait until the UN General Assembly session was over, which was expected to end late in the evening on the 14th. This memo is important because it demonstrates once again the differences in opinion between State Department and the White House on the question of recognition of Israel.

Document 50, USUN Cable, May 19, 1948: USUN wrote a telegram to the Department summarizing how US recognition of Israel had been viewed by other delegations. In short, the US Delegation to the UN felt that US recognition of Israel "deeply undermined the confidence of other delegations in (US) integrity." USUN points out that the United States had emphasized in the Security Council as well as in the informal truce negotiations that no action of a political character should be taken that "would alter the status quo or prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of either Arabs or Jews." US recognition thus violated the terms of the Security Council truce resolution.

Appendix - Alternate Assessment Ideas

- **Advising Meeting.** Students will present their memorandum to President Truman in a meeting of all of Truman's advisors on the question of the future of Palestine. Give students the following scenario: You are assigned a specific viewpoint to present and defend as the appropriate foreign policy for the United States to adopt relating to the Palestine issue. You will present your proposed policy in a meeting which will be attended by other members of the State Department with differing viewpoints. You want to persuade President Truman to adopt your policy therefore you must include details about the perspective you represent. You should also be prepared to refute the other viewpoints which will be presented to President Truman

- **Position Paper.** Students may write a position paper from an assigned point of view supporting or challenging the efficacy of creating an independent state of Israel and suggesting the foreign policy point of view to be adopted by the President of the United States.

CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
A History Unit
Using Primary Source Documents

Overview:

The interest in a homeland for the Jews officially emerged with the Zionist movement in Europe and was given credence during World War I in the letter known as the Balfour Declaration sent by the British Foreign Office to Lord Rothschild, a leader in the Zionist movement. The role of the British army during World War I in the Middle Eastern theatre encouraged Arabs to believe that their support of the British against the Ottoman Turks would result in independent Arab states at the conclusion of the war. Unbeknownst to the Arabs or Zionists, the British and French in the Sykes-Picot agreement determined the fate of this region after the war and it reflected their pre-war colonial attitudes and did not provide for either a Jewish homeland or Arab independent states.

During the interwar years, foreign policy vacillated between support of Jews and Arabs but with World War II and the Holocaust, the issue of Jewish emigration to Palestine came to the forefront. Britain realized the impossibility of an acceptable outcome for both parties of the situation and abandoned her mandate to the United Nations. The documents indicate the struggle of American foreign policy makers in dealing with this issue and present students with the opportunity to see multiple perspectives about the creation of the State of Israel. The events/circumstances of the political environment following World War II forever changed the international power structure with the emergence of the United Nations and the end of colonialism as a power base. Thus new perspectives and voices not only could be heard in an international arena but had to be considered when making foreign policy, even by the two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Inquiry Question:

How did international conditions affect the creation of the state of Israel?

Grade Level: 9th -12th grade

Time Allotment: The assessment requires at least a 50 minute class period with preparation time for the assessment before hand. Five class periods should be adequate time for traditional 50 minute classes. Block scheduling of 90 minute class periods will allow this unit to be completed in four class periods.

Standard being assessed: This assessment evaluates student proficiency in the following history standards:

International power relations

Students will understand how new international power relations took shape following World War II.

Historical Analysis and Interpretation.

Students should be able to compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values, personalities, behaviors and institutions.

Historical Issues- Analysis and Decision Making.

Students will identify issues and problems in the past and formulate a position or course of action on an issue.

Students will be prepared to perform this assessment and meet the standard concerning how international power relations evolved when they are able to do the following:

- explain the role and motivations of Great Britain, France, Zionists and Arabs in the 1914-1948 time period
- describe the affect of the Holocaust on Palestine and the perspective of world leaders
- analyze primary documents to determine main points and bias of the material
- apply their knowledge and explain viewpoints with the perspective of the time period
- evaluate the pressures the U.S. State Department had to consider before developing foreign policy in the Palestine situation
- describe the role of the State department in advising the President on foreign policy development
- describe the perspective of the Palestinian Arab, Palestinian Jew, Zionist/American Jew, Arab states, United States, Great Britain, and France in relation to the creation of the state of Israel.
- analyze primary source information
- analyze and explain cause and effect relationships using historical information, and make inferences by analyzing historical data.
- analyze public policy issues and interpret data
- communicate ideas in writing and communicate ideas persuasively, verbally

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ASSESSMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEACHERS

Using primary source documents and handouts provided, students will demonstrate an understanding of the various perspectives of the peoples involved in the creation of the state of Israel, as well as the influence of major powers on the way in which Israel came into being. The unit and assessment relates to the History Standards, specifically how new international power relations took shape following World War II. Students will debate the efficacy of creating an independent state of Israel by presenting all of the pertinent perspectives to a meeting of the UN General Assembly. Preparation for this assessment requires students to learn about the following perspectives during the 1914 to 1948 time period: Palestinian Arab; Palestinian Jew; Zionist/American Jew; Arab states; United States; Great Britain; and France.

After completing the unit of study using primary documents, prepared handouts and class activities, students will be assigned a perspective to present and debate that point of view. A one class period debate will be prepared in reference to the evaluation rubric provided to students in advance. Students should use the documents, worksheets and notes from class discussion to prepare their presentation before the UN General Assembly. Students may work on this in groups based on the seven perspectives. Conduct the debate in three parts: initial presentation, rebuttal, summation. Students may prepare their initial presentation of their perspectives concerns and point of view about creating a state of Israel as homework. Prior to the debate determine if each student must present information orally. If so, have students within the groups determine who will be responsible for presenting the initial presentation, the rebuttal and the summation. After all groups have presented the initial presentation give a set amount of time (5-10 minutes) for the groups to prepare a rebuttal for points presented by other perspectives that contradict or criticize their assigned perspective. Once again have each group present their rebuttal. Finally give the groups another 5 minute discussion session to prepare their summation of their viewpoint following the rebuttal arguments.

Teachers may wish to use the enclosed peer evaluation form for group projects. The evaluation sheet allows students to inform the teacher about how much they contributed to the project and the work performance of other members of the group. Emphasize that they are being evaluated on how well they can fairly judge the process of preparing for the debate. Explain that being able to fairly evaluate a situation or other's work performance is a useful skill in the working world. The second part of the evaluation encourages students t listen closely to other students presentations.

Final Assessment instructions:

Handout Documents 16, 17, 20, 29, 33, 34, 36, 37
These documents provide background information on the position of all the groups involved in the creation of the state of Israel. Divide the class into groups representing the following groups representing the following:

- United States
- Arab States
- Zionists
- Great Britain
- France
- Palestinian Arabs
- Palestinian Jews

Give each group the following assignment:

Assessment Instructions for Students

Assigned Perspective _____

Your group will present the position of the perspective you are representing to a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly is debating the question of partition of Palestine. Your presentation should include information on the position of your perspective on the following:

- ♦ Do you favor or are you in opposition to the partition plan?
- ♦ An explanation as to why your group has taken this position with regard to the following issues:
- geography - land size, population, location, resources
- economics
- security issues/interest
- national identity
- implementation of the partition plan
- the role of your group in making the plan work
- the withdrawal of the British forces
- the role of the United States in the partition plan
- the role of the Soviet Union
- support for the Arab state
- support for the Jewish state
- relationship of your group to the other groups involved
- the role of the United Nations

The presentation of each group before the General Assembly of the United Nations should focus on the support or opposition of their country/group for the United Nation's partition plan. Each country/group should assess and appraise the position of their country/group on the issues addressed above.

Initial presentation: Each perspective will present its desired goals for the future of Palestine and information critical for understanding the viewpoint.

Rebuttal: Each perspective responds to issues/demands presented by others. Clarify the position and/or respond to information from others. It is not necessary to address all issues presented.

Summation: Offer potential compromise positions to achieve a peaceful solution. Identify those viewpoints similar to yours.

Rubric for Israel Assessment

Criteria weight	Pre-basic (1 piont)	Basic (2 pionts)	Proficient (3 pionts)	Advanced (4 pionts)
Understands the general background to creation of the state of Israel. x2	Information about the creation of the state of Israel incorrect and or incomplete.	Some factual errors and or incomplete information.	Some factual errors but not serious one—or slightly incomplete information.	Information about the creation of the state of Israel factually correct and complete.
Evaluates the changing positions of powers and perspectives in World War II political environment. x3	Information about the perspective relating to other viewpoints incorrect and or incomplete.	Some perspectives missing or incomplete but a general understanding of change expressed.	Some factual errors but not serious one—or slightly incomplete information.	Information about the perspective relating to other viewpoints correct and complete.
Analyzes the relationship of assigned perspective to the historical situation. x3	Little or no evidence of understanding of historical background of the perspective.	Identifies perspective clearly but does not address its historical significance.	Some factual errors but not serious one—or slightly incomplete information.	Evidence of understanding of historical background of the perspective.
Understands the primary goals of the perspective assigned related to the Palestine issue. x1	Goals for perspective in relationship to the Palestine issue not clearly stated.	Goals for perspective in relationship to the Palestine issue stated but not supported or sufficiently explained.	Goals for perspective in relationship to the Palestine issue stated adequately with some support.	Clear statement of goals for perspective in relationship to the Palestine issue with clear justification.
Analyzes the opposing viewpoints and weaknesses of assigned perspective. x3	Did not challenge other viewpoints and or did not answer criticism directed at their perspective.	Responded to other viewpoints and criticism directed at perspective but not completely or persuasively.	Responded to other viewpoints and criticism directed at perspective adequately.	Responded to other viewpoints and criticism directed at the perspective completely and persuasively.
Describes the acceptable solutions to the Palestine problem from assigned perspective. x3	Did not present realistic solutions reactions for perspective's position.	Solutions reactions for perspective's position demonstrated knowledge but lacked depth or a sense of reality.	Realistic solutions reactions for perspective's position demonstrated knowledge of situation.	Solutions reactions for the perspective's position demonstrated a depth of knowledge and a sense of reality.

Criteria weight	Pre-basic (1 piont)	Basic (2 piont)	Proficient (3 piont)	Advanced (4 piont)
Persuasive points rather than simply informative ones. x 1	Not persuasive about proposals or perspective.	Persuasive about proposals or perspective.	Persuasive about proposals and perspective.	Very persuasive about proposals and perspective.
Organization skills x 1	Presentation and information poorly organized.	Presentation or information fairly well organized but with evident flaws.	Presentation and information organized.	Presentation and information very well organized.
Verbal skills x 1	Poor verbal skills; not easily heard or ideas poorly communicated.	Average verbal skills; easily heard but ideas not communicated clearly	Average verbal skills; easily heard and ideas clearly communicated.	Excellent verbal skills; spoke clearly, easily heard and information communicated very well.

Peer Evaluation Sheet

Name_____
Topic _____

Describe your group's project presentation:

List the members of your group (including yourself) and give them points based on the following criteria:

A. contributed good ideas for the group presentation
B. cooperated with the rest of the group
C. prepared their part of the assignment.

Use the following scale for each assessment: 10=excellent, 9=very good, 8=above average, 7=average, 6=below average, 5-0=poor to very poor.

Student's name	**topic assigned**	**criterion A**	**criterion B**	**criterion C**
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				

Listen carefully to all of the groups' presentations. Give each group a grade based on the following criteria using the 10 point scale:

A. Statement of goals in Palestine issue clearly presented.
B. Relevant factual information about the perspective given.
C. Responded to other viewpoints and criticism directed at the perspective.

Write one statement about what you liked from each group's presentation.

Palestinian Arab Criterion A. _____Criterion B. _____Criterion C _____

Palestinian Jew	Criterion A. _____	Criterion B. _____	Criterion C _____
Zionist/American Jew	Criterion A. _____	Criterion B. _____	Criterion C _____
Arab states	Criterion A. _____	Criterion B. _____	Criterion C _____
United States	Criterion A. _____	Criterion B. _____	Criterion C _____
Great Britain	Criterion A. _____	Criterion B. _____	Criterion C _____
France	Criterion A. _____	Criterion B. _____	Criterion C _____

Activities

Unit activities will focus on primary source documents beginning with a handout giving historical background and a student worksheet over the reading.

Suggested Activity 1
Historical Background:
This activity provides students with a view of the international power structure for the period 1914 - 1948 allowing students to understand the shift from 19th century power base formulated around colonial empires to the nationalistic characteristics emerging after World War II.

Students must have a sense of major players and world affairs before World War II in order to understand the various perspectives/viewpoints of the participants in the conflict over the creation of the state of Israel.

Give students Handout #1 providing historical background from 1914 to 1948. Students should answer the questions on worksheet, Handout #2. This could be given as homework the class period before beginning the unit. Discussion of the worksheet would introduce the unit to the students.

Suggested Activity 2
Understanding the drive for independence:
This activity will provide students with information about the underlying causes for conflict over the area of Palestine. Students should see the justification used by each interested party in their claim to the land, as well as perceiving the inability of the former colonial powers to deal with this issue.

The students will explore the Arab desire for independence, the desire of Jews for a homeland, the relationship of the Holocaust and emerging Arab nationalism with regard to Palestine.

Using poems, stories, newspaper/magazine articles or film clips as background information have the students draw a political cartoon depicting the importance of Palestine to each of the following groups of people:

Palestinian Jews
Palestinian Arabs
European Zionist Jews
Arab Nationalists

Suggested Sources include:
Anderson, Eilliott (ed) Contemporary Israeli Literaure. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publiccation Society of America, 1977.
Carmi, T. and Dan Pagis. Selected Poems. Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc,. 1976.
Friedlander, Albert H. Out of the Whirlwind: A Reader of Holocaust Literature. Garden City: Doubleday & Co, Inc. 1968.

The following film clips could be used:

- From Lawrence of Arabia - scene depicting the liberation/take over of Damascus. Video: Lawrence of Arabia. Columbia Tri-Star Video, 1995.
- From Liberation by the Shoah project - scenes depicting liberation and the desire of Jews to emigrate to Palestine.

- From Exodus - scenes depicting the desire of the Jews to leave Europe and emigrate to Palestine. Video: Exodus. Twentieth Century Fox videos, 1982.

Suggested Activity 3
How to read documents and primary source material:
Give handout #3 with instructions for reading documents and primary source material. Explain the importance of noting dates and authors before reading the actual material in order to be able to identify bias and point of view.

Distribute copies of Document 1 and using the instructions from Handout #3 have students answer the questions on the worksheet, Handout #4, accompanying Document 1.

Suggested Activity 4
Synthesis of information:
Students should begin to think critically about the information learned to date and attempt to identify the salient points of controversy for the United States in determining whether to be involved in this dispute and what policy serves the U.S. national interest.

Divide class into small groups of 3-4 students. Tell them that on Sunday, September 7, 1947 an article appeared in the Washington Post entitled " Palestine Partition Puts U.S. on the Spot".

Based on information learned thus far, students should determine 5 main points to be included in an article with this title. (Possible points include a) suggested political leadership for Palestine; b) limits on immigration; c) future British role in the region; d) Palestine as a local issue or world issue; e) the difficult issues left unresolved; and
f) possibility of observing strict impartiality between Jews and Arabs.

Have each group write their 5 points on the chalkboard. In class discussion determine the common ideas from the groups and have the students give reasons for these viewpoints.
Next have students prioritize the points listed from all student suggestion from most important to least.

Optional assignment: Students may be required to write for homework the article based on the 5 most important points determined in class.

Suggested Activity 5
Making inferences by analyzing historical data. Analyzing public policy issues:

Activity 5 consists of 4 parts.

A. Hand out Document 5 and allow the students time to read the document.
The following questions are designed for an inclass discussion on this document.

1. How do the statements of the delegates reflect the role of the United States as a superpower at the beginning of the Cold War?
2. What are the major interests of the United States in this region of the world?
3. Compare and contrast the interests of the United States with those of the United Nations.
4. How have the roles of international powers shifted from prior to World War II?

B. After discussion is finished: When these questions have been thoroughly discussed, have the students speculate as to what the Secretary of State will say in his speech. On the board, write an outline for this speech.

Instructions for students:

Based on the information presented in the minutes of the meeting of the United States delegation, outline the speech the Secretary of State will deliver Wednesday.

C. Read Document 6 and discuss: How does the actual speech of the Secretary of State compare with your outline?

Divide the class into 4 groups (or discuss as a whole class). Assign each group one of the following roles:

Palestinian Jews
Palestinian Arabs
American/European Zionist Jews
Arab States - Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia

In groups or as the whole class, predict/speculate on the reaction to the Secretary of State's speech. Either have the groups report back to the whole class or use jigsaw method to place a student representative from each group in a different grouping to share information.

D. Using Document 7 compare the reaction of the Arab States - Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia to the reaction you predicted in your group work with an assigned perspective.

Suggested Activity 6
International implications:

Give students copies of Document 8. Through class using the following questions, students should begin to see the role of the superpowers in formulation of foreign policy and the importance of considering Arabs and Jews, with no official standing, in the resolution of the Palestine issue.

The following questions may be used to direct the discussion or students in groups could be assigned some questions and use the jigsaw method to teach other students.

1. Describe the longer term effects of any U.S. decision in the Palestine problem.

2. What seems to be the position favored by the U.S. according to the document?

3. How might the Arabs justify an alliance with the Soviet Union? What considerations should the U.S. make at this time when the Cold War is beginning to take shape?

4. What is the predicted result of weakening the influence of moderate Arabs and Jews in Palestine? Why should this result be considered?

5. How might the British attitude in 1947 and their experience in Palestine since 1918 inform U.S. foreign policy makers?

6. Explain the drawbacks to the Partition plan.

7. Explain the drawbacks to the UNSCOP Majority plan.

8. How do these plans (Partition and Majority) diverge from the ideals of the UN charter?

9. How does the document discriminate between the terms "Jewish state" and "Jewish national homeland."

10. What seems to be the most practical approach to the Palestine problem according to the author of the document?

Historical Background: Significant Agreements

The region of Palestine evokes many emotional responses. Jews tend to emphasize Palestine as their original homeland but bring attitudes and viewpoints more closely representative of western civilization, whereas Arabs' long historical association with the area center around their emerging nationalistic attitudes and their religious ties to Islamic holy places in Palestine. Jews trace their historical roots to centuries of occupation prior to 70 CE when the Romans ended Jewish control of the region after centuries of conflict. The Romans destroyed the second temple and dispersed the Jews (the Diaspora) from the region. However Judaism survived in locations around the Mediterranean and in Europe. The Palestinian origins in the geographical area are less clear and lack the historical documentation of Jewish occupation provided by Roman historians but clearly they have inhabited the region for at least seven centuries and made up the dominant demographic group in recent centuries. At the time of World War I, Arabs comprised 90% of the population of Palestine.

From 1916 to 1939, different groups and countries perceived the importance of Palestine in quite different ways with varying motivations for determining its future. During World War I the British/Allies fought the Ottoman Turks/Central Powers in the Middle East. The world viewed the Ottoman Empire as the "sick, old man of Europe" and the British sought allies during the war by promising parts of the soon to be destroyed empire to countries for their support. However they implied to the Arabs who helped the British and the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to defeat the Ottoman Turks that they would receive the right for political self-determination and thus land in a treaty to end the war. In the 1918 armistice ending hostilities with the Turks this promise was honored and Arabs believed independence was imminent.

Sykes Picot Agreement - 1916

Based on the strategy of promising future land acquisition in the region of the Ottoman empire, Britain made several agreements to gain allies in World War I. In 1915 a secret treaty with Russia promised to support the Russian claim to control the Bosporus Strait and the Dardanelles in Turkey. At the same time, Italy demanded large parts of southwest Anatolia and Greece also desired parts of Turkey. France had historic ties with Syria, located within the Ottoman empire, and did not want to give up these claims which also included parts of Lebanon and Palestine. Thus in May of 1916, France, Britain and Russia signed the Sykes Picot Agreement in which France would gain direct rule in northern and western Syria plus a sphere of influence around Damascus. Britain acquired an area in lower Iraq and the "right" to advise Arab governments located between the Egyptian border and eastern Arabia, effectively giving Britain control of the region from the

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Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. Russia wanted influence in controlling Christian holy places so a compromise placed Jaffa and Jerusalem under international control. Thus the only living space left for Arabs was located in the Arabian desert.

Balfour Declaration - 1917

Prior to 1917, a nationalist movement called Zionism emerged in Europe. The underlying belief for Zionists centered around the idea that Jews are a nation and need a homeland. Thus this concept of a Jewish homeland did not have a religious base but a political one. With similar motivation as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British sought Jewish financial support for the war effort. The Balfour declaration appears in a letter written by the British foreign secretary, Lord Balfour, to Lord Lionel Rothschild, honorary president of the Zionist Federation of Britain and Ireland.

Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have such pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour

The British believed they could deliver on this promise at the end of the war with conquest of the Ottoman Empire. This declaration alarmed the Arabs even though the British implied that Jewish immigration would be limited. Arabs protested further Jewish settlement and refused to cooperate with the British as long as they maintained this policy. An issue never effectively dealt with concerned defining legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs. Almost immediately Jewish immigration increased. The Jewish population in Palestine grew from 56,000 in 1920 to 180,000 by the end of the 1920s. Arab population was about 750,000. By 1948 ,with the increased immigration due to the Holocaust during World War II, the Jewish population rose to 650,000, comprising about 40% of the total population.

San Remo meeting - 1920

When the triumphant powers in World War I began to write the Treaty of Versailles, the agreements concerning the former Ottoman empire made by Britain and France for expedient purposes during the war had to be addressed. An American commission, the King-Crane Commission, was formed to resolve Arab, Zionist, British and French claims in the Middle East. Neither Britain nor France wanted the commission to survey the inhabitants about their wishes for the future of the area, although each country was willing for the other's territory to be surveyed. A stalemate resulted and they abandoned this idea. The commission learned that Arabs wanted independence under Faysal's provisional government in Damascus. Arabs were very suspicious of British and French motivations by this time and insisted that they would only accept advice from the Americans who had not participated in imperialism in the Middle East. Originally Americans had been sympathetic to Zionist claims and had expressed support for them. However upon hearing Arab viewpoints, the commission realized serious Jewish Arab conflict would be the result. Therefore the commission recommended a reduction in the Zionist program, a limit on Jewish immigration into Palestine and to abandon the plan to make Palestine a Jewish homeland. Arabs had high hopes for dreams for independence based on this report and the idealism of President Wilson's 14 Points, especially concerning the idea of self-determination. However Wilson's emphasis on the creation of the League of Nations led to a sacrifice of the points dealing with the idea of self-determination.

The result allowed Britain and France, at San Remo, to resolve their claims on their own. A mandate system was created to please President Wilson. Supposedly this system would train the territories to govern themselves. The Mandates would be supervised by the League of Nations to prevent exploitation by Britain and France. Thus the territory in the Middle East was split between Britain and France. France received Syria and Lebanon while Britain acquired Iraq and Palestine which also included Jordan. Only the Arabian peninsula achieved independence.

Suggested teacher discussion questions over background reading in addition to the questions on Handout #2.

Sykes-Picot:

Whose needs primarily were met by this agreement?

How might Jews and Arabs have viewed this agreement?

Balfour Declaration:

How can anyone create a home for one group of people in a land inhabited by another? Should the local residents agree to this before it occurred?

In addition to Muslim rights, what would be the political status of Arabic speaking Christians?

Historical Background worksheet

1. Explain the motivations behind the Sykes-Picot agreement. What role did the Ottoman Empire play ?

2. Explain the promises made in the Balfour Declaration. What future implications could arise from these promises?

3. How does the San Remo Agreement alter Palestine's situation in comparison to the Balfour Declaration?

4. Why would Britain and France desire control over these areas in the Middle East?

5. Why did Jews and Arabs have so little influence on the decisions made about Palestine?

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Reading Documents and Using Primary Sources

Before reading a document or primary source, determine several key pieces of information that will allow you to understand the document/source in its correct time and place in history which can indicate both perspective and bias.

1. Note the date for the document/source.
2. Note the author.
3. Note any governmental relationship or geographical location being represented.
4. Read the document carefully being aware of the probable perspective of the author/location .
5. Look carefully for loaded words which bias the reader to a pre-determined conclusion. Additionally note the publication and whether it tends to represent a certain viewpoint. (Examples include the journals, The Nation versus National Review.)
6. When using multiple documents, compare and contrast the date of the documents, author and geographical locations. This can help determine similarities and differences between time periods, locations and sources of information.

Historical Background Worksheet

1. Describe the proposals for partition explaining the political and economic consequences.

2. How does the proposal deal with Jewish immigration? How would Zionists and Arabs view this proposal?

3. How does Britain see its future role in Palestine? What does the British mean when they wish to change the issue of Palestine from a world to local issue?

4. Describe the major issues left unresolved.

5. Do you think this proposal demonstrates British impartiality? Why or why not?

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Summary of Documents

Document 1
Memo dated February 10, 1947 from Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson summarizing the British proposals regarding Palestine. This is the first the State Department had been officially notified of the British proposal to establish a United Nations Trusteeship in Palestine. This document is interesting not only because it summarizes the British concerns about Palestine in early 1947 but also because it demonstrates what happens within the bureaucracy when such a paper is received. Inevitably, someone within the Department of State is tasked to write a summary of the paper for use by higher-level officials who, presumably, have less time to read the original document. The memo is unusual in that it was written by Loy Henderson himself rather than by someone who worked for him—notice the initials at the bottom left of the last page.

Document 5
Excerpts from Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly in New York on September 15th. This document reflects the debate that took place within the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations regarding what the U.S. position should be on the UN Special Committee on Palestine's report calling for partition, which had been issued on August 31st. Results of this discussion would shape the Secretary of State's address before the United Nations General Assembly on September 17th. Main issues discussed included probable Russian, Arab, and Jewish reactions to possible U.S. support of the majority report (calling for partition with an economic union), the importance of supporting the report for the sake of supporting the United Nations as a new institution, and proper timing of the announcement.

Document 6
Excerpts from the Secretary's statement before the UN General Assembly on September 17, 1947. In this statement, the Secretary announces that the United States supports the views reflected by the majority in the UNSCOP report, i.e., that the United States supports partition with an economic union.

Document 7
Memo dated September 18, 1947 from Henderson to Under Secretary of State Lovett reporting on the reaction among Arab delegations to the Secretary's September 17 address endorsing the UNSCOP report (which called for partition with economic union). After the Secretary's speech, the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations met with officials from Arab delegations to get their reaction to the speech. These views were then reported to the Department of State. The cable was then summarized by the Office of Near East and African Affairs in the form of a memo for the Undersecretary of State. Notice the note on the bottom of page one indicating that the Secretary has seen the memo.

Document 8
This Top Secret memo dated September 22, 1947, from Henderson to Secretary Marshall, provides Henderson's reaction to Marshall's 9/17/47 statement at the United Nations in support of partition. In this memorandum, Loy Henderson informs the Secretary that because of the need for him to be in New York prior to the Secretary's speech, he was unable to provide his office's (the Office of Near East and African Affairs) views in advance of the speech. Nevertheless, Henderson felt that the Secretary should be aware of his office's views and, indeed, what he claims to be the views of "practically every member of the Foreign Service and of the Department who has been engaged in work intimately connected with the Near and Middle East." The memo clearly states that any plan for partition of Palestine would be unworkable and that support of such a plan would undermine U.S. relations with the Arab states. This perhaps one of the best summaries of the State Department's views on this issue as of September 1947.

Document 16
In late 1947/early 1948, George Kennan was asked to head up a new Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. One of the first tasks of this new office was to come up with a position paper on what U.S. policy should be with respect to Palestine. The Policy Planning Staff's paper pints out that the United States, in supporting partition, had put itself in a position where it would be expected to use force to support implementation of the UN General Assembly's resolution. The paper recommends that the U.S. take no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition and that the U.S. oppose sending armed forces into Palestine for that purpose. Furthermore, the U.S. should recognize that , given the unwillingness of the parties involved to support partition, partition is not a realistic option. Therefore once others have recognized that there is no reasonable prospect for success of partition, the U.S. should encourage a peaceful settlement between Palestine Arabs and Palestine Jews or investigate the possibilities of any other suggested solution such as a federal state or trusteeship. This is a very good summary of the multiple issues related to the question of Palestine in early 1948.

Document 17
In mid-February, the newly-created National Security Council provided the State Department with its own draft report on the Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine. The conclusions of this draft report are provided in Document 17. The NSC report's conclusions coincide with those of the State Department's report in most areas. You will note, however, that some elements of the National Security Council staff felt that the United States should continue to support the partition plan "by all measures short of the use of outside armed force." The NSC paper, however, more clearly proposes creation of a U.N. Trusteeship in Palestine if the UN General Assembly reconsiders the Palestine problem.

Document 20
This secret report was drafted by the then recently-created Central Intelligence Agency on Possible Developments in Palestine on February 28, 1948. The primary conclusion of the report is that the partition plan as envisioned by the United Nations General Assembly cannot be implemented and the issue will have to be reconsidered by the Security Council.

Document 29
Meanwhile, in Palestine, the situation continued to evolve. On April 12, 1948 the General Zionist Council issued a declaration (provided) stating that a governing body of the Jewish state "shall come into being" upon the termination of the mandatory regime.

Document 33
On April 22, 1948 a memo was sent to the Undersecretary suggesting that Secretary Marshall return to Washington from the Conference of the Americas in Bogota in order to devote a major portion of his time to Palestine. THE memo also suggests that the National Security Council once again review the issue with a view toward clarifying the U.S. position vis-a-vis Palestine. The Secretary is also urged to consult with Congressional leaders and both political parties in order to remove Palestine from domestic politics.

Document 34
On the same date, a member of the United Nations Affairs office sent a memorandum to the Undersecretary of State providing his own views on Palestine. In the memo, Mr. McClintock points out that there had been lukewarm reception to the idea of a trusteeship in the UN and that implementation of a trusteeship would probably require the use of American force. McClintock states openly that these are his own views and that they had not been cleared by anyone else in the Department, even by his boss, Dean Rusk.

Document 36
On the same date, USUN sent a telegram to the Department summarizing the major points covered in conversations with Fawzi Bey of Egypt and Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Among other things, the discussion covered the efforts to establish a truce in Palestine and U.S. commitment to finding a solution that would be acceptable to the two communities of Palestine.

Document 37
On May 4, 1948, Mr. John E. Horner, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, drafted a memorandum on the Future of Palestine. In his memo, Horner points out that many delegations were distrustful of the U.S., fearing that because of domestic political reasons the United States might commit an about-face, leaving them in an untenable position. More importantly, Horner proposes a third solution: annexation by the Kingdom of TransJordan of that part of Palestine which the UNGA November 29, 1947 resolution had intended to be a separate Arab state. This, he argues, is the only solution that would effectively keep the Soviet Union out of the region while at the same time being satisfactory to both the Jews and the Arabs.

Appendix - Other Assessment Ideas

- Students present the briefs they wrote concerning documents 22 and 23 to the class. Following the presentations, discuss key points needed in UN policy identifying whose views these points represent. Upon conclusion of the discussion the teacher and students collaborate to produce an outline (write it on the chalkboard) for a UN position paper on the Palestine issue to be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

- Assessment: Student Assignment: Write a position paper expressing the UN's position of the future of Palestine for the Secretary General.

Additional related standards: This unit could lead to alternative assessments suggested following these history standards:

- Students will understand the search for community, stability, and peace in an interdependent world.

  Teachers may have students write a position paper about the creation of the state of Israel and whether or not it provided peace and stability for an interdependent world.

- Students will understand major global trends since World War II.

  Students could address the following topics and relate them to the creation of the state of Israel: post-war colonialism, concept of globalism (UN), emergence of the Cold War, nuclear technology, economic interdependence.

Supplemental suggestions

Consequences of supporting the creation of the state of Israel for US foreign policy

Suggestion for follow-up activities addressing the repercussion of U.S. foreign policy supporting the creation of the state of Israel. Due to this decision, the U.S. foreign policy was frequently limited in dealing with the crises that arose in the Middle East in the 1949 - 1999 period. The concept behind partition has emerged as the most viable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict with "land for peace" being the main component of negotiations to resolve the conflict.

For the following events, students should analyze what foreign policy responses were logical and evaluate which responses were available to the United States based on their support of the state of Israel and the Cold War attitudes toward the Soviet Union by using the documents associated with each event.

1. July 26, 1956 - Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.
- US using diplomacy to deal with the event
- Explore the reactions of Britain and France
- Israel's desire to overthrow Nasser in order to obtain Gaza, the Sinai coast to Aqaba depending on US sympathy to Israel to provide the necessary support

2. Six Day War - June 1967
- Basis for conflict occurred over water from the Jordan River when Arabs diverted headwaters in the Golan Heights
- Emergence of revived Palestinian national militancy
- US urged caution to both sides
- Israel mobilized
- Role of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in diplomatic affairs after Six Day War.
- Following the war at Summit Conference in Khartoum, September 1967, the first hints from Arab nations about a pragmatic approach to resolving the conflict
- Use document UN Resolution 242, November 22, 1967 - first indication of a "land for peace" formula

3. The October War or Yom Kippur War, 1973
- Failure of negotiations based on Resolution 242 centered around extreme imbalance of power in Arab world and political differences
- US foreign policy to support Israel with military and economic aid caused Israel to see no need to may concessions to achieve peace.
- Arab states would consider no peace agreement without regaining their land.
- Dispute over format of negotiations: Israel wanted face-to-face talks, while Arabs wanted UN brokered talks.
- Client states of both US and USSR hindered movement toward negotiations
- Increased militant action by Palestinians led to war
- US responded with massive aid and military supplies to Israel
- Oil uses as a diplomatic weapon
- Ultimately, the US and USSR cooperated to bring the war to an end out of fear of a confrontation with each other.

4. UN Security Council Resolution 338, October 24, 1973.

- US and USSR would have preferred a stalemate for 1973 war believing that situation would be more conducive to peace agreements
- Kissinger's solo shuttle missions to Middle East, excluded USSR brought about the three bilateral disengagement agreements:

  Sinai I - January 18, 1974. Israel withdrew from west side of Suez Canal; Egypt reopened canal in June 1975; UNEF troops patrolled a buffer zone; Egypt restored diplomatic relations with Washington; and Saudi Arabia lifted the oil embargo in March 1974

  The Golan Accord - May 31, 1974. Israel withdrew from Syrian land captured in October War; Israel retained control over several hills used for observation posts; and diplomatic relations resumed between US and Syria.

  Sinai II - September 1975. Israel gave up more land in Sinai; Egypt renounced use of force against Israel; and most significantly for future foreign policy the US secretly agreed with Israel not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO while it refused to recognize Israel's right to exist or accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

5. Camp David Accords

- President Carter supported reconvening the Geneva peace conference as a means to begin a movement toward peace.
- Several situations thwarted this effort: US domestic opposition; dissension among Arab states; and Israel's desire to exclude both the USSR and the Palestinians.
- November 9, 1977 Sadat declared he would go anywhere to secure peace—even to Israel. He addressed the Knesset on November 20, 1977.
- Sadat and Begin attempt to reach agreements
- Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to Camp David in order prevent the collapse of the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations.

6. Gulf Crisis 1990-91

- US able to organize an international coalition against Iraq which included many Arab nations and Israel on the same side.
- Collapse of the Soviet Union once again changed the international world order and similar to the end of World War II a new power structure began to evolve.

7. Washington, September 30, 1993

- Arafat and Rabin meet to sign the Declaration of Principles that had been negotiated and written in Oslo.

8. Wye River Accords 1998

- Current events and research in periodicals should be used to evaluate the importance of these agreements currently.

Suggested Teacher Resources:

Brower, Danier R. The World in the 20th Century: The Age of Global War and Revolution. Prentice Hall, 1992.

Goldschmidt, Arthur,Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East. Westview Press, 1983.

Lesch, Ann M. and Dan Tschirgi. Origins and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Greenwood Press, 1998.

Shipler, David K. Arab and Jews: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land. Penguin Books, 1986.

Walker, Tim and Tiffany Farrell Larbalestier. International Relations: Understanding the Behavior of Nations. Close-up Publishing, 1995.

RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL – DOCUMENT LIST

1. Memo dated February 10, 1947 from Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs Loy Henderson to Undersecretary of State Acheson summarizing the British proposals regarding Palestine (facsimile)

2. September 1, 1947 New York Times article: The Palestine Report

3. September 3, 1947 Washington Post article: Verdict on Palestine

4. September 7, 1947 Washington Post article: Palestine Partition puts U.S. on Spot

5. Excerpts from Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, New York, September 15 1947 (discusses what U.S. position should be on the UN Special Committee on Palestine's report)

6. Excerpts from the Secretary's 9/17/47 statement before the UN General Assembly

7. Memo dated September 18, 1947 from Henderson to Under Secretary of State Lovett reporting on the reaction among Arab delegations to the Secretary's September 17 address endorsing the UNSCOP report (which called for partition with economic union)

8. September 22, 1947 memo from Henderson to Secretary Marshall regarding Marshall's 9/17/47 statement at the United Nations

9. November 10, 1947 memo from Loy Henderson to the Secretary regarding suspension of exports of arms and ammunition to Arab States and Palestine

10. November 24, 1947 letter from Acting Secretary of State to the President stating that security in the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States

11. December 9, 1947 cable from Pakistan (no 198) forwarding message from Governor General Jinnah to President Truman

12. Early 1948 undated and unsigned memorandum from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Wadsworth) to President Truman regarding Iraqi views on U.S. policy toward Palestine

13. January 14, 1948 McClintock memo to Rusk on Palestine

14. State Department Memo reporting that Syria is the center of recruitment and training of "irregulars" intended for infiltration into Palestine

15. January 16, 1948 telegram (no. 62) from Jerusalem to Secretary of State

16. State Department's Policy Planning Staff paper 19 – Report on Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine

17. Conclusion of draft report prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine

18. February 21, 1948 Message to the President drafted in the Department of State forwarding a draft position paper for use in the Security Council's discussions to be held February 24, 1948; para 12 refers to trusteeship

19. Department telegram (no. 98) to USUN dated February 27, 1948 quoting that portion of Secretary Marshall's press conference dealing with Palestine

20. Report by the Central Intelligence Agency on Possible Developments in Palestine (summary only), dated February 28, 1948

21A. Facsimile of Telegram 107 from State Department to USUN laying out the conclusions of U.S. policy with respect to Palestine following the withdrawal of the British. Cable was drafted March 5, 1948.

21B. Facsimile of Department Telegram 108 to USUN setting out U.S. policy toward Palestine after May 15, 1948. Reference is made to immediately preceding telegram (number 107, document 21A).

22. Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel Clark Clifford to President Truman dated March 8, 1948

23. Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations before the Security Council on March 19, 1948

24. March 22 memo drafted by Humelsine stating that Lovett believed that Truman had approved the policy change (from partition to trusteeship)

25. March 30, 1948 Telegram from USUN to State Department suggesting that the Secretary approach the Argentine Foreign Minister to solicit Argentina's support for U.S. resolutions in the Security Council

26. March 30, 1948 Telegram from USUN to State Department suggesting that immediate representations be made in London and Paris to swing British and French votes to affirmative on US resolutions submitted to the Security Council on the same day

27. March 31, 1948 Telegram containing Secretary Marshall's response to above-mentioned March 30 Cable from USUN

28. March 31, 1948 Telegram from Acting Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy in London (no. 1099) instructing the embassy to discuss USUN's resolutions with the British Government

29. Text of the Declaration adopted by the General Zionist Council in Tel Aviv April 12, 1948

30. April 15, 1948 Telegram from USUN to the State Department reporting on conversation with Chaim Weizmann

31. April 15, 1948 memorandum from State Department's United Nations Affairs office (UNA) to Undersecretary Lovett suggesting that USUN's April 15 cable reporting on the conversation with Chaim Weizmann be forwarded to the President under cover of a separate memorandum (attached).

32. Instructions cable sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Cairo for action, dated April 22, 1948

33. April 22, 1948 memo to Undersecretary Lovett recommending that the Secretary return to Washington from the Conference of the Americas in Bogata in order to devote major portion of his time to Palestine

34. Memorandum from Robert McClintock to Undersecretary Lovett, April 22, 1948

35. Reporting cable from Jerusalem (Consul General Wasson) to Secretary of State on the deteriorating security situation in Jerusalem, dated May 3, 1948

36. May 3, 1948 Telegram from the U.S. Mission to the UN to the Secretary of State summarizing major points covered in conversations with Fawzi Bey of Egypt and Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia

37. May 4, 1948 Memorandum by Mr. John E. Horner, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, on the Future of Palestine

38. May 13, 1948 Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) on recognition of successor states in Palestine

39. May 14, 1948 Letter from Eliahu Epstein (representative of the Jewish Agency) to Secretary Marshall notifying him that the State of Israel would be proclaimed at midnight in Israel

40. May 14, 1948 Telegram from Department to several Arab posts advising them that Washington expected to recognize the new provisional government of Israel "within hours"

41. Text of May 14, 1948 press release recognizing the provisional government of Israel as the de facto authority of the State of Israel. (As reproduced on Page 179 of "Teaching with Documents, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

42. May 15, 1948 notice/advertisement in the New York Times announcing a mass demonstration in honor of the creation of the new state of Israel

43. May 15, 1948 New York Times article: The State of Israel

44. May 15, 1948 New York Times article: Recognizing the Realities in the New Palestine

45. State Department memorandum dated May 16, 1948 proposing a reply to Mr. Epstein's letter

46. Letter from Undersecretary Lovett to Eliahu Epstein responding to the latter's letter of May 14, 1948 to Secretary Marshall. (letter dated May 14 although handed over in person on May 17, 1948)

47. May 16, 1948 Washington Post article: State of Israel

48. May 17, 1948 Memorandum of Conversations drafted by Under Secretary of State Lovett regarding conversations that took place regarding recognition of Israel on Friday, May 14, 1948

49. May 18 1948 Washington Post article: Washington Calling

50. USUN Cable dated May 19, 1948 summarizing how U.S. recognition of Israel was viewed by other delegations

51. June 13, 1974 letter from Dean Rusk to the Historian's Office of the State Department laying out his recollection of the events in which he had participated relating to the recognition of Israel by the United States on May 14, 1948

Recognition of Israel

Time Line

Aug. 1897	Basle Declaration – First official statement of Zionist purpose
Nov 2, 1917	Balfour Declaration issued by the British Government favoring establishment of a Jewish homeland
Apr 24, 1920	San Remo Conference decides to assign mandate for Palestine to Britain under the League of Nations
June 30, 1922	U.S. Congress approves the Balfour Declaration by Joint Resolution
July 24, 1922	League of Nations ratified Balfour Declaration and appointed Britain to rule Palestine, effective September 1923
1939	British Government issues a White Paper restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine
Oct/Nov 1942	Balfour Policy again approved by declaration of members of the 77th Congress – 68 senators and 193 members of the House approved the declaration, which was presented to the president on November 2, 1942
1944	Both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions adopted resolutions favoring the establishment in Palestine of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth
July 2, 1945	Letter from House and Senate – signed by a majority of each – to President Truman urging steps toward establishment in Palestine of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth as soon as possible
July 2, 1945	Governors of the 48 states wrote to President Truman urging establishment in Palestine of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth
Dec 19, 1945	Concurrent resolution adopted by the Congress resolving that the United States should use its good offices toward establishment of a democratic commonwealth in Palestine
April 1946	"Anglo-American Committee on Inquiry" issues a report calling for trusteeship agreement administered by United Nations, full Jewish immigration, and two autonomous states with central government control over Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Negev.
Feb 14, 1947	British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin announced that the British Government had decided to refer the Palestine problem to the United Nations
Apr 2, 1947	British Government officially requests the creation of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)
May 15, 1947	UNSCOP established

Aug 31, 1947 UNSCOP issues report calling for partition of Palestine with economic union; Accepted by the Jewish Agency, rejected by Arab governments and the Arab Higher Executive. Sizable minority on the Committee opposed partition.

Nov 29, 1947 United Nations General Assembly passes resolution (33-13) endorsing the UNSCOP report of 8/31/47 and calling for partition with economic union. Russia and the U.S. supported the resolution; Britain did not,

Jan 20, 1948 Policy Planning Staff of the State Department prepares a report on the Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine

Feb 17, 1948 National Security Council produces draft report on Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine

Feb 28, 1948 Central Intelligence Agency produces report on Possible Developments in Palestine

Mar 19, 1948 U.S. Representative at the United Nations, Senator Austin, makes a statement before the Security Council calling for a truce in Palestine and endorsing creation of a UN trusteeship in Israel following end of British mandate on May 15, 1948. The U.S. also called for an immediate special session of the General Assembly

Mar 30, 1948 U.S. Delegation submits resolutions to the Security Council calling for truce and trusteeship

Apr 12, 1948 Declaration adopted by General Zionist Council in Tel Aviv stating that upon the termination of the mandatory regime "there shall be an end of foreign rule in Palestine and that the governing body of the Jewish state shall come into being"

Apr 14, 1948 Representatives from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN) met with Chaim Weizmann, leader of the Zionist Movement, in New York. During conversation, Weizmann admits that trusteeship might be acceptable to the Jews if three essential requirements were met: immigration, land settlement, and economic development

Apr 16, 1948 Special Session of the General Assembly convoked

Apr 17, 1948 UN Security Council calls for a truce in Palestine

Apr 20, 1948 U.S. Delegation to the UN submits a draft trusteeship agreement

Apr 22, 1948 State Department sends memorandum to Secretary Marshall recommending that he cut short his participation in the Conference of the Americas (being held in Bogata) and return to the U.S. in order to devote a major portion of his time to the Palestine issue

May 3, 1948 Consulate General Jerusalem reports on deteriorating security situation in Palestine

May 14, 1948 Eliahu Epstein, official representative of the Jewish Agency) writes to President Truman and Secretary Marshall informing them that the

Jewish state was to be proclaimed at midnight in Israel (which would be 6:00 p.m. in Washington)

May 14, 1948 Shortly after 6:00 p.m., President Truman issues press statement recognizing the provisional government of Israel as the *de facto* government of the State of Israel

May 15, 1948 British Mandate expires

May 15, 1948 Regular armed forces of Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries enter Palestine

RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL

TEACHER'S ANNOTATED DOCUMENT LIST

1. Memo dated February 10, 1947 from Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson summarizing the British proposals regarding Palestine. This is the first the State Department had been officially notified of the British proposal to establish a United Nations Trusteeship in Palestine. This document is interesting not only because it summarizes the British concerns about Palestine in early 1947 but also because it demonstrates what happens within the bureaucracy when such a paper is received. Inevitably, someone within the Department of State is tasked to write a summary of the paper for use by higher-level officials who, presumably, have less time to read the original document. The memo is unusual in that it was written by Loy Henderson himself rather than by someone who worked for him – notice the initials at the bottom left of the last page.

2. September 1, 1947 New York Times article: The Palestine Report. Documents 2-4 reflect the public opinion regarding the August 31, 1947 report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). In its report, UNSCOP calls for partition of Palestine in conjunction with an economic union. The essence of this report was later adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947.

3. September 3, 1947 Washington Post article: Verdict on Palestine

4. September 7, 1947 Washington Post article: Palestine Partition puts U.S. on Spot

5. Excerpts from Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly in New York on September 15th. This document reflects the debate that took place within the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations regarding what the U.S. position should be on the UN Special Committee on Palestine's report calling for partition, which had been issued on August 31st. Results of this discussion would shape the Secretary of State's address before the United Nations General Assembly on September 17th. Main issues discussed included probable Russian, Arab, and Jewish reactions to possible U.S. support of the majority report (calling for partition with an economic union), the importance of supporting the report for the sake of supporting the United Nations as a new institution, and proper timing of the announcement.

6. Excerpts from the Secretary's statement before the UN General Assembly on September 17, 1947. In this statement, the Secretary announces that the United States supports the views reflected by the majority in the UNSCOP report, i.e., that the United States supports partition with economic union.

7. Memo dated September 18, 1947 from Henderson to Under Secretary of State Lovett reporting on the reaction among Arab delegations to the Secretary's September 17 address endorsing the UNSCOP report (which called for partition with economic union) After the Secretary's speech, the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations met with officials from Arab delegations to get their reaction to the speech. These views were then reported to the Department of State. The cable was then summarized by the Office of Near East and African Affairs in the form of this memo for the Under Secretary of State. Notice the note on the bottom of page one indicating that the Secretary has seen the memo.

8. This Top Secret memo dated September 22, 1947, from Henderson to Secretary Marshall, provides Henderson's reaction to Marshall's 9/17/47 statement at the United Nations in support of partition. In this memorandum, Loy Henderson informs the Secretary that because of the need for him to be in New York prior to the Secretary's speech, he was unable to provide his office's (the Office of Near East and African Affairs) views in advance of the speech. Nevertheless, Henderson felt that the Secretary should be aware of his office's views and, indeed, what he claims to be the views of "practically every member of the Foreign Service and of the Department who has been engaged in work intimately connected with the Near and Middle East." The memo clearly states that any plan for partition of Palestine would be unworkable and that support of such a plan would undermine U.S. relations with the Arab states. This is perhaps one of the best summaries of the State Department's views on this issue as of September 1947.

9. November 10, 1947 confidential memo from Loy Henderson to the Secretary recommending suspension of exports of arms and ammunition to Arab States and Palestine. Although the memo is from Loy Henderson, we can tell that it was drafted by a certain "ABColquitt" from the annotation at the bottom left of the document. We also know that several other offices were asked to clear (give their okay) on the memo as indicated by the acronyms and names listed under "concurrences." A marginal note to the left of the recommendation paragraph indicates that the Secretary approved the proposal to suspend authorization for the export from the United States of arms, ammunition, and other war material intended for use in Palestine or in neighboring countries.

10. On November 24, 1947, Acting Secretary of State Lovett sent this Top Secret memo to President Truman stating that security in the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States. The memorandum resulted from a series of consultations with the British regarding the situation in the Middle East. The British had, reportedly, come to a similar conclusion about the importance of security in the Middle East. Future American policy decisions with respect to the region were based on the conclusions set forth in this paper. U.S. concerns about the intentions of the Soviet Union in the region are clearly expressed. The paper also states that the United States should assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Iran.

11. This is a restricted cable dated December 9, 1947 from the U.S. Embassy in Karachi Pakistan forwarding a message to President Truman from Governor General Jinnah. This message, which was sent shortly after the decision of the United National General Assembly to support the UNSCOP report calling for partition of Palestine, expresses the shock and disappointment of the Arab world with respect to this decision. Notice the marginal note on page one stating that President Truman has seen the message.

12. This undated and unsigned memorandum from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Wadsworth) to President Truman describes the situation in Arab countries in general and in Iraq specifically. It is thought that the memo was written in early 1948. In the memo, Wadsworth clearly states that Iraq is inclined to work with the United States if it weren't for the U.S. policy with respect to Palestine. The Ambassador urges the President not to support partition with force and points out that the U.S. has strategic interests in maintaining Arab-American relations on a solid footing. Wadsworth goes so far as to suggest that the United States support a trusteeship arrangement rather than partition.

13. This Secret memorandum dated January 14, 1948 analizes in outline form the policy options available to the United States subsequent to the U.S. decision to support partition of Palestine. Primary concerns revolve around potential actions (and reactions) of the Arabs, the Jews, and the Russians.

14. This State Department memo summarizes U.S. Embassy reporting from Damascus on January 15, 1948 that Syria is the center of recruitment and training of "irregulars" intended for infiltration into Palestine. The Embassy has apparently suggested that the Department consider "cautioning" the Syrians regarding these activities.

15. On January 16, 1948, the Department received this telegram from Jerusalem reporting that the Arabs planned to establish a general national administration for the whole of Palestine on the day the British terminate their mandate. AHE in the first paragraph stands for the Arab Higher Executive, a group representing the Arabs who were concerned with the outcome of the situation in Palestine.

16. In late 1947/early 1948, George Kennan was asked to head up a new Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. One of the first tasks of this new office was to come up with a position paper on what U.S. policy should be with respect to Palestine. The Policy Planning Staff's paper points out that the United States, in supporting partition, had put itself in a position where it would be expected to use force to support implementation of the UN General Assembly's resolution. The paper recommends that the U.S. take no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition and that the U.S. oppose sending armed forces into Palestine for that purpose. Furthermore, the U.S. should recognize that, given the unwillingness of the parties involved to support partition, partition is not a realistic option. Therefore, once others have recognized that there is no reasonable prospect for success of partition, the U.S. should encourage a peaceful settlement between the Palestine Arabs and Palestine Jews or investigate the possibilities of any other suggested solution such as a federal state or trusteeship. This is a very good summary of the multiple issues related to the question of Palestine in early 1948.

17. In mid-February, the newly-created National Security Council provided the State Department with its own draft report on the Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine. The conclusions of this draft report are provided in Document 17. The NSC report's conclusions coincide with those of the State Department's report in most areas. You will note, however, that some elements of the National Security Council staff felt that the United States should continue to support the partition plan "by all measures short of the use of outside armed force." The NSC paper, however, more clearly proposes creation of a U.N. Trusteeship in Palestine if the UN General Assembly reconsiders the Palestine problem.

18. A few days later, February 21, 1948, the State Department sent a message to the President forwarding a draft position paper for use in the Security Council's discussions to be held February 24th. In paragraph 12 of the paper, the Department states that if partition proves unworkable and the Security Council is unable to develop an alternative solution by agreement between Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the matter should be referred back to a special session of the General Assembly. What's more, the Department expressed its position that some form of trusteeship will be necessary.

19. On February 26, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall was asked about Palestine at his press conference. The text of his statement was sent to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN) on February 27th for its information. Page 2 of this document is an earlier version of the same cable showing the penned-in changes.

20. This Secret report was drafted by the then recently-created Central Intelligence Agency on Possible Developments in Palestine on February 28, 1948. The primary conclusion of the report is that the partition plan as envisioned by the United Nations General Assembly can not be implemented and the issue will have to be reconsidered by the Security Council.

21A. On March 5, 1948 the State Department a telegram to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations containing the approved text of conclusions to be added to a statement (see 21B below) on the situation in Palestine for use after British withdrawal May 15, 1948. Telegram 107 (Document 21A) contains the text of the conclusions which were to be added to the body of the statement, which was sent by separate telegram (see below). As you will see on page 3 of Document 21A, the Department believed as early as March 5 that the Security Council would reject the idea of partition of Palestine. Given the lack of Security Council support for partition, the United States then called for the Secretary General of the UN to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of Palestine and to specifically consider the possibilities of a trusteeship arrangement. Notice that the telegram was drafted by Mr. McClintock in the United Nations Affairs office and cleared (okayed) with Mr. Henderson of the Near East and Africa office and with Undersecretary Lovett. Another office, presumably the Legal advisor's office, abstained on clearing. Note the phrase NIACT about a third of the way down on page one. This indicates the precedence of the telegram – that is, the urgency with which it was to be handled. NIACT stands for "Night Action" indicating that the telegram must be handled immediately upon receipt regardless of the time of day or night.

21B. An hour later on the same day, the Department sent telegram no. 108 to USUN containing the approved text of the proposed statement to be made by Ambassador Austin on the situation in Palestine after British withdrawal. The Department sent a separate cable on March 8 advising USUN that the President had approved the draft statement on the situation in Palestine after May 15, 1948 (Document 21B), with concluding remarks as set forth in the Department's telegram 107 of March 5th (Document 21A). Note the marginal note on page one indicating that the text contained in Telegram 108 was included in Ambassador Austin's March 19th speech before the UN Security Council with only minor changes). Both this cable and its companion piece above were classified Top Secret in order to keep the U.S. position secret until Ambassador Austin made his statement before the Security Council on March 19th.

22. On March 8, 1948 the President's Special Counsel Clark Clifford wrote a memo to the President outlining his views on the Palestine issue. Among other things, this memo provides interesting background information about how the Palestine question had been dealt with domestically up until that point. Clifford points out twice on page 4 that the adoption of the partition plan in the General Assembly was in large part due to pressures brought to bear by President Truman himself. Abandonment of the partition plan, he argued, would cause a serious loss of American prestige and moral leadership.

23. Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations before the Security Council on March 19, 1948. Paragraph four contains a reference to a temporary trusteeship. This speech was the source of much debate at the time with President Truman stating that he had not given the approval for a shift in policy from partition to trusteeship.

24. On March 22, a member of the Secretariat Staff drafted a memo to the Secretary forwarding a statement drafted by Undersecretary Lovett indicating that he believed that Truman had approved the policy change from partition to trusteeship. Lovett's statement was apparently prompted by a statement Clark Clifford made to Lovett to the

effect that the President had never approved the speech given by Ambassador Austin on March 19th (Document 23). Lovett's recollection coincides with Department telegram sent out on March 8 informing USUN that the text of the statement on the Situation in Palestine after the Withdrawal of the British had been approved by the President.

25. On March 30, 1948, USUN sent a telegram to the State Department suggesting that the Secretary (who was in Bogota attending the Conference of the Americas) approach the Argentine Foreign Minister (who was attending the same conference) and the Colombian Foreign Office to solicit Argentina's and Colombia's support for the US resolutions that had been submitted to the Security Council that day. This document and its companion pieces (Documents 26-28) demonstrate one way that the United States tries to promote its policies in an international body such as the United Nations.

26. On the same day, USUN sent a telegram to the State Department suggesting that immediate representations be made in London and Paris to swing British and French votes to affirmative on the US resolutions submitted to the Security Council.

27. On March 31, 1948, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota sent a telegram to the Department containing Secretary Marshall's response to the above-mentioned March 30 Cable from USUN, i.e., that Argentina and Colombia had agreed to support the U.S. position.

28. Following up on Document 26, the Department sent a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in London on March 31, 1948. In the telegram, the Department instructs the embassy to discuss the U.S. Security Council resolutions with the British Government, urging it to send instructions to the UK Delegation to the United Nations to support our position.

29. Meanwhile, in Palestine, the situation continued to evolve. On April 12, 1948 the General Zionist Council issued a declaration (provided) stating that a governing body of the Jewish state "shall come into being" upon the termination of the mandatory regime.

30. On April 15, 1948, USUN sent a telegram to the State Department reporting on a conversation Ambassador Austin had had with Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the Zionist movement. In the conversation, Weizmann indicated for the first time that the Jews might accept a trusteeship arrangement if certain requirements (namely immigration, land settlement, and economic development) were met.

31. Upon receiving the above telegram from USUN on April 15th, Mr. Rusk of the United Nations Affairs office drafted a memorandum to the Undersecretary suggesting that the telegram be forwarded to the President under cover of a brief memorandum (page 2). The telegram (Document 30) is repeated as pages 3 and 4 of this document in order to give a clear picture of the whole package as sent to the Undersecretary.

32. This telegram demonstrates the linkage between the situation in Palestine and U.S. willingness to provide assistance to help alleviate the serious political/economic situation in Iraq. In addition to Baghdad, the cable was sent to Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, Cairo, London, Paris, and New York for their information.

33. On April 22, 1948 a memo was sent to the Undersecretary suggesting that Secretary Marshall return to Washington from the Conference of the Americas in Bogota in order to devote a major portion of his time to Palestine. The memo also suggests that the National Security Council once again review the issue with a view toward clarifying the U.S. position vis-a-vis Palestine. The Secretary is also urged to consult with Congressional leaders and both political parties in order to remove Palestine from domestic politics.

34. On the same date, a member of the United Nations Affairs office sent a memorandum to the Undersecretary of State providing his own views on Palestine. In the memo, Mr. McClintock points out that there had been lukewarm reception to the idea of a trusteeship in the UN and that implementation of a trusteeship would probably require the use of American force. McClintock states openly that these are his own views and that they had not been cleared by anyone else in the Department, even by his boss, Dean Rusk.

35. On May 3, 1948 the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem sent a telegram to the Department reporting on the deteriorating security situation in Palestine.

36. On the same date, USUN sent a telegram to the Department summarizing the major points covered in conversations with Fawzi Bey of Egypt and Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Among other things, the discussions covered the efforts to establish a truce in Palestine and U.S. commitment to finding a solution that would be acceptable to the two communities of Palestine.

37. On May 4, 1948, Mr. John E. Horner, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, drafted a memorandum on the Future of Palestine. In his memo, Horner points out that many delegations were distrustful of the U.S., fearing that because of domestic political reasons the United States might commit an about-face, leaving them in an untenable position. More importantly, Horner proposes a third solution: annexation by the Kingdom of TransJordan of that part of Palestine which the UNGA November 29, 1947 resolution had intended to be a separate Arab state. This, he argues, is the only solution that would effectively keep the Soviet Union out of the region while at the same time being satisfactory to both the Jews and the Arabs.

38. By mid-May, the Department of State's Legal Advisor was considering legal issues surrounding recognition of a new state in Palestine. On May 13, 1948, the Legal Adviser wrote to the Undersecretary of State on Recognition of Successor States in Palestine. In his memo, the Legal Advisor points out that proclamation of a state and government by either community during the special session of the General Assembly would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 (d) of the Security Council truce resolution dated April 17, 1948. As a result, the Legal Advisor concludes that the United States "probably should not recognize the existence of any new state in Palestine during the special session, unless the Security Council should repeal its April 17 resolution."

39. On May 14, 1948 Eliahu Epstein (representative of the Jewish Agency) wrote to President Truman notifying him that the State of Israel would be proclaimed at midnight in Israel and stating that the new state would respect the borders as envisioned in the UNGA resolution of November 29, 1947. A similar letter was sent to Secretary of State Marshall; that letter is included as Document 39.

40. That same afternoon, the Department of State sent a telegram to several Arab posts advising them that Washington expected to recognize the new provisional government of Israel "within hours". This cable was sent NIACT, requiring immediate action upon receipt, regardless of whether it was day or night.

41. Original of the text of the May 14, 1948 press release issued by President Truman recognizing the provisional government as the de facto authority of the State of Israel. This facsimile shows the last minute changes made by President Truman himself. (As

reproduced on Page 179 of "Teaching with Documents, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.)

42. May 15, 1948 notice/advertisement in the New York Times announcing a mass demonstration in honor of the creation of the new state of Israel

43. May 15, 1948 New York Times article: The State of Israel

44. May 15, 1948 New York Times article: Recognizing the Realities in the New Palestine

45. Memorandum dated May 16, 1948 proposing a reply to Mr. Epstein's letter of May 14th. The memo discusses issues such as what date should be put on the reply, whether a title should be given to Mr. Epstein, and to what extent the Department should enter into detailed communication with a person whose representational position "has not yet been clarified."

46. Letter from Undersecretary Lovett to Eliahu Epstein responding to the latter's letter of May 14, 1948. (letter dated May 14 although handed over in person on May 17, 1948)

47. May 16, 1948 Washington Post article: State of Israel

48. On Monday, May 17, 1948, Undersecretary Lovett drafted a Memorandum of Conversation regarding conversations that took place regarding recognition of Israel on Friday, May 14, 1948. In his memo, Lovett recalls that he had urged the President to hold off on recognizing any new state in Palestine for a day or so until the U.S. Government could confirm the details of the proclamation. In addition, Lovett felt that it was important to notify key U.S. allies, in particular the British, French, and Belgian Governments in advance as well as to advise U.S. Embassies in the Middle East. And finally, Lovett argued that the President should at least wait until the UN General Assembly session was over, which was expected to end late in the evening on the 14th. This memo is important because it demonstrates once again the differences in opinion between the State Department and the White House on the question of recognition of Israel.

49. May 18 1948 Washington Post article: Washington Calling

50. On May 19, 1948 USUN wrote a telegram to the Department summarizing how U.S. recognition of Israel had been viewed by other delegations. In short, the U.S. Delegation to the UN felt that US recognition of Israel "deeply undermined the confidence of other delegations in (US) integrity." USUN points out that the United States had emphasized in the Security Council as well as in the informal truce negotiations that no action of a political character should be taken that "would alter the status quo or prejudice the rights, claims, or positions or either Arabs or Jews." U.S. recognition thus violated the terms of the Security Council truce resolution.

51. In June 1974 Dean Rusk responded to a request from the Historian's Office of the State Department to provide his recollection of the events in which he had participated relating to the recognition of Israel by the United States on May 14, 1948. Mr. Rusk's letter provides insight into the events of the day from the perspective of the State Department and in particular those people who had been involved with the issue at the United Nations.

Document 1
Facsimile of Memorandum from Loy Henderson to Under Secretary of State Acheson, February 10, 1947

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : U - Mr. Acheson

FROM : NEA - Mr. Henderson

SUBJECT: Palestine.

DATE: February 10, 1947

UNDERSECRETARY'S file DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F.W.867N.01/2-747

Attached hereto is the summary of Mr. Bevin's proposals of February 7, 1947 to the Jews and Arabs regarding Palestine.

These proposals in brief provide for:

1. A United Nations Trusteeship to be administered by Great Britain; the trusteeship to be for a period of five years, at the end of which Palestine is to become an independent country.

2. The primary purpose of the trusteeship is to be to prepare Palestine for independence.

3. During the period of the trusteeship:

(a) Palestine is to be divided up into a number of areas of local administration, in each of which there will be substantial Arab or Jewish minorities. The powers of these local administrations will be extensive. They will include jurisdiction over land transfers, but not over immigration into Palestine as a whole.

(b) The High Commissioner will continue to be the supreme legislative and executive authority. Assisting him will be an Advisory Council formed by him of representatives of the local administrations, and also of labor, cultural and other interests. This Council will replace the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish Community and the High Commissioner. In preparing Palestine for self-government, the High Commissioner will gradually fill his Executive Council with Palestinians.

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(c) Jewish

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Facsimile of Memorandum from Loy Henderson to Under Secretary of State Acheson, February 10, 1947

(c) Jewish immigration into Palestine will be at the rate of 4,000 monthly for two years and in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity thereafter. The High Commissioner shall decide the rate in consultation with his Advisory Council; in the event of a disagreement, the final decision would rest with an Arbitration Tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

4. At the end of four years of trusteeship, a constituent assembly would be elected. In case the majority of the Jewish members can not agree with the majority of the Arab members on the terms of a constitution, the Trusteeship Council will be called upon to advise with regard to the next move. In any event, the British Government is not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine because of the inability of Arabs and Jews to agree upon a means of sharing the Government between them.

It is interesting to note that the British Government is endeavoring gradually to reduce Palestine from a world to a local issue. Its proposals would mean that the Jews of Palestine through the Advisory Council, rather than the Jews of the world--particularly of the United States--through the Jewish Agency as at present would speak for the Jews. Furthermore, the Arabs of Palestine, rather than the representatives of Arab States, would speak for the Arabs.

The proposals, furthermore, seem to point more directly towards a binational state than did the Morrison-Grady plan. At the end of the five years, however, in case of failure of agreement between Arabs and Jews, partition, cantonization, binationalism, or any other form of state or states could apparently be recommended by the Trusteeship Council.

No reference is made in the summary to the holy places or to the rights of Palestinians who are neither Arab nor Jew. It is probable that the full proposals will have appropriate provisions of this character.

American Zionists will bitterly oppose the plan because:

1. It does not provide for an independent Jewish state.

2. It provides for local administrations which will be predominantly Arab in areas in which Arabs are at present in the majority.

3. It fails to give Jews the right to determine their own rates of immigration.

4. The

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4. The rate of immigration is too low and for too short a period. American Zionists will certainly insist upon the admission of several hundred thousand Jews during any period of trusteeship.

5. It apparently does not give financial autonomy to the Jewish districts. They will lose a measure of control over the situation since the Agency in which they wield great influence will no longer act as a spokesman for the Jews. They will, nevertheless, be able through their financial power to bring much pressure on the Jews of Palestine.

The Arabs will also object because:

1. Provisions are made for further Jewish immigration. They are sure to be suspicious that the High Commissioner and the Arbitration Tribunal will admit large numbers of Jews during the last three years of the trusteeship.

2. There is no provision for the establishment of a Palestinian State based on majority rule.

In general, the plan should not be so objectionable to the Arabs as to the American Jews.

From the point of view of the American Government, one of the main defects is the slow rate of Jewish immigration. It would be preferable for the 100,000 to go to Palestine during the course of a year, beginning at once, rather than over a two-year period. The proposals are so worded that it is possible under them for immigration to begin at once if there is not too much opposition to them.

If we give our support to the proposals, even if amended so as to speed up the admission of the 100,000, American Zionists will probably charge that we have betrayed them. Nevertheless, the proposals seem to be somewhat nearer to the original Anglo-American plan than were the Morrison-Grady proposals. The British, furthermore, in preparing them were clearly endeavoring to live up to the letter of the mandate and to preserve strict impartiality as between Jews and Arabs.

We feel that it would be unwise for us to comment on the merits of the plan until the storm which its announcement will raise has subsided.

LWH

Loy W. Henderson

NEA:LWH:mw

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Document 2

New York Times Article on Palestine, September 1, 1947

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THE PALESTINE REPORT

The United Nations Committee on Palestine has produced a 7-to-4 report, made public yesterday in summary, which at least points a way toward a solution of the Holy Land's tragic and heart-breaking problems. The plan includes partition, with an economic union between the Arab and Jewish States; it would place Jerusalem under a United Nations trusteeship; it would admit 150,000 Jewish immigrants within the next two years; it would leave Britain as a trustee Power until the new governments are set up, but under United Nations supervision and perhaps with one or more other members of the United Nations as collaborators; it would call for democratic rights and processes, for the protection of minorities, for the safeguarding of the holy places of three great religions, and for the preservation of existing languages and cultures.

Some of us have long had doubts as to the wisdom of erecting a political state on a basis of religious faith. The question, however, is now in the hands of the United Nations. Since we believe the prestige of that great enterprise to be of primary importance at this stage of the world's history we would stand ready to accept any favorable U. N. decision and to work and hope most earnestly for the success of the proposed new commonwealths. The remainder of the general principles laid down will appeal to all those who believe in democracy and brotherhood.

There will be especial interest in the proposed relaxation of the immigration restrictions. If these are lifted there should be no more pitiful shiploads of refugees, rarified hopelessly from port to port, 'no more' desolate exiles on Cyprus. And there should be an end to bloodshed in Palestine, to lawless killings, to cruel reprisals, to martial law, to the stirring up of hate between those whose common interest it is to work in peace in the same promised land.

Unhappily, two great questions must remain in doubt. No one can make up his mind in an hour or two as to the practicability and justice of the proposed partition lines. As in all such partitions, there will be minorities on each side of the line, and in all such cases it is difficult to secure absolute fair play for such minorities. If economic cooperation between the two proposed states could be complete the boundaries might come to mean little. But in Palestine's present mood they mean a great deal.

The second question is the acceptance of any such plan. India, Iran and Yugoslavia voted against partition, preferring a federal plan of their own. Arab opposition has already been expressed. The Zionists, who manifestly have more to gain, may be expected to be more amenable. But we are entering upon a great discussion, not completing one.

A great step forward has been made in lifting the problem of Palestine into the world-wide arena. The Assembly committee came as near representing world opinion, minus the special pressures of the great Powers, as any such group could. The Assembly, in which the report will be debated, cannot compel acceptance, but it can bring world opinion to bear in favor of a just, peaceable and early settlement.

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Document 3

Washington Post Article on Palestine, September 3, 1947

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Verdict On Palestine

The report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine can be better evaluated in terms of expediency than of justice. For the primary question to be asked of the solution it recommends is not whether it is fair to all the conflicting interests concerned—that seems to be quite impossible—but whether it is workable. The question, in other words, is whether the report affords a genuine solution; whether it will bring an end to the problem. From the point of view of the rest of the world, a solution of this problem is imperative. Already it has embroiled so many groups and nations beyond those immediately involved in it as to constitute a real peril to peace. The existing state of affairs simply cannot be permitted to continue. What is necessary now is to accept the verdict and make it effective.

The Arabs, who have already protested against the U. N. report, have a legitimate case against it. So have the Jews, who have thus far lodged no formal protest but have certainly been awarded less than they deemed their due. The decision cannot be considered wholly fair to either side. Jews and Arabs alike can bring to the support of their respective contentions all sorts of data and documents; even Britain, the responsible ruling power, which has played the Jews and Arabs against one another, can make a case for itself, we suppose, out of the pressures and exigencies of world affairs. The U. N. committee no doubt listened patiently to all these cases, striving vainly to decide between them. But in sober truth they were beside the point. The point was that an intolerable situation had to be ended with as much fairness as possible and by the most expedient means.

This, it appears, is what the committee tried to do. Only time, of course, can test whether its solution will work well. But it seems to us to have the best chance of working of any proposal yet broached. Partition, to be sure, is no ideal solution in an area so small as Palestine. Yet it seems the only practicable solution in view of the bitterness that has been generated among its inhabitants. Its ill effects may be tempered by the economic integration recommended in the report. With good will and acceptance of the plan in good faith, Jews and Arabs in Palestine may well be able to develop the good neighborly relations which alone can bring peace and the blessings of prosperity to the long-troubled Holy Land.

No doubt there will be efforts, and especially by feudal leaders of the Arabs, to engender strife and to make the plan unworkable. It is indispensable to the success of the plan, if it is adopted by the United Nations, that such efforts be checked promptly and thoroughly; there is no room here for vacillation. The United States, we think, should share the responsibility and the burden of enforcing whatever solution the United Nations may decree. With this kind of firmness, the problem may be solved. And in this lies the best hope of Jews and Arabs and the world at large. Peace in Palestine is now the indispensable foundation for justice.

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Document 4
Washington Post Article, September 7, 1947
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EDITORIALS
Books

SECTION II

ASHINGTON: SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1947

Palestine Partition Puts U. S. on Spot

By Mary Spargo
Post Reporter

THE United Nations faces a crucial test the fall in considering the recommendations of its Special Committee on Palestine.

The U. N. must find not only a workable solution of the Palestine problem, but also the means to implement any decision it makes.

If the United Nations falters or fails, its task, the whole future usefulness of the international agency may be seriously compromised.

This was recognized from the outset by Secretary General Trygve Lie, who warned the special committee last May that the confidence of the world in the United Nations hinged upon the result of its work on Palestine.

It is therefore of the gravest importance that the Palestine proposals be examined and evaluated in every conceivable light, from every possible point of view.

The Ineffable 'If'

WILL the suggested partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state and an internationally controlled city of Jerusalem bring an end to the bitter Arab-Jewish-British warfare which has torn the Holy Land asunder and jeopardized the peace of the world for nearly 30 years?

Can the United Nations bring even a reasonable degree of peace to the torment little land over which the furious tides of battle have been surging intermittently since 2000 years before the birth of Christ?

Will the creation of a homeland approximately only half the size of the State of Vermont, for those ancient wanderers of the earth—the Jews—begin to erect a problem which at last has touched the conscience of the world?

Will the more backward Arab get over a fear where to continue tilling the soil his forebears for centuries have tilled before him?

Will it be possible for these two peoples, with nearly 30 years of hate between them, to cooperate in the economic union of Palestine as the special committee suggests?

And when it comes to the question of compulsion, just how far are the individual members of the United Nations going to be willing to go to enforce peace in that Holy Land whence came to mankind the Prince of Peace?

Down to Brass Hats

COME what may, it's obvious the British, who have been cuffed, kicked at and shot at by both sides, are no longer going to try to run this show alone.

Bluntly then, suppose the United States, which has a share of historic responsibility for the creation of this situation in the first place, is asked to furnish troops to maintain order in Palestine.

Will the United States furnish its share of troops, if troops be necessary?

An even more immediate question is how will the United States stand on the U. N. proposals when the chips are down?

The Arabs feel that the highly articulate voice of world Jewry, some 16 million or so persons scattered over the earth, has always given the cause of the Jewish state in Palestine an unfair advantage.

But on the other hand will be the weight in the power of that rich Moslem world, the Arab oil which has always spoken in terms of quiet authority for the Arab.

American oil interests have a vast economic stake in that black gold of Arabia.

When this matter comes before the

THE PROPOSED PARTITION of Palestine, with Jerusalem an autonomous city. The Arab and Jewish states would be in three parts, connecting at two points.

United States Congress. Or any action this country might decide to take, there will be those two main pressures: the country's historic Jews and the votes they cast, and the oil interests and the political power their wealth provides.

Since 63 A. D.

WILL the proposed partition into Palestine of 750,000 Jews in the next two years help relieve a tense situation in many parts of the world and particularly at least erase the heartbreaking pictures of thousands of homeless Jews turned back at the edge of "the national home."

Will the determined hordes of Jewish terrorists, who say the U. N. proposals are not good enough, try to continue to wage their warfare of blackmail, theft and murder?

Will the Jewish Agency, the Haganá, the underground with which it works, and the Zionist movement be sufficient to control the extremists of their own race, or will they need help?

These are only a few of the questions to which the new U. N. special committee proposals give rise.

Before one can even speculate on the answers, it is always necessary to consider how Palestine got into this tragic mess in the first place.

It must be remembered that never since 63 B. C., when Pompey stormed Jerusalem has Palestine been an independent state.

It was in the seventh century A. D. that Palestine was conquered by the Arabs.

Then in 1517 it was conquered, with Syria and Egypt, by the Ottoman Turks. It remained in the hands of the Turks to all intents and purposes until World War I broke out.

In 1914, in what its present stormy history started, England, its back to the wall, seeking support wherever it could against the German hordes, began to suggest deals, make promises.

In October, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British government, promised the Sherif of Mecca that in return for Arabian aid England would recognize Arabian independence. In typical diplomatic double talk the exact territorial rights in Palestine were somewhat glossed over, but certainly the Arabs thought Palestine would become an independent Arab state.

Backed by Wilson

BUT in 1917 England found itself still in need of more support. The influence and help of Jews all over the world was sought.

This effort culminated in the Balfour Declaration promising the Jews "a national home" in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration was approved by President Woodrow Wilson and subsequently was incorporated in the mandate given England by the League of Nations over Palestine.

Lloyd George, the fiery little Welshman who was Britain's wartime Prime Minister, subsequently frankly admitted that the Balfour Declaration was "due to propagandist reasons."

That statement was made to the Royal Commission headed by the Earl of Peel, which was appointed in 1936 to investigate Arab disturbances in the Holy Land, and reported in 1937 in favor of partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an independent Jerusalem under neutral control.

This brilliant report, by far the greatest issued by any of some 19 different commissions which have investigated Palestine, was truly prophetic.

Investigating the Arab "disturbances" of 1936, Peel found that they, like those of 1929, 1920 and 1933, were caused by the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. When Jewish immigration increased, because of the rising Nazi threat in Germany, the Arabs increased their terroristic tactics.

Tel Aviv Forecast

POINTING out that the Jews were the law-abiding element in Palestine, upholding the British administration, Peel warned that this might not always be true.

If the British, Peel said, were to appease the Arabs by cutting down on Jewish immigration, and the Je

See PALESTINE, Page 6, Column 1

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Document 4 (p2)
Washington Post Article, Palestine Partition puts U.S. on Spot, September 7, 1947

...ion ... [illegible] paused and leaned forward. "Listen, man, we didn't have anything like that in those days. The ships were full of bedbugs and the food stank. Safety measures? There were none. And on top of that, long hours and low pay."

At an early age Lundeberg was introduced to the two divergent concepts of unionism—political action, through his mother, who was the head of the Norwegian Labor Party, and nonpolitical, action-by-strike trade unionism, through his syndicalist father. Before long he made up his mind to follow the latter course, and after membership in Norwegian and British maritime unions, as well as a Spanish syndicalist union, and finally an Australian union, he transferred to the American Sailors Union of the Pacific.

"The going was rough after 1921 for about 12 years. The strike of '21 was broken and a flood of labor combined with fewer ships cut jobs 50 per cent. During the depression, conditions got worse." He smiled and put his hands on his knees. "But you know something? When a man gets kicked down so far, there comes a time when he can't be kicked any more. We struck in 1934 and held up the ships 97 days." He touched. "And I got blacklisted on every ship."

It was following this strike that Lundeberg was elected business agent in the port of Seattle, and in 1936 he became secretary and treasurer of the SUP, his present position.

Counts on Owners

THAT afternoon found Harry and two other deckhands back aft, each with a heavy needle and thread and a sailmaker's palm, finishing a rope ladder. Several students had gathered in the compartment, asking questions.

"Mr. Lundeberg, how will the Taft-Hartley bill affect your union?"

The sailor waved a massive hand. "Not so much. We get a clean union. Our books are audited four times a year."

"But how about the closed shop?"

"Well, we had to fight to get our hiring halls which supply union men in rotation for the ships, but now they are working so well that I think the ship owners will want to keep them. They're efficient, and the owners always know our hall's got them sailors who can tell the fat tail from the fo'c'sle."

"Suppose the ship owners begin hiring men off the street anyway?"

Lundeberg smiled, and spoke slowly. "Well, I don't believe a reasonable man would have a very happy time on one of our ships."

The questioner persisted. "But what if the courts really enforce the new bill?"

The tall Norwegian paused, needle in hand, and pointed to his nose. "Say, listen, do you see this nose? Busted. Nine times, too. I've been in fights I can't even remember. It's held up pretty well though, considering. Well, our union has fought ten, and we will fight again, in the streets, if necessary."

He nodded at the other seamen.

"That's right, Harry," was their unanimous approval.

Town Meeting Plan

A TANGIER Princeton student in shorts raised his hand. "Mr. Lundeberg, few of us have ever met a labor leader before and we are curious about your opinion concerning certain popular ideas. For instance, some people think that labor leaders have too gentlemanly. We go to get rough."

"You don't mean we should fight? What should the United Sta... [illegible] He leaned and grinned. "You know, I better quit wasting your time and get to work. I don't want to lose my job."

PALESTINE—*From Page 1*

Battle Is Britain's, But U. S. Has a Stake

began to worry about the realization of their dream of a national state, and fear Arab supremacy, the situation might be reversed and the Jews might turn on the British.

Because the British had made certain promises to each side, they were bound to be in wrong with one or the other.

The years 1945 and 1947 were to prove how right Peel had been 10 years before.

The very disturbances he predicted were to cause the British to turn the Palestine question over to the United Nations last April.

The Peel Commission, in short, foresaw the very pattern of 1946 and 1947, which caused the British to turn the matter over to the United Nations last April.

Some of the headlines of only a few months ago, "5 Dead, 36 Hurt in Holy Land Terrorism," "Guns Blaze in the Streets of Jerusalem," "10 Dead, 3 Hurt in Holy Land Violence Wave," might have been those of 1938 except that this time it was the other side which had turned its guns on the British.

But the Peel report was not acted upon, another commission was sent out two years later, and the British continued to try to "muddle through" for another 10 or 11 years.

To quote from Lord Peel, the controversy between Arab and Jew is "fundamentally a conflict of right with right," and as he put it, "No other 'Problem of the Time' is rooted so deeply in the past."

Arabs on Outside

THE partition plan, as proposed by the U. N., certainly gives neither Arab nor Jew as much as either had hoped: one from the McMahon note; the other from the Balfour Declaration. But given facts as they are, it is better than the present state of seesawing violence, with the Arabs bursting out one year and the Jews another, depending upon how many Jewish immigrations are allowed, and so forth.

The Jewish Agency, the powerful Zionist Action Committee and other Jewish groups have approved the majority report of the United Nations Special Committee.

The Arabs, who outnumber the Jews in Palestine, are fighting it. Some of their more extreme leaders declare it "a Jewish war."

It seems safely enough to have to consider what the Arabs do have a beneficial justification for their position. Let us do the Jews.

One of the most significant things about the whole U. N. report is that 10 of the 11 nations represented on the committee agreed that a Jewish state should be established in Palestine, and that the oppressed Jews of the world should be allowed to take sanctuary there in liberal numbers. Two of the nations also agreed the British mandate should terminate, but that was all but implicit in the situation from the start, anyway.

Australia was the only one of the 11 nations which refrained from voting.

A Cross Section

THE 10 which agreed on the fundamental principle of a Jewish state were Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay (which signed the majority report), and India, Iran and Yugoslavia (the minority).

Surely this can be considered a fair world judgment of the situation, with pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet nations, widely different types of democracies, and former colonial areas which have won their own independence, included in the list.

The majority and minority differed on methods which would best preserve peace between Arab and Jew, but not on the question of the Jewish state.

Government sources in Jerusalem estimate that until the 150,000 additional Jews are taken into Palestine, there will be more Arabs than Jews in the proposed Jewish state.

Jerusalem estimates were that there are 310,000 Arabs and 900,000 Jews in the Jewish state, 712,000 Arabs and 330 Jews in the Arab state, and apportioning; 100,000 each of Arabs and Jews in the Jerusalem international zone.

The U. N. committee estimated there would be 500,000 Jews and 419,000 Arabs in the Jewish state and 715,000 Arabs and 8000 Jews in the Arab state.

The committee proposes lifting present restriction upon purchase of land in the Jewish state. Undoubtedly Arabs within the Jewish state may be tempted by the high prices for their land to sell and move into the Arab state.

New Land Needed

JUST how the predominantly agrarian Arab is going to make a living with his land area cut down is another problem. It will necessarily mean development of irrigation, underdeveloped areas, probably in Trans-Jordan.

The Jews have lots of a problem, because they are primarily industrial and as the Arabs are always pointing out, they have vast financing from the outside.

In order to gain independence both sides will have to agree to a constitution which will protect the rights of minorities.

The two states will also be required to enter into a treaty for an economic union of Palestine. This will mean a customs union, common currency, operations in the common interest of railways, interstate highways and postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and joint use of the ports of Haifa and Jaffa.

Australia Reports Bigger Wool Sales

SYDNEY, Sept. 6 (AP)—The National Council of Wool Selling Brokers has reported Prompt and forward wool sold in Australia in the 1946-47 season ended June 30 now valued at $709,189,000. This was an increase of $188,420,000 over the previous season.

Total sales were 2,542,420 bales against 2,296,949 in 1945/46. Average price per pound for greasy was approximately 32½ cents and for scoured 53½ cents.

...interesting analysis of the world game of politics."

After lunch, most of the Germans talk of a united Europe.

"The only thing to do is to set up a United States of Europe," asserts 17-year-old Manfred Knauf, mimeograph operator. "Every nation does what it wants. What we need is a government over all of us."

Cabinet Wolfgang Hirsch, 30-year-old former German army major, says despairingly:

"The unity of Europe is a very good idea but it will never be realized. Nations are too greedy to unite. Even when atomic bombs finally leave only a few people on earth, like the great flood did in the time of Noah, those few will begin quarreling all over again."

Manfred Matthes, 24, a Berlin city councilman, observes that "all political remedy" follow phrases unless one is given enough energy through food to reconstruct the Continent."

Gerhard Franke, 21-year-old student, sums up briefly:

"We are hungry, regardless of our political background, and that should be enough for unity."

Giovanni Crupi, 23-year-old law student of Rome, is pessimistic and believes another war inevitable.

"I'm not a warmonger," he says. "It's just time to build a peaceful Europe, the democratic ideal has to triumph over communism, and a third world war will be the only way to do it. After that, there should be an elected government to rule all of Europe."

Benedetto Anzalone, 17-year-old Roman student, visualizes a United States of Europe with the government composed exclusively of men of "scientific and spiritual culture." But first of all, he says, "the great powers should abandon their imperialistic doctrines."

Chiquita Torrieri, 25-year-old housewife of Rome, says:

"Politicians work only for their own interests. They never think of the people. Political parties want wars. People never want them."

Persistent Nationalism

A 24-YEAR OLD London scoutmaster, who withheld his name, has this to say:

"Too many politicians are thinking in terms of their own interests instead of what is really good for them. There seems to be too much suspicion and too much stress on nationalism.

"It seems we've lost the sense of urgency we had in the war. I think the urgency is just as great now. To get anywhere every country must give up some part of its autonomy. If we can't have a world government, let's start with something smaller, such as a European controlling authority—a sort of little U. N."

Ernest Coates, 28-year-old draftsman, of London's Hillsdale East End, declares "the present mistrust between nations" and suggests that all countries exchange a system of interchange of visitors "to help remove mistrust and suspicion." He also suggests a referendum in education to promote understanding of "the ways of living in other countries."

"I take a very poor view of Russia's attitude," Coates adds, "but feel that a certain amount of sympathy is due. If Russia continues her policy of isolation, then we should go ahead without her."

Marion Young, 23-year-old girl guide, suggests that "we show more friendship and less suspicion of Russia."

"And I think," Marion says, "there is a lack of religion on the Continent. I don't mean any one religion—each can have his own—...

...ment the causes of communism."

Polish youth are looking to the United States to finance European reconstruction, and believe that while Germany should be rebuilt the countries that suffered at the hands of Germany should be properly reimbursed.

There would be no trouble about reconstruction, Europe's people would all stop talking about war and start talking and working for peace, says Andrzej Wyrzykowski, 23-year-old secretary. "There should be collaboration and cooperation in rebuilding ruins and other war devastated countries."

"It is a pity that Europeans are traditional nationalists," said 23-year-old Karel Vasina, a student at Prague University. "We Czechs, like all other nationalities, cling to our nationalism, and that of course slows down matters tremendously.

"Each country has its own reconstruction problems," he added, "and the solution is an all-European system of exchange of goods."

His compatriot, 27-year-old Otto Langer, said European rehabilitation should be solved by socialization and planned economy—"big enterprises should be nationalized all over Europe."

Albert Bull, 24-year-old British miner, also believes in planned economy, "but no bloc without Russia can be successful."

Sebastiano Cappelani, 24-year-old law student of Italy, said the Marshall Plan "would have a chance if Russia joined it," but with a division of Europe "there isn't much hope."

SUTTGART—*From P...*

One Year of 'B... Yields Only Ne...

Most particularly of all, the policy of going ahead without Russia is being applied in the Far East. Since two years' negotiations with Russia over Korea have led to no result whatever, the United States has now proposed a four-power conference to set up an independent Korea. If Russia refuses, as everyone expects she will, the United States is ready to go ahead without Russia to setting up a new regime in southern Korea, the part which is under American control.

Finally, the peace treaty with Japan probably will be drafted without Russia. The United States proposed that the 11 major Pacific powers hold a conference on the Japanese treaty, under a voting system that would not be at the mercy of a Soviet or other great power veto. The Russians refused; now the United States is ready to make a start without Russia, probably in November.

It goes without saying that this process of pushing forward, or disregarding Russia, has deepened the Kremlin's instinctive suspicions of American intentions. The gap between East and West is widened; and Radio Moscow unjokes with charges that we are violating the Potsdam agreement, when it was the Soviet refusal to carry out Potsdam which made Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart necessary.

THE real test of the new policy, however, is whether it will work. If western Germany were already reviving, if Baltic coal were already flowing in greater quantities to Germany's western neighbors, if western Europe were pulling itself together instead of floundering in a worse crisis than ever, Moscow would be singing a different tune today.

So far the United States has pathetically little to show in the

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Document 5
Excerpts from Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, September 15, 1947

Position on Palestine

The Secretary explained that Ambassador Johnson could not be present because of the meeting of the Security Council. Before proceeding with the Agenda, he brought to the Delegation's attention a matter arising from the discussion held by Mr. Henderson and the General Hilldring with the Zionists. He reminded the Delegation that General Hilldring had been designated by the President as an alternate representative, replacing Dean Gildersleeve.

Secretary Marshall said he was being pressed for a decision before he spoke to the General Assembly on Wednesday on the subject of Palestine. The United States, he recalled, had been largely involved in the procedure which had been following regarding the sending of a United Nations committee to Palestine. This committee had now returned a majority and a minority report. While Australia had abstained, he now understood the Australian representative on the committee would now be pushed aside and Dr. Evatt would step in and press vigorously for the majority report.

Adoption of the majority report, the Secretary said, would mean very violent Arab reaction. To be consistent with the integrity of its position, the United States should avoid actively arousing the Arabs and precipitating their *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union in the first week or ten days of the General Assembly. This would happen, he said, if the Delegation took a clear stand on Wednesday. On the other hand, if the Delegation did not take a clear stand, the Secretary said, he and the State Department would undoubtedly be severely attacked for "pussyfooting." If the Delegation took a stand in accord with the evident popular desire, for support of the majority report, it thereby would create difficulties for itself in subsequent General Assembly maneuvering.

The Secretary added that Mr. Henderson was especially concerned by the long-term factor. If the Delegation committed itself definitely – and a two-thirds General Assembly majority without such a United States commitment – then the United States would be obliged to take part in implementing action agreed upon by the General Assembly.

Arab reaction, the Secretary repeated, would be hostile to such implementation action. About twenty-percent of Zionist opinion would also be hostile. No commission could undertake the job. Great Britain had made it clear that it would not carry through alone; it was therefore quite obvious that the United States would have to take part.

Mrs. Roosevelt[1] at this point asked whether it was really evident, as indicated in previous discussion, that the USSR would be opposed to the majority report. Secretary Marshall replied that this was the assumption, since the case offered such a fine opportunity for the soviets to carry out their ends regarding the Arabs, for the sake of expediency. Mrs. Roosevelt said that the Arabs were clearly more afraid of the USSR than of us. Mr. Henderson said he was convinced that just as we, during the war, lined up with the USSR although having nothing in common, so the Arabs for convenience would work with the USSR against the No.1 common enemy, ourselves.

General Hilldring said that the Russians had already made their position clear. Their first choice was a federal state. He believed they would espouse a federal state to the very end, as an advocate of Arab desires.

The Secretary then introduced the statement which had been framed by Mr. Lovett and Mr. Henderson for delivery by him on Wednesday. This expressed hope that the General Assembly would find a definite solution for the problem of Palestine; that if this problem were to be solved it must be approached with resolution and restraint; that in considering the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine it was worthy of note that although the committee had been unable to reach an [unanimous!] agreement on eleven points; and concluded with the hope that general agreement would be reached during this session, after the General Assembly has had an opportunity to study in full the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine report.

General Hilldring then said that it would certainly be a disappointment to the American Jews and Jews everywhere, who hoped the United States would take a favorable position on Palestine at the beginning of the General Assembly in favor of the majority report. But, he felt, this was not serious enough consideration to warrant

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[1] Anna Eleanor Roosevelt (Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt), Representative of the United States at the Second Session of the General Assembly.

Excerpts from Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, September 15, 1947

a definite statement by the United States on Wednesday in favor of the majority report. The Delegation should talk to representatives of the Jews, explain that it was impossible for the United States to take a definite position, and ask them to contain themselves a little longer. This was not the time for such a definite position.

Mrs. Roosevelt asked what was to be supported by a definite position. General Hilldring replied that he meant a definite position at least in support of partition. The real nub of the matter, he said, was disagreement in the United States Government as to whether to accept the principle of partition. He though the United States should go further and accept the majority report, while remaining willing to amend it as a result of debate in the Assembly.

Mrs. Roosevelt then asked whether another question was not involved in this matter, something which had nothing to do with the Jewish situation. She felt this was the question of the importance of supporting a report brought in by the United Nations committee, for the value of such support in promoting the success of the United Nations. She posed the question whether this was not quite a serious consideration for the Delegation, as important or more important, a consideration than whether such a stand would please American Jews. Such a position in support of the United Nations report would strengthen the United Nations in the minds of the American people.

The Secretary said he had been surprised at the quality of the report and at the extent of agreement on this extraordinarily difficult matter. The report had proved much better than he had anticipated. He added that one consideration which must be borne in mind by the Delegation was that when the United States supported this report, it must follow through. It could not be regarded merely as an immediate political settlement, bringing relief to all parties in the United States. Recalling his mention of the ability of the Soviet Union to take advantage of Arab hostility to the partition, he said this was merely part of the problem. We will have to be ready to put troops into Palestine, the Secretary said.

Mr. Henderson agreed that there was no doubt that the majority report, if accepted, would have to be implemented by force. The British Government, he felt, would either say it would not have anything to do with implementing the report or that it would do its share. He doubted very much that the British Government would even be willing to do its share. Mr. Bevin, Mr. Henderson said, had been evasive during a talk with Mr. Henderson, but had made it clear that Britain could not be prepared to raise hostility toward itself in the Arab world. The question therefore arose of whom the Unites States was to send to aid in implementing. Two fronts would arise: Jewish terrorists would continue to fight and assassinate, and Arab terrorists would do likewise. He did not know how far this would go, Mr. Henderson said.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine report, while intended to be impartial, was not based on any principle, he said. It was full of sophistry. Mr. Henderson said that he thought it proper for the United States to use force and to incur enmity when a principle was involved, but he failed to find any principle here, only expediency. Those who signed the majority report would not be concerned in carrying it out; it was therefore easy for them. Those who carried it out would have to be the great powers. He did not think Great Britain, France, or the USSR would be willing to help carry it out.

Assuming the United States was going to favor the majority report, Ambassador Austin said, then it was necessary to judge the timing of the statement of the United States position. The question was whether to take up a position now or to wait until the row got hot, resentment higher, and until the favor we would have to exert for the side we favored would have to be stronger. In line with the United States principle of backing the United Nations by defending political independence and integrity, Ambassador Austin did not see how it was possible to carve out of an area already too small for a state a smaller state. He though it was certain that such a state would have to defend itself with bayonets forever, until extinguished in blood. The Arabs, he said, would never be willing to have such a small state in their heart.

Ambassador Austin said he stood with the Secretary on the matter. On the assumption that the delegation was going to support the majority report, it would be necessary to take the urgent next step, and to support it with all the required help, including troops. However, he feared his judgment might have been effected by his special study of the matter in 1936, accordingly, he made the following statement with reservations. His notion was that it would be a much sounder policy for the Delegation to take its position then, and to announce it Wednesday, not in a threatening manner but in dignified accents. Such action would buoy up the United Nations, he felt. The Delegation had taken a position in the Secretary's speech the previous day, a very strong position, and the Delegation would be slipping if it did not march consistently in accord with that speech. He therefore repeated that he felt Wednesday's

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statement should be as clear as possible; the United States then would stand before the world as courageous and wise, and by creating a determined effect early would prevent the situation from flaring up -- since the Arabs would not get the idea that they would convince the Delegation.

Mr. Dulles said that he did not feel confident enough about his view to want to volunteer them at the moment, although he would speak if necessary, with great reservations.

The Secretary said that in that case the meeting would proceed, and that a copy of the proposed statement from Washington would be given each of them for consideration before the afternoon meeting. Mr. Dulles said he would like this procedure, and also he wanted to ask some questions of General Hilldring and. Mr. Henderson.

Thomas F. Power, Jr.

Document 6
Excerpts from the Secretary's Statement Before the General Assembly, September 17, 1947

Statement by the Secretary of State

[Extract]

The General Assembly is also faced with the problem of Palestine. The Government of the United States intends to do everything within its power at this session of the General Assembly to assist in finding a solution for this difficult problem which has stirred up such violent passions, and which is now resulting in the shedding of blood and in great mental and moral anguish. The solution will require of each of us courage and resolution. It will also require restraint.

The Special Committee on Palestine is to be highly commended for its contribution to the solution of this problem. Although the members of this Committee were not able to agree unanimously upon a number of important issues, including that of partition, they have been able to find the basis for agreement on eleven recommendations to this Assembly. Their achievement in reaching unanimity on so many points represents definite progress.

We realize that whatever the solution recommended by the General Assembly, it cannot be ideally satisfactory to either of the two great peoples primarily concerned. While the final decision of this Assembly must properly await the detailed consideration of the report, the Government of the United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the Special Committee, but also to those which have been approved by the majority of that Committee.

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Document 7
Facsimile of Memorandum from Loy Henderson to Under Secretary Lovett, September 18, 1947

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NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : U - Mr. Lovett

DATE: September 18, 1947

FROM : NEA - Mr. Henderson

SUBJECT: Reaction of Arab Delegations at UN to Secretary Marshall's Remarks on Palestine in GA on September 17.

Ambassador Wadsworth, who recently arrived from Baghdad in the United States, is now in New York as one of the political advisers to the American Representative at the UN. Following the Secretary's address before the General Assembly of the UN on September 17 Ambassador Wadsworth ascertained the reaction of the various Arab delegations to be substantially as follows:

The delegates from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were unanimous in interpreting the Secretary's words as an all-out declaration of American support of the Majority Plan in the UNSCOP report, and consider it as being a forthright commitment that the United States would make every effort and wield its influence in favor of a Zionist solution for the Palestine problem.

Members of the Syrian and Lebanese Delegations consider Secretary Marshall's statement that the United States gives "great weight" to the Majority Plan in the UNSCOP report as meaning full U.S. support for that plan. These members also observed that the U.S. Government, with the exception of the White House, had been neutral until today but that even the State Department was now following a pro-Zionist policy. It was added that even though the Secretary did not commit the U.S. to final support of the Majority Plan, he could not later go back on his remarks favoring the Majority report.

Ambassador Wadsworth added that Prince Faisal, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had two principal points: (1) No useful purpose would be served in discussing the terms of procedure in the UN with Ambassador Wadsworth, as Secretary Marshall had already made the American commitment; (2) There was no aspect on the Palestine question on which further Arab-American cooperation was possible. Prince Faisal observed that the decision indicated by the Secretary's remarks on Palestine

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Palestine was the most dangerous step which the United States had ever taken on the Near Eastern political scene, that it was dangerous not only for the United States and for the Arab States, but for world peace, and that "it just can't be made out as you wish".

Faris el-Khouri, of the Syrian Delegation, was in hearty agreement with the Secretary's address, with the exception of the passage on Palestine. Faris el-Khouri was adamantly opposed to our Palestine policy, and said that the issue would hamper Arab-American cooperation on other problems.

Ambassador Wadsworth reports that Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister, and Malik, Lebanese Minister in the U.S., were more pessimistic than Faris el-Khouri. Malik said, "We are younger -- to us Palestine is the issue." Jamali said that the U.S. has embarked on a policy leading to tragedy, that U.S. troops would probably be sent to Palestine, that Jewish aggression would continue, but that means would be found to oppose such aggression, "even by force of arms". Jamali added that both the Arabs and Great Britain could have agreed on Palestine if it had not been for Zionist pressure on the U.S. Government which had forced the U.S. to intervene. Jamali accordingly considered the U.S. as primarily responsible for present and future developments in Palestine.

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Document 8
Facsimile of Memorandum from Loy Henderson to Secretary Marshall, September 22, 1947

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NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : S - Mr. Secretary.

DATE: September 22, 1947

FROM : NEA - Mr. Henderson.

SUBJECT:

OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR
OCT 20 1947
MR. HENDERSON'S
EXPEDITE

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Attached hereto is a memorandum setting forth some of the views of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs with regard to the attitude which we should take and the tactics which we should pursue during the present session of the General Assembly with regard to the UNSCOP Report on the Palestine problem.

The purpose of this memorandum is to place before you in more concrete form some of the views which I expressed orally in New York last Monday. I should add that the views expressed in this memorandum with regard to the partitioning of Palestine and the setting up of a Jewish State are shared by practically every member of the Foreign Service and of the Department who has been engaged in work intimately connected with the Near and Middle East. In this connection, I am attaching hereto a copy of a secret memorandum handed to me on this subject by Colonel William A. Eddy, who, as you are aware, is one of the outstanding experts in this country on the Arab world.

I wish to assure you that in spite of the views expressed in this memorandum, the staff of my Office is endeavoring loyally to carry out the decision which you made last Monday, and unless informed otherwise by you, will continue to endeavor to execute that decision in a manner which will minimize so far as possible the damage to our relations and interests in the Near and Middle East.

We have already worked out with General Hilldring a number of position papers to enable the carrying out of what we consider to be your decision.

L. W. H.
Loy W. Henderson

Attachments:
1. Memorandum setting forth the views of NEA with regard to UNSCOP Report.
2. Memorandum by Colonel Eddy, September 13, 1947, "Comment on the UNSCOP Report".

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Document 8, Page 2
Facsimile of Memorandum from Loy Henderson to Secretary Marshall, September 22, 1947

UNCLASSIFIED
NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : S - Mr. Secretary

FROM : NEA - Loy W. Henderson

DATE: September 22, 1947

SUBJECT:

OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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RECORDS RELATING TO PALESTINE, 1945-1947

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I went to New York on September 15 with General Hilldring at the request of Mr. Lovett to present our views as to what you might say in your speech of September 17 with regard to Palestine. I had just returned from Greece and was not really prepared to enter into a full discussion as to the attitude which we should assume with regard to the UNSCOP report. I am afraid, therefore, that I did not give the views of my office, which are also those of nearly every member of the Foreign Service or of the Department who has worked to any appreciable extent on Near Eastern problems, in the manner in which they should have been presented.

The attitude which we assume towards the Palestine problem during the proceedings of this Special Session may have far-reaching effects upon our relations with the peoples of the Near East and with Moslems every where. It may greatly influence the extent of success or of failure of some of our efforts to promote world stability and to prevent further Soviet penetration into important areas free as yet from Soviet domination. I consider, therefore, that it is my duty briefly to point out some of the considerations which cause the overwhelming majority of non-Jewish Americans who are intimately acquainted with the situation in the Near East to believe that it would not be in the national interests of the United States for it to advocate any kind of a plan at this time for the partitioning of Palestine or for the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine.

Certain Considerations against Advocacy by the U.S. of the Majority Plan

1. An advocacy on our part of any plan providing for the partitioning of Palestine or the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state would be certain to undermine our relations with the Arab, and to a lesser extent with the Moslem, world at a time when the Western World needs the friendship and cooperation of the Arabs and other Moslems.

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Without at least a degree of Arab cooperation we shall encounter numerous difficulties in connection with any support which we may give to the efforts of the British to find bases which will enable Great Britain to remain as a stabilizing power in the Eastern Mediterranean. We shall need the confidence and cooperation of the Arabs in the near future if we are to achieve any success in forestalling violent Arab nationalist uprisings against the French in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The resources and geographical position of the Arab countries are of such a character that those countries are necessarily factors of importance in the international economic field. Arab friendship is essential if we are to have their cooperation in the carrying out of some of our vital economic programs. During the next few years we are planning to draw heavily on the resources of the area, not only for our use, but for the reconstruction of Europe. Furthermore, we are intending to make important use of the communications facilities in the area. Already, partly as a result of our policies regarding Palestine, the attitude of the Arab Governments towards American firms has changed sharply and their demands on the firms are becoming more and more truculent and extravagant. Loss of confidence in the sense of justness and in the impartiality of the United States has been accompanied during the last two years in the Arab world by a growing suspicion of our overall motives and by increasing doubts as to our national integrity. Although the Arabs have in general no use for Communism, they feel so emotional with regard to the problem of Palestine that if an attempt should actually be made to set up a Jewish State in Palestine in pursuance of decisions supported by us, they may consider the United States as their foremost enemy and enter into at least temporary cooperation with the Soviet Union against us just as we cooperated with the Russians during the war years against common enemies.

If we press for a Jewish state, we shall undoubtedly weaken the position of the moderate Arabs who are friends of the western world and strengthen that of the fanatical extremists. Just last week, for instance, one of the moderate Arab leaders was slain in Palestine by followers of the fanatical Mufti.

2. If we advocate a plan providing for partitioning and the setting up of a Jewish State, we shall certainly be expected to make major contributions in force, materials and money to the implementation of such a plan if it is adopted.

We are under tremendous pressure at the present time to advocate such a plan. If we do, and if the plan is adopted, we shall be under still greater pressure to contribute to its implementation. We shall be lacking in courage and consistency, it will be argued, if after a plan supported by us has been adopted we do not do our part in carrying it out. Furthermore, we shall be expected to bear the main burden of implementation. We have shown more interest in the Palestine problem than any other

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great Power, except Great Britain, and Great Britain is beginning to weary of the Palestine burden. Furthermore, the execution of a partition plan such as that in the majority report will be a task lasting over a period of many years. Differences arising from attempts to carry out such a plan will arise to plague every session of the General Assembly. As one of the sponsors for the execution of the plan, we shall be the target for bitter attacks by both Arabs and Jews.

3. Any plan for partitioning Palestine would be unworkable.

Of all the previous committees which have ever studied the Palestine problem, only the Royal (Peel) Commission 1937 recommended partition as a solution.

The Partition (Woodhead) Commission set up in 1938 to carry out the Peel proposals was unable to devise a practicable plan for partition, so the Peel recommendations fell to the ground. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, composed of six prominent Britishers and six well-known Americans, stated in their report of April 20, 1946:

> "Partition has an appeal at first sight as giving a prospect of early independence and self-government to Jews and Arabs, but in our view no partition would have any chance unless it was basically acceptable to Jews and Arabs, and there is no sign of that today. We are accordingly unable to recommend partition as a solution."

If complete partition would be unsuccessful unless acceptable to Jews and Arabs, how much chance of success in the face of fierce Arab opposition has the UNSCOP majority plan which provides for an economic union of the two states--a union which cannot possibly succeed without Arab-Jewish friendship and cooperation? Irrigation ditches, railways, roads, telephone and telegraph lines, etc. must pass through both states. These facilities cannot function if the population of one state is hostile to that of the other. If political partition providing for the incorporation of 400,000 Arabs in a Jewish State is forced on the population of Palestine, this hostility will exist and will increase.

4. The UNSCOP Majority Plan is not only unworkable; if adopted, it would guarantee that the Palestine problem would be permanent and still more complicated in the future.

Some of the reasons for the unworkability of the Majority Plan are:

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By NARA, Date

(a) It is not possible for the two states to have political individuality and economic unity if the population of one or both of these states objects to such a partnership and refuses to cooperate;

(b) In case economic unity is found to be unworkable, it would not be possible to have complete economic individuality since the terrain of the country and the nature of the communications are such that the two states are inextricably meshed economically;

(c) In spite of the arguments advanced to the contrary in the report, an Arab state of the type envisaged would not be viable even if subsidized by receiving half of the revenues derived from the customs and other services;

(d) The cost of policing, in view of both extreme Arab and Jewish irrendentism, would be more than the combined national budget could bear.

5. The Majority Plan does not dispose once for all of the Palestine problem because:

(a) It provides for an economic union to be presided over by a Joint Economic Board, the members of which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and the foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council. An organ of the United Nations must, therefore, indefinitely act as an economic umpire between these two States. Will representatives of the Great Powers serve on this Board? If so, will an American serve? In case important Jewish interests are involved, is the American Government to be put under constant internal political pressure to order its representative to side with the Jewish State? Is the Soviet Union or a Soviet satellite to be represented by one of the three members? If so, what kind of a role would such a representative be likely to play?

(b) The Majority Plan provides that if either of the two states should fail to take the steps suggested in the plan, including the calling of a constituent assembly, the setting up of a provisional government, the making of a Declaration, etc., that fact will be communicated to the United Nations for such action by the General Assembly as may be deemed proper.

It is likely that the Arab State will not take the steps suggested and that, therefore, the whole

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whole Palestine problem will be back on the doorstep of the General Assembly at least within two years.

We are convinced that no plan can be found which will completely dispose of the Palestine problem so far as the United Nations is concerned at this session. I have stressed the fact that the majority plan does not rid us of this problem merely because there has been some thinking in the Department to the effect that if it is adopted, we can finally wash our hands of this disagreeable matter.

6. The proposals contained in the UNSCOP plan are not only not based on any principles of an international character, the maintenance of which would be in the interests of the United States, but they are in definite contravention to various principles laid down in the Charter as well as to principles on which American concepts of Government are based.

These proposals, for instance, ignore such principles as self-determination and majority rule. They recognize the principle of a theocratic racial state and even go so far in several instances as to discriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons outside of Palestine. We have hitherto always held that in our foreign relations American citizens, regardless of race or religion, are entitled to uniform treatment. The stress on whether persons are Jews or non-Jews is certain to strengthen feelings among both Jews and Gentiles in the United States and elsewhere that Jewish citizens are not the same as other citizens.

The United States is undoubtedly honor bound to take steps to make sure that the Jews in Palestine are not discriminated against and that they participate on at least an equal basis with other peoples in the Government of Palestine. We are under no obligations to the Jews to set up a Jewish State. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate provided not for a Jewish State, but for a Jewish national home. Neither the United States nor the British Government has ever interpreted the term "Jewish national home" to be a Jewish national state.

Tactics which the United States should pursue in the handling of the Palestine problem before the present session of the General Assembly.

In our opinion, there is no ready solution of the Palestine problem to which both Jews and Arabs would acquiesce to such an extent

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extent as to render it workable. Any kind of an imposed solution opposed by the majority of either the Arabs or the Jews is bound to result in failure, involving much loss of property and bloodshed and loss of prestige to the supporters and executors of the plan, as well as to the whole United Nations. If a solution is found which is workable, it will, we believe, be evolved only after long and protracted discussions during the course of which the moderate Jews and moderate Arabs would find common ground. If we at the beginning take either the Arab or the Jewish side of the controversy, it will be extremely difficult for either the moderate Arabs or the moderate Jews to get together.

Our Government has already stated that we give serious weight to the majority proposals. On an early occasion, we should repeat this statement, making it clear at the same time that our minds are by no means closed and that we shall also give due weight to the views of other nations and particularly of the interested parties.

During the debates regarding the merits of the various plans, we should not play too active a role. We should create the respect of all fair-minded persons by being, so far as possible, strictly impartial. We should concentrate our efforts primarily on working out agreements of all parties with regard to as many points as possible. It seems to us that there is a possibility that the moderates in both camps might be lead to acquiesce in a sufficient number of points to enable the setting up of a trusteeship for a period of years which would be instructed to function in such a neutral manner as not to favor either partition or a single state. At the conclusion of this term of years, there could be a plebiscite on the question of partition, in the light of which the General Assembly could make its final decision on this fateful question. Any kind of a temporary arrangement should probably provide for immediate Jewish immigration of at least 100,000 persons.

It may be impossible even to work out a delayed solution such as that outlined above. If so, the Palestine problem will probably become even more of a world problem than at the present time.

It is realized that the tactics outlined above are not likely to appeal to those of us who prefer to approach all problems with energy and decisiveness. There are times, however, when energy and decisiveness are not appropriate.

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Document 9
Facsimile of Memorandum from Loy Henderson to the Secretary, November 10, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

To : The Secretary November 10, 1947

Through : S/S

From : NEA - Loy W. Henderson

Subject : Suspension of Exports of Arms and Ammunition to Arab States and Palestine

Discussion:

From time to time requests are received from Arab governments of the Near East for the purchase and export of arms and ammunition or other military material of a type requiring export licensing. Moreover, it is expected that the Jewish Agency or other Jewish organizations will make similar requests in the near future.

While these acquisitions are requested on the ground that they are required to improve and strengthen the internal security forces of these countries, I am of the opinion that, in view of the tense situation in Palestine and on its frontiers, we should not permit the export of any material of this nature to Palestine or neighboring states so long as the tension continues. Otherwise, the Arabs might use arms of U.S. origin against Jews, or Jews might use them against Arabs. In either case, we would be subject to bitter recrimination.

Recommendation:

I, therefore, recommend that effective immediately we suspend authorization for the export from the United States of arms, ammunition and other war material intended for use in Palestine or in neighboring countries, until the situation in that area has become somewhat more clarified. This suspension should also apply to export licenses already issued but not yet utilized.

Concurrences:

U - Mr. Lovett
A-A - Mr. Armour
MD - Mr. Cummins
NE - Mr. Merriam

Loy W. Henderson

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Document 10

The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

Washington, November 24, 1947

My Dear Mr.President: I enclose for your consideration and for your approval if you concur, a memorandum resulting from conversations with the British in regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The National Security Council has approved this document. The Secretary of the Army, however, approved subject: (a) a similar British commitment, particularly at to military features, being simultaneously made, and (b) the policies outlined being first discussed, and if possible cleared, with the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House and of the Senate and with the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee.

With reference to (a), a similar memorandum was prepared by the British for consideration by the British Government.

I also enclose for your information a paper setting forth the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the enclosed document.

Faithfully yours, Robert A. Lovett

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Top Secret [Washington, undated.]

The American Paper

After detailed discussion and careful deliberation, and after a full exchange of views with both American and British military advisers, we have arrived at the following basic conclusions:

1. Since the basic objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the maintenance of world peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the United States must be concerned with any situations which might develop into international armed conflict. The Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is an area in which situations exist at the present time.

2. The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States. (It is understood that the British Government has already arrived at the conclusion that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is vital to the security of Great Britain, but has not as yet made policy decisions based on this conclusion.)

3. The security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any one of the following countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey, or Iran.

4. In view of the foregoing, it should be the policy of the United States, in accordance with the principles, and in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, to support the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. As a corollary of this policy the United States should assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and the political independence of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

5. In carrying out this policy, the United States should be prepared to make full use of its political, economic, and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective. Before resorting to the actual employment of force, the United States should exhaust political and economic means, including recourse to the United Nations. Any resort to force

should be in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations and, so far as possible, in cooperation with like-minded members of the United Nations.

6. It would be unrealistic for the United States to undertake to carry out such a policy unless the British maintain their strong strategic, political and economic position in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, and unless they and ourselves follow parallel policies in that area.

7. One of the greatest dangers to world peace may be the failure of the Soviet Union to understand the extent to which the United States is prepared to go in order to maintain the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It should, therefore, be the policy of this government to make evident in a firm but non-provocative manner the extent of the determination of the United States to assist in preserving in the interest of the world peace and the security of the area.

Document 11
Facsimile of Cable Forwarding Message from Governor General Jinnah to President Truman, December 9, 1947

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Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Rec'd December 9, 1947
2:18 p.m.

DIVISION OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
DEC 10 1947
Department of State

FROM: Karachi

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 198, December 9, 1 p.m.

In letter dated December 8, Secretary Foreign Affairs has requested me transmit following message from Governor General Jinnah to President Truman and asks Department deliver copy Ambassador Ispahani his information (verbatim text):

"At this hour when the Muslim world has received a terrible shock owing to the most unfortunate decision of the United Nations Organization to enforce partition of Palestine, I would like to address to you, Mr. President, this personal appeal.

Two. The decision is ultra vires of the United Nations charter and basically wrong and invalid in law.

Three. Morally it is untenable. Political, historically, geographically and practically it would be impossible to enforce partition against the united resistance of the Arabs who have the full sympathy and support of over three hundred million Mussalmans and many non-Muslim countries and not only those who voted against UNO decision.

Four. In the long run it will and must fail. The very people for whose benefit this decision is taken - the Jews, who have already suffered terribly from Nazi persecution - will I greatly fear, suffer most if this unjust course is pursued. Moreover the decision presents a great danger to world peace.

Five. May I therefore, at this eleventh hour, appeal to you and through

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Facsimile of Cable Forwarding Message from Governor General Jinnah to President Truman, December 9, 1947

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By [illegible] NARA, Date ___

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-2- # 198, December 9, 1 p.m. from Karachi

you and through you to the great and powerful American nation, which has always stood for justice, to uphold the rights of the Arab race. The Government and the people of America can yet save this dangerous situation by giving a correct lead and thus avoid the gravest consequences and repercussions.

Six. May I, Mr. President, with your permission, release this telegram to the press. M. A. Jinnah Governor General of Pakistan".

LEWIS

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Document 12
Memorandum from Ambassador Wadsworth to President Truman, Undated

[ANNEX]

The Ambassador to Iraq (Wadsworth) to President Truman[1]

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MR. PRESIDENT: I have sought this opportunity to see and pay my respects to you before returning to my post at Baghdad. I should welcome particularly any general directives you may feel it desirable to give me.

The Regent, Prince Abdul Illah, has charged me with presenting his compliments and kindest regards to you personally. He recalls with warmest appreciation that when visiting this country in 1945, he was your first official foreign guest in the White House. He and his ministers have anxiously sought American understanding and friendship.

The situation in Iraq, as throughout the Arab World, is gravely troubled. Strong new social and political ferments are at work. When I left Baghdad last September for temporary detail here the Prime Minister charged me with an important message.

Its essence was that, in a world of increasing political tension between the Western Powers and Russia, Iraq believed the time had come for it to take positive action to identify itself forthrightly with the major policies and regional strategic program of Great Britain and the United States.

Iraq, he said, in such a relationship, envisaged for itself a position closely resembling that of its neighbor and friend, Turkey. It could, too, helpfully play a role as "pivot" between the Saadabad group of countries[2] and those of the Arab League in the evolution of a common policy of defense against Soviet aggression and communist infiltration.

Further, he said, Iraq would need British-American assistance (and support when applying to the World Bank for credits) to realize its great Tigris-Euphrates Valley development project. He had particularly appreciated the expression of keen interest in this project which you authorized me last year to convey to the Regent.

However, the Prime Minister concluded, none of this could be brought within the field of practical politics unless a mutually acceptable settlement of the Palestine problem be found, with our help, by the United Nations.

Such a settlement, Mr. President, has not been found. Rather are we, today, in Arab eyes, chiefly and almost solely responsible for the United Nations recommendation for Palestine "Partition with Economic Union." Arab leaders are convinced that in spearheading that action the United States was, under Zionist pressures, unfaithful to its own principles, notably those of self-determination and majority rule.

The United States is, and can hardly be otherwise, the main driving force in the United Nations. The Arab World does not object to this so long as it is convinced that our objectives are those of peace, security and fair dealing.

We are now, to put it bluntly, highly suspect in their eyes--to such a degree even that they fear these same Zionist pressures will impel you to order American troops to Palestine to implement by force that single portion of the General Assembly's recommendations which envisaged a sovereign Jewish state.

More than forty percent of the population of such a state would be Arabs whose ancestors had owned the land for many centuries; a hostile state, they say, lying athwart the world's most strategically important landbridge, which, running from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, separates some 20,000,000 Arabs in southwest Asia from a like number in northeast Africa.

Mr. President, until this Arab fear is removed, there will be little if any constructive work in the field of Arab-American relations which can be accomplished. Four points are outstanding:

---

[1] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol V, pp. 596-599. The source text is a carbon copy undated and unsigned.

[2] These are the Moslem countries--Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan--which signed in 1937 at Saadabad (near Teheran) a pact of mutual assistance. Pakistan is a possible applicant to membership. [Footnote in the source text.]

1) The great Tigris-Euphrates Valley development project, which might in five years meet half the world's wheat shortage, cannot progress;
2) Our Middle East oil development schemes, on which success of your great European Recovery Plan may well depend, will be curtailed;
3) British-American strategic interest must continue to suffer, as in the case of the recently-signed Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which led last week to fall of the Iraqi government amid popular repudiation of an alliance which would have assured us as well as Britain the use, in an emergency, of the greatest military air base in the Middle East;
4) Our moral influence, built in large measure by private American institutions and enterprise, through a century of Arab renaissance, must increasingly suffer from the stultifying effect of a new and growing Arab scepticism as to our political *bona fides*.

May I not, therefore, take back with me your personal assurance that the American Government will not support or participate in any project to impose partition by force? May I not say that no American troops will be so employed, either directly as an American force or disguised under the banner of the United Nations?

With such an assurance, I believe your representatives to the Arab countries, can effectively prevent direct action seriously harmful to vital American interests pending appropriate action by the United Nations to reconsider the Palestine Problem in the light of current developments.

It would, too, I believe, be immediately helpful were you to authorize your representatives at the Arab capitals to add that the American Government would not oppose, in any proper organ of the United Nations, any proposal to the effect that, before decision be taken to implement any of the present recommendations, except it be in general agreement with the wishes of the population the competency of such organ so to decide be submitted to the World Court for advisory opinion.

I make this latter suggestion because an Arab resolution to seek such opinion on basic legal issues of the problem was defeated at Lake Success by but a single vote; and there is ground to believe that in a less emotional atmosphere it would have received a substantial majority.

A gesture of this nature now, if supplementing the suggested assurance as to the non-use of force, might well temporarily ease our strained relations with the Arab governments and enable your representatives near those Governments to exercise beneficial moderating effect against the adoption of extremist policies (including direct armed aggression against Palestine) now under consideration in Arab capitals.

The essential objectives and major purpose of our regional policies in the Near East have long been effectively summarized by the phrase: "Peace, progress and stability." Today, I feel, time is of the essence. By now supporting Partition and the establishment of a Jewish state, we are supporting a policy most calculated to defeat our major purpose and which has already begun to produce the opposite, namely war, stagnation, and chaos.

And, if we fail to achieve our major purpose, the probable end-results will be irreparable damage to our vital national interest. I conceive it probable even that such end results may well include eventual subjection of much if not all of the Arab World, and of Iran as well, to Soviet domination.

It is these conclusions which, as your Ambassador, I have felt it my duty to report.

In so reporting, I have not endeavored to suggest a solution of the Palestine problem. On that immensely troubling subject my own views, which I submit with all deference, may be outlined as follows:

1) No solution can be found unless the present recommendations of the General Assembly be changed;
2) Until they are changed, conditions in Palestine and the Arab World will become increasingly chaotic;
3) A workable solution can best be found within the framework of eventual compromise agreement between Arabs and Jews;
4) Such agreement can best be found after a period of direct United Nations trusteeship over the whole of Palestine, similar to that now envisaged for the Jerusalem area;
5) Earliest possible establishment of such a trusteeship seems vital to prevent the present situation from further, perhaps irreparably, degenerating towards chaos.

Document 13
Facsimile of Memorandum from McClintock to Rusk, January 14, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date [illegible]

SPA- Mr. Rusk 2-24-82 Jan. 14, 1948.

SPA- Mr. McClintock

The Problem of Enforcing Partition in Palestine.

SECRET

The United States will presently be faced with a choice between two courses of policy consequent upon its decision to favor the partition of Palestine. One course is to support enforcement measures by the Security Council of the United Nations; the other is to support exclusive reliance on the Jewish and Arab militia which are to be established under the terms of the Assembly's resolution on Palestine adopted November 29, 1947.

The adoption of either of these alternative policies will involve injury to the interests of the United States in greater or lesser degree and to the United Nations in greater or lesser degree. It is a question then of sober judgment on balance which policy will most greatly injure the interests of the United States. In an endeavor to analyze this problem I have worked out the following rough outline and have come forth with a suggested line of policy which falls far short of being satisfactory by any other standard than the fact that no line of policy applied to the present Palestine problem can prove satisfactory.

SECRET 1-14-48

Two Courses

I- UN Enforcement

1. US participation in SC enforcement measures. Consequences:

   a. US troops or citizens shoot Arabs.

      (1) Undying animosity of Arabs for US will result in

         (a) Loss to US of oil resources of Middle East,

         (b) Loss of strategic lodgement in Middle East; e.g. airfields.

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2. USSR participation in SC enforcement measures. Consequences:

A. Soviet military lodgement in Middle East.

B. Soviet-Communist infiltration of Middle East.

(1) Possibility of Jewish State in Palestine becoming Communist.

(2) Possibility of Arab States becoming Communist.

C. Disaffection of such US friends and clients as Turkey and Iran.

3. Withdrawal of Arab States from UN as consequence of enforcement measures might initiate crack-up of organization, to injury of US interests which are predicated on UN success.

II- No enforcement by UN but security measures limited to militia of Jewish and Arab States.

1. No Arab State will be created.

A. Therefore, no Arab State militia.

B. Instead, there will be organized guerrilla forces supplied from States of Arab League. These forces will be pitted against

2. Militia of Jewish State.

A. Haganah, abetted by terrorists of Irgun and Stern groups.

(1) Jewish forces will probably be militarily inferior to Arabs, due to latter's superiority in arms and numbers.

3. Fighting will break out on large scale after British withdrawal. Consequences:

A. Demand of Jewish State for

(1) SC intervention with force.

(2) Release of US arms embargo and recruitment of US and other Jews to fight in Jewish Palestine militia.

B. Abject loss of face by SC in particular and UN in general for inability or unwillingness to act to

enforce

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B. (continued)
enforce its own solution for Palestine problem. This also may mean beginning of the end of UN, which would be injurious to US interest.

III- Possible US policy.

1. Refusal to agree to SC enforcement measures.

2. Stress GA recommendation that Jewish and Arab militia provide security forces in Palestine.

3. Inform Arabs that unless they cease hostilities we shall end arms embargo and permit recruitment, by Jewish militia only.

4. Inform Arabs that if they keep the peace we shall not, as a Government, provide Jewish State with more than strictly limited financial assistance.

5. Inform Jews that unless they keep the peace we shall deny them all hope of relaxing arms embargo and of economic or financial aid.

6. Seek creation by foregoing measures of an uneasy but actual local balance of power which will give the Palestine partition experiment a fair chance of being tried.

SPA:RMcClintock:em

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Document 14

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Secret [Washington, undated]

Summary: Reports from the U.S. mission at Damascus indicate that Syria is the center of recruitment and training of the so-called "irregulars", which are intended for infiltration over the Palestine border and subsequent guerrilla work in Palestine. There is evidence that such forces have already proceeded across the border to a considerable extent. National forces do not appear to be directly involved.

(1) Requirement. Active recruiting of "irregulars" under Fawzi Qawuqji has been carried on in Syria. The total recruited by January 1, 1948 was estimated at approximately 16,000, although only a small number actually were receiving instructions and uniforms. (Damascus 436 of Dec. 20, 1947; Damascus 438 of Dec. 21, 1947; Damascus 2 of Jan. 1, 1948.)

(2) Training. Syria appears to be the training center for recruits from Palestine, Egypt and Iraq. The Liberation Army Chief of Staff is reported to be the Taha Hashimi and the Field Commander to be Qawuqji. (Damascus 415 of Dec. 11, 1947.) Two contingents of Iraqi volunteers arrived in Syria for training, totaling 800, and indications are that more will follow. Syria presumably arms them. Supply arrangements were embarrassed by the unexpectedly large number of such volunteers. (Damascus 24 of Jan. 12, 1948; Damascus 39 of Jan. 19, 1948.)

(3) Infiltration into Palestine. Sizable bands of the volunteer "irregulars" have crossed the border from Syria into Palestine. (Damascus 436 of Dec. 20, 1947; Damascus 439 of Dec. 22, 1947; Damascus 453 of Dec. 28, 1947.) It was reported that a prominent Hama deputy, Akram Haurani, led a force into north Palestine in the last week of December. (Damascus 7 of Jan. 3, 1948.) Arabs reportedly dressed in Syrian Army uniforms fell back into Syria following night action about January 9, 1948. (Jerusalem 43 of January 12, 1948 -- Eight[h] report for Army.) Emir Faour is reported to have stated that an attack of Fadl tribesmen across the Palestine frontier in the second week of January was made "under orders", and [Syrian] Defense Minister Sharabati in a flat statement to American newsmen described the attack as a "screen", under cover of which there is good reason to believe that approximately 600 Syrian-trained, equipped and transported "regular irregulars" moved across the border into Palestine. (Damascus 31 of January 15, 1948.)

(4) Memminger has suggested that the Department "might consider cautioning the Syrian government that its participation in recruiting, training, financing and transporting the 'irregulars' to the frontier in Syrian army trucks is contrary to the word and spirit of the UN charter and the GA UN resolution in partition." (Damascus 31 of January 15, 1948.)

Document 15
Facsimile of Telegram from Jerusalem to the Secretary of State, January 16, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760050
By RDS NARA, Date

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

SECRET

Control 5046

JAN 19

DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM: Jerusalem

TO : Secretary of State

NO : 62, January 16, 6 p.m.

Chile Chery of AHC. Just returned from Cairo meeting with Mufti, informed official COMGEN following:

One. General national coordination for whole Palestine will be established by Arabs on any partition separate mandate. Administration now being organized in Cairo press communique 5 January.

Two. Believes Abdullah regardless private thoughts must accept Palestine Arab policy against partition. Though admits possibility various parts Palestine may be annexed to bordering states. Only line is that unimportant who takes over Palestine provided Palestine remains Arab. Preference is for unified Palestine state.

Three. In any event Haghemites must acquiesce to Mufti or lose position Arab world. Possible that Mufti will soon visit Abdullah. Reiterated Arab Legion welcome in Palestine and would be loyal to Mufti.

Four. Reference Palestine Government's request to Jerusalem religious leaders to intervene re opening Old City seated Arabs have informed Palestine Government will ing release hold Old City and guarantee safety, ...ss therein if Haganah would withdraw from vicinity. Mufti's condition would be police escort of ... vehicles entering Old City to insure complete ... However Arabs always suspect ... during truce ...

867N.01/1-1648

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Document 15, Page 2

Facsimile of Telegram from Jerusalem to the Secretary of State, January 16, 1948

UNCLASSIFIED
NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date [illegible]

DRAFT

[illegible] 62, January 16, 6 p.m., from Jerusalem.

[illegible]. Recent Arab attacks in Tel Aviv-Kfar Shalom area were palpable revenge [illegible] Ahmad Hilmi [illegible] Arab Grand Mufti. For Jewish attack month ago. [illegible] permitted Hilmian remain in [illegible] organized attack.

Two. Attack Wednesday against Jewish settlement Kfar Etzion badly organized and of necessity called off. Mustered 3,000 armed Arabs in battle area (this figure reconfirmed to CONSUL by British military), although only several hundred employed in attack.

Seven. Arab attacks at present for demonstration, training and probing purposes. Clash with British undesired but British must remain impartial both sides while assisting increasingly Jewish and young Arabs undergoing rigid training.

Eight. [illegible] situation Haifa improved as result [illegible] short visits by high [illegible] there with group well-trained fighters. Advice for doing in Haifa [illegible] Jewish [illegible]. Though [illegible] in our interests we will

Nine. Situation really worse with government unable [illegible] stores owned.

[illegible] very friendly and appeared unfriendly, especially [illegible] informed. [illegible] President with arrival Abdel Hadi [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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Document 16
Text of Report on the Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine, January 20, 1948

[Annex]

Report by the Policy Planning Staff on Position of the United States With Respect to Palestine

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1948
PPS/19

The Problem: 1. To assess and appraise the position of the U.S. with respect to Palestine, taking into consideration the security interests of the U.S. in the Mediterranean and Near East areas, and in the light of the recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the partition of Palestine.

Analysis

2. Palestine occupies a geographic position of great strategic significance to the U.S. It is important for the control of the eastern end of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. It is an outlet for the oil of the Middle East; which, in turn, is important to U.S. security. Finally, it is the center of a number of major political cross-currents; and events in Palestine cannot help being reflected in a number of directions. For these reasons, and particularly in view of the Soviet pressure against the periphery of that area, and Soviet infiltration into the area, it is important that political, economic, and social stability be maintained there.

Because of the present irreconcilable differences between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, great danger exists that the area may become the source of serious unrest and instability which could be readily exploited by the USSR unless a workable solution can be developed.

3. The UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish sovereign states, substantially as proposed by the majority report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine. The partition plan provides for an economic union of the two states, administered by a Joint Economic Board, and for the city of Jerusalem to be placed under international trusteeship. The mandate for Palestine would be terminated by August 1, 1948 and the newly created states and special regime for Jerusalem would come into existence by October 1, 1948. Provision was made for a five-member UN Commission to take over progressively the administration of Palestine and to establish Provisional Councils in each new state.

4. The boundaries of the proposed new Arab and Jewish states do not satisfy Zionist aspirations from either the political or the economic viewpoint, and the whole plan of partition with economic union is totally unacceptable to the Arabs. Although frequent reference has been made to "sacrifices" accepted in the interest of compromise, the partition plan was strongly supported by the Jewish Agency for Palestine and by various Zionist organizations favoring the establishment of a sovereign Jewish political state in Palestine. It did not, however, have the support of the Irgun, the Revisionists or the Stern gang (the so-called leftist groups), whose influence among the Jews of Palestine appears to be increasing.

5. The Arabs of Palestine and the Arab states have uniformly and consistently maintained their unequivocal opposition to any form of partition. The Arabs of Palestine have indicated their determination not to establish a separate government in the Arab area of Palestine designated by the UN, and to boycott all activities of the UN Commission charged with the transfer of authority from the British to the new Arab and Jewish states. Even if partition were economically feasible, the Arab attitude alone

renders it improbable that any economic union could be effected between the two new states.

The General Assembly, in adopting the recommendation for partition, left unanswered certain questions regarding the legality of the plan as well as the means for its implementation. Nor did the General Assembly, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, have an opportunity to explore the last minute announcement by the Arab States on November 29 of their willingness to accept the principle of a Federal State in Palestine which they had previously opposed. There was no indication of any real effort by the UN toward conciliation between the Jews and the Arabs.

6. The U.S. and USSR played leading roles in bringing about a vote favorable to partition. Without U.S. leadership and the pressures which developed during UN consideration of the question, the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly could not have been obtained. From this there has grown a belief that the United States has a heavy responsibility for seeing that partition works. It has been shown that various unauthorized U.S. nationals and organizations including members of Congress, notably in the closing days of the Assembly, brought pressure to bear on various foreign delegates and their respective home governments to induce them to support the U.S. attitude on the Palestine question. Evidence to this effect is attached under Tab A.

7. The decision of the U.S. Government to support the UN Special Committee's majority plan was based primarily on the view, expressed to the GA by Secretary Marshall on September 18 [*17*], 1947, that "great weight" should be accorded the majority opinion of a UN Committee.

8. Strong nationalistic and religious feelings were aroused throughout the Arab world as a result of the UN recommendation on Palestine. Widespread rioting has followed. In Palestine, the outbreaks have consisted of armed clashes between Arabs and Jews; in certain of the Arab states, there have been attacks on Jewish quarters and demonstrations directed primarily against the U.S. These manifestations of popular feeling have not so far represented organized Arab resistance to partition, although a "jihad" (holy war) against the Jews of Palestine has been proclaimed by Moslem leaders in most of the Arab states and has been joined by Christian leaders in Syria.

9. As British forces are progressively withdrawn from Palestine and as steps are taken with a view to implementing the UN decision, organized large scale opposition by the Arabs is to be expected. Irregular military units are now being organized in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia to fight in Palestine. There are strong indications that at an appropriate moment at least some of these units will move into the Arab portion of Palestine as defined by the UN. That these forces will come into violent conflict with the Haganah or other Jewish military bodies operating from the Jewish state is probable.

10. In order to protect themselves and to secure the establishment of a Jewish state, Zionist representatives will seek armed support from the U.S., for without substantial external assistance the proposed Jewish state cannot be established or exist. This may take the form of an attempt *(a)* to obtain money, arms and volunteers in the U.S. and/or *(b)* to induce the U.S. Government to assist in organizing an international armed force under the UN to enforce partition.

11. The UN decision did not provide for outside armed forces to impose the partition scheme, either in maintaining law and order in the two new states or in affording protection to the five-member UN Commission which is to implement the decision. The UN Commission is almost certain to meet with armed Arab opposition in seeking to discharge its functions. Palestine police authorities have declined to assume responsibility for its safety outside of Tel-Aviv. There can be no assurance that in the

present and foreseeable circumstances, local security forces will be able to maintain law and order; rather may their failure to do so be confidently predicted.

12. The U.S. has suspended authorization for the export of arms, ammunition and other war material intended for use in Palestine or in neighboring countries. If we resist pressure by the Zionists to alter this position, the question then arises whether we should send troops to Palestine as part of an international force under the UN. It may be assumed that the Soviet Union would, in certain circumstances, be prepared to contribute troops to such an international force. If the USSR should do so, it would be awkward for the U.S. to decline to take similar action. If Soviet troops are sent to Palestine, further opportunities would be provided for the exercise of Russian influence in the whole Near Eastern area.

13. U.S. support of partition has already brought about loss of U.S. prestige and disillusionment among the Arabs and other neighboring peoples as to U.S. objectives and ideals. U.S. support of the principles of self-determination was a basic factor in the creation of officials, missionaries, and educational institutions in the Near East have built successfully on this foundation, and U.S. businessmen have reaped the benefit of the widespread belief that the U.S. had no political motives in the area inimical to Arab welfare.

14. The position of Saudi Arabia in the Palestine question is of particular importance. King Ibn Saud values the friendship between his country and the U.S. and recognizes the significant financial aid to Saudi Arabia derived from oil royalties. He is reluctant to sever political and economic ties with the U.S. Nevertheless, he is under strong pressure from other Arab states to break with the U.S. Prince Faisal, his son and Foreign Minister, departed for Saudi Arabia from the UN General Assembly in a bitterly anti-American mood and may give strength to a faction of less moderate elements which will force the King's hand. Important U.S. oil concessions and air base rights will be at stake in the event that an actively hostile Government should come into power in Saudi Arabia.

15. In view of the evident determination of the Arabs to resist partition with all the means at their disposal, it may be anticipated that, if an attempt is made to carry out the UN decision (with or without U.S. assistance), the more moderate and intellectual leaders of the Arab states, most of whom have ties with the west, will be swept out of power by irresponsible elements. Leaders such as Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, would be displaced by extremists such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Hatred of the Zionists or of those identified with Zionism might be extended to include all westerners in direct proportion to the latter's support of Zionist armies in general and of partition in particular.

16. Any assistance the U.S. might give to the enforcement of partition would result in deep-seated antagonism for the U.S. in many sections of the Moslem world over a period of many years and would lay us open to one or more of the following consequences:

(a) Suspension or cancellation of valuable U.S. air base rights and commercial concessions, cessation of U.S. oil pipeline construction, and drastic curtailment of U.S. trade with that area.

(b) Loss of our present access to the air, military and naval facilities enjoyed by the British in the area, with attendant repercussions on our overall strategic position in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

(c) Closing or boycotting of U.S. educational, religious and philanthropic institutions in the Near East, such as the American University at Beirut established in 1866 and the American University at Cairo.

(d) Possible deaths, injuries and damages arising from acts of violence against individual U.S. citizens and interests established in the area. Official assurances of the

Arab Governments to afford protection to U.S. interests could not be relied on because of the intensity of popular feeling.

(e) A serious threat to the success of the Marshall Plan. The present oil production of the Middle East fields is approximately 800,000 barrels a day. To meet Marshall Plan requirements, production must be raised to about 2,000,000 barrels a day, since no oil for Europe for this purpose could be provided from the U.S., from Venezuela, or from the Far East. Before the current disturbances, U.S. oil companies had made plans for the required development in the Middle East, with which it will be impossible to proceed if the present situation continues.

17. The USSR stands to gain by the partition plan if it should be implemented by force because of the opportunity thus afforded to the Russians to assist in "maintaining order" in Palestine. If Soviet forces should be introduced into Palestine for the purpose of implementing partition, Communist agents would have an excellent base from which to extend their subversive activities, to disseminate propaganda, and to attempt to replace the present Arab governments by "democratic peoples' governments". The presence of Soviet forces in Palestine would constitute an outflanking of our positions in Greece, Turkey and Iran, and a potential threat to the stability of the entire Eastern Mediterranean area.

18. It is not certain however, that the USSR would choose to send its forces into Palestine. To do so would be to place those forces in an exposed position, far from a base of supply, and without suitable lines of communication. Rather than risk the enmity of the Arab world by such action, the Soviet Union might prefer to have U.S. forces bear the brunt of enforcement and incur the odium of the local population and Moslems everywhere as a result.

19. Other choices are open to the USSR besides the furnishing of troops. Evidence is accumulating that the USSR may be covertly or indirectly supplying arms not only to the Jews but to the Arabs, thus aggravating the friction in the Near East. From the Soviet viewpoint, it might be preferable to exploit in this manner the explosive character of the situation created by partition rather than to enter the area in a military sense.

Whether or not Soviet forces should assist in implementing partition, the UN decision is favorable to Soviet objectives of sowing dissention and discord in non-communist countries. The partition of Palestine might afford the USSR a pretext on the basis of "self-determination of minorities" to encourage the partition of areas in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Greece, with a view to setting up separate [Kurdish?] Azerbaijani, Armenian and Macedonian states enjoying the support of the USSR.

All in all, there is no way of telling in exactly what manner the USSR will attempt to turn partition to its advantage. It must be assumed, however, that Moscow will actively endeavor to find some means of exploiting the opportunity.

20. Various other factors would enter into the situation if an attempt is made to enforce the UN recommendation. The foregoing is intended merely to suggest the principal elements in the problem. So numerous would be the ramifications of mounting Arab ill will, of opening the door to Soviet political or military penetration, and of generally chaotic conditions in Palestine and neighboring countries that the whole structure of peace and security in the Near East and Mediterranean would be directly or indirectly affected with results impossible to predict at this stage in detail but certainly injurious to U.S. interests.

Conclusions

21. As a result of U.S. sponsorship of UN action leading to the recommendation to partition Palestine, U.S. prestige in the Moslem world has suffered a severe blow and

U.S. strategic interests in the Mediterranean and Near East have been seriously prejudiced. Our vital interests in those areas will continue to be adversely affected to the extent that we continue to support partition.

22. The original U.S. premise in supporting the partition of Palestine was founded on the belief that, with certain modifications in the majority proposals of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, a just and workable plan could be devised immediately which would receive broad international support, provided always that there was cooperation between the parties concerned. A study of the present plan raises serious doubts as to its workability because of the artificial ad arbitrary political subdivision of a complicated economic area. Events have demonstrated that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine will not cooperate even to endeavor to make the partition plan work. Therefore, one of the major premises on which we originally supported partition has proved invalid.

23. The United States should not send armed forces to Palestine, either on a volunteer or contingent basis, for the following reasons: *(a)* This would represent a political or military commitment of which the dimensions, both in time and space cannot be calculated or foreseen and which might carry us into actions of a major character, out of all proportion to the foreign policy objectives involved; and *(b)* to do so would invite the possibility of the movement of Soviet armed forces to the strategic Near Eastern and Mediterranean area. For similar reasons, the U.S. should oppose the sending of armed forces of any nationality to Palestine.

24. While the governments in Arab countries have partially succeeded in restraining demonstrations against the Jews when their borders, in the case of open conflict major massacres of Jews in Moslem countries would seem to be inevitable, despite efforts of the governments of those countries to control popular feeling. Moreover, a basis would be provided for anti-Jewish agitation in other parts of the world. The process of assimilation or integration of the individual Jew in the life of the country of which he is a citizen, which has been strongly advocated by World Jewry in the past, would be made more difficult and he would be singled out for attack as an alien political factor. In the U.S., the position of Jews would be gravely undermined as it becomes evident to the public that in supporting a Jewish state in Palestine we were in fact supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism, to the detriment of overall U.S. security interests.

25. Unless an effort is made to retrieve the situation, the prestige of the UN itself will be at stake because of the notoriety and resentment attendant upon the activities of U.S. pressure groups, including members of Congress, who sought to impose U.S. views as to partition on foreign delegations. Furthermore, the probable abstention by the Arab states from active participation in many UN activities may further weaken the effectiveness of the UN and the U.S. position within the UN, as has Soviet abstention in certain other activities.

26. The U.S. Government should face the fact that the partition of Palestine cannot be implemented without the use of force, and that the U.S. would inevitably be called upon to supply a substantial portion of the money, troops and arms for this purpose. The British have made it clear that they would not accept any role in the enforcement of partition. No other nation except Russia could be expected to participate in such implementation to any appreciable extent.

26*a*. It must be concluded that the partition of Palestine will not be possible of attainment without outside assistance on a substantial scale. If the U.S. is determined to see the successful establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (either as proposed or as may be geographically modified because of Arab noncooperation in the proposed economic union), the U.S. must be prepared to grant economic assistance, together with aid to the Jewish authorities through the supply of arms, ammunition and implements of war. Ultimately the U.S. might have to support the Jewish authorities by the use of

naval units and military forces. It should be clearly recognized that such assistance given to the Jewish state, but withheld from the Arabs and the Arab States, would in Arab eyes be a virtual declaration of war by the U.S. against the Arab world. It is improbable that the Jewish state could survive over any considerable period of time in the face of the combined assistance which would be forthcoming for the Arabs in Palestine form the Arab States, and in lesser measure form their Moslem neighbors. The preparations now being made for intensive guerrilla warfare by the approximately 400,000 Arabs resident in the proposed new Jewish state are alone giving rise to serious doubt as to whether the Jewish people in Palestine could themselves control the situation.

Recommendations

27. We should take no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition.

28. We should oppose sending armed forces into Palestine by the UN or any member thereof for the purpose of implementing partition. We should also oppose the recruitment of volunteers for this purpose.

29. We should maintain and enforce our embargo on arms to Palestine and neighboring countries.

30. We should endeavor as far as possible to spread responsibility for the future handling of this question, and to divest ourselves of the imputation of international leadership in the search for a solution to this problem.

31. When and if the march of events has conclusively demonstrated that the effort to carry out the partition plan as prescribed by the UN General Assembly offers no reasonable prospect for success without the use of outside armed force, we should then take the position that we have been obliged to conclude that it is impracticable and undesirable for the international community to attempt to enforce any form of partition in the absence of agreement between the parties, and that the matter should go back to the UN General Assembly.

32. Thereafter, our position in the UN should be that we would cooperate loyally in working out and implementing any proposals designed *(a)* to encourage pacific settlement between the Palestine, Arabs and Palestine Jews or *(b)* to investigate the possibilities of any other suggested solution such as a federal state or trusteeship, which would not require outside armed force for implementation.

33. We should oppose referring to the International Court the question of the UN recommendation on Palestine on the grounds that the fundamental issue, i.e. whether the two communities involved will cooperate to make the partition plan effective, is not a proper question for the Court.

Document 17
Conclusions of the Draft Report Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council, February 17, 1948

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[Washington,] February 17, 1948.

The Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine

Conclusions

14. Any solution of the Palestine problem which invites direct Soviet participation in administration, policing, or military operations in Palestine is a danger to the security of the United States.

15. Any solution of the Palestine problem which results in the continued hostility of the Arab world toward the United States will bring about conditions which endanger the security of the United States.

16. The US should continue support for the Partition Plan in the UN by all measures short of the use of outside armed force to impose the Plan on the people of Palestine.

(The military members of the Staff do not concur in the above conclusion and offer the following substitute)

The United States should alter its previous policy of support for partition and seek another solution to the problem. In doing so, United States should propose that, in view of the changed conditions as set forth in the Analysis, the UN Security Council request that a special session of the General Assembly be convoked to reconsider the Palestine problem.

17. The United States should urge the Government of the United Kingdom to continue to exercise its mandate over Palestine in the event of reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the General Assembly. The United States should also support a resolution by the UN Security Council requesting the UK to take this action.

18. In the event of reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the General Assembly, the United States should propose the creation of a trusteeship in Palestine with the UN Trusteeship Council as the administering authority. If necessary, this proposal should include provision for an international force to maintain internal order during a transitional period.

19. The United States should oppose dispatch of armed forces to Palestine for the purpose of enforcing the Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, against the objections of the inhabitants of Palestine.

20. The United States should immediately urge all Arab states to refrain from any act of aggression against Palestine.

Document 18
Facsimile of Draft Message for the President from the Department of State, February 21, 1948

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Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

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DRAFT MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT

Following is outline of proposed United States policy on United Nations action with respect to Palestine which, if you approve, will be used as basis for Senator Austin's statement to the Security Council on Tuesday, February 24, and in subsequent United Nations consideration of the problem:

1. The problem of Palestine has been before the United Nations as a matter of special concern since the United Kingdom placed it before the General Assembly on April 2, 1947. The United States, as a loyal Member of the United Nations, has supported since that date those United Nations procedures which we considered best adapted to obtaining a broad and impartial expression of world opinion on the problem which would result in a just and workable solution and which would therefore commend itself to the Mandatory Power and to the people of Palestine.

2. As a result of the recommendations of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 on Palestine, that problem is now before several

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of the principal organs of the United Nations for various types of action under the Charter. The United States, as a Member of the United Nations and of these principal organs, will continue to deal with the question of Palestine as a Member of the United Nations and in conjunction with other Members. The United States will not act unilaterally. Its action on Palestine will be as a Member of the United Nations.

3. In view of the complexity and importance of the Palestine problem, every possible effort must be directed toward calmness and the avoidance of bitterness. The task will require the attention of the United Nations for some months to come. In dealing with the various aspects of this problem in the principal organs of the United Nations, the United States Government ~~does not intend to be influenced by threats~~ will not submit itself to pressures or by threats of any kind ~~or to yield to improper pressure~~ from any source, whether from within the United States, within Palestine, or from ~~the Arab world around Palestine.~~ We must decide what is right for us to advocate as a Member of the United Nations and we must pursue this course regardless of ~~such~~ pressures, or threats.

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4. During the consideration of this question in the various organs of the United Nations, the delegations of the other Members should ~~look~~ understand ~~only~~ to the United States Delegation representatives ~~for the authorita-~~ ~~tive statement of the~~ sole spokesman alone are authorized to present the attitude of the United States Government.

5. The recommendations of the General Assembly, although not legally binding, have great moral force and all Members are under ~~great~~ moral obligation to accept them and to give them full effect. The moral force of such recommendations applies to all Members regardless of the way in which they might have voted on any given recommendation.

6. Similarly, the Security Council, although not bound under the Charter to accept and carry out General Assembly recommendations, is nevertheless expected to give great weight to them.

7. The Security Council now has before it the recommendation of the General Assembly on Palestine of November 29, 1947 which was received by the Security Council on December 9, 1947 but which has not yet been acted upon by the Council. In addition, the Council has before it two

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two reports of the Palestine Commission, the first and interim Report of February 2, 1947 and a Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine of February 16, 1948. In determining what action it should take with respect to these three documents, the Security Council must consider the major responsibilities which derive from the recommendation of the General Assembly as well as the obligations and the powers of the Council under the Charter.

8. The Security Council is required by the Charter to take the necessary action to maintain international peace if it finds that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists with respect to Palestine. This might arise either in connection with incursions into Palestine from the outside or from such internal disorder as would itself constitute a threat to international peace. Although the Security Council is empowered to use, and would normally attempt to use, measures short of armed force to maintain the peace, it is authorized under the Charter to use armed forces if necessary

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for that purpose. A finding by the Security Council that a danger to peace exists places all Members of the United Nations, regardless of their attitudes on specific political questions, under obligation to assist the Council in maintaining peace. If the Security Council should decide that it is necessary to use armed forces to maintain international peace in connection with Palestine, the United States will be ready ~~to~~ with the approval of Congress to make available for use on behalf of the United Nations its share of the necessary forces and will look to other Members to do the same.

9. The Security Council is not authorized by the Charter, however, to employ enforcement measures ~~to~~ only to give effect to recommendations either of the General Assembly or of the Security Council itself. [Specifically, the Security Council may not use its enforcement measures to impose the partition plan recommended by the General Assembly upon the Mandatory Power or the peoples of Palestine.] The Council, under the Charter ~~possess~~, ~~can~~ to supplement its take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council, ~~by these same powers,~~ to supplement its can take action to prevent a threat to

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to international peace and security from inside Palestine. This enforcement action must be directed solely to the maintenance of international peace. It is not empowered with implementing by forceful means the Assembly's resolution on Palestine. The Council's action, in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition.

10. Apart from enforcement action, however, the Security Council can and should undertake to reach a settlement of the Palestine question along the lines of the General Assembly recommendation. It can accept the tasks which the General Assembly requested it to accept in the resolution of November 29, 1947 and can use its broad powers and great influence to find a peaceful settlement of the problem through agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

11. In summary, the Security Council takes action on the one hand to maintain international peace, calling upon its full authority under the Charter if necessary to use enforcement measures to that end; on the other hand, it should attempt to carry out the requests of the General

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General Assembly with respect to the partition plan, short of the use of its enforcement powers to impose the plan upon the people of Palestine; in any event, it should ~~take every effort~~ try to use its authority and experience in the field of peaceful settlement to obtain a result which is agreed between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

12. If the Security Council and the other organs of the United Nations are unable to give effect to the General Assembly resolution on Palestine for lack of sufficient acquiescence on the part of the people of Palestine to permit its implementation without enforcement measures, and if the Security Council is unable to develop an alternative solution by agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the matter should be referred back to a special session of the General Assembly. The Department of State considers that it would then be clear that Palestine is not yet ready for self-government and that some form of United Nations trusteeship for an additional period of time will be necessary.

13. Since the proposed effort to reach a peaceful solution under Security Council auspices may take additional time, it may be necessary for

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for the Security Council to consult with the United Kingdom and to ask it as Mandatory Power to retain the mandate pending further United Nations consideration and action on the matter.

14. In connection with the above, the Department of State plans to take vigorous diplomatic action with the Arab Governments and the representatives of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine to bring about an immediate cessation of violence and illegal acts of all kinds which are contributing to the present disorders in that country.

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February 20, 1948.

Document 19
Facsimile of Telegram from the Department of State to USUN, February 27, 1948

FORM DS-322
7-18-[illegible]

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By [illegible] NARA, Date [illegible]

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Department of State

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Washington

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Control 5663

Feb 27, 1948
6 p.m.

US URGENT

USUN

NEW YORK

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501.BB PALESTINE/2-2748

Secretary Marshall made the following statement on Palestine at his press conference Feb. 26:

QUOTE I tell you now I will not answer detailed questions on Palestine because there must be no confusion between Ambassador Austin and myself as to what is being stated and any statement will be made from there rather than from here.

Following for Ambassador Austin's confidential information only. Secretary Marshall then made the following statement completely OFF THE RECORD: QUOTE I will tell you this: That so far as I am concerned and the State Dept. is concerned, but particularly so far as I am concerned, that in this highly emotional period of extreme bitterness and violent attacks, my intention is to see that nothing is done by the State Dept. in guidance for the action of its delegates to the United Nations, in response to either military threats or political threats, one or the other, nothing whatever. My intention is to see that the action of the US Govt. is to be on a plane of integrity that will bear inspection and a common review and that there will be no bending to any military threat or to any political threat so long as I am Secretary of State. END OF OFF THE RECORD. UNQUOTE

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MARSHALL

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NEW YORK

Secretary Marshall made the following statement on Palestine at his press conference Feb 26:

QUOTE I tell you now I will not answer detailed questions on Palestine because there must be no confusion between Ambassador Austin and myself as to what is being stated and any statement will be made from there rather than from here. Following for Ambassador Austin: Confidential information only. Sec. Marshall ~~OFF THE RECORD entirely~~, "I will tell you this: That so far as I am concerned and the State DEPT is concerned, but particularly so far as I am concerned, that in this highly emotional period of extreme bitterness and violent attacks, my intention is to see that nothing is done by the State DEPT in guidance for the action of its delegates to the United Nations, in response to either military threats or political threats, one or the other, nothing whatever. My intention is to see that the action of the US GOVT is to be on a plane of integrity that will bear inspection and a common review and that there will be no bending to any military threat or to any political threat so long as I am Secretary of State. END OF OFF THE RECORD. UNQUOTE

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Document 20, Page 1
Report by the Central Intelligence Agency on Possible Developments in Palestine, February 28, 1948

Report by the Central Intelligence Agency[1]

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[WASHINGTON,] 28 February,

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE

SUMMARY

It is apparent that the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (and an international zone), with economic union between the two states, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 29 November 1947, cannot be implemented. The Arab reaction to the recommendation has been violent, and the Arab refusal to cooperate in any way with the five-nation United Nations Commission will prevent the formation o fan Arab state and the organization of economic union. The Arabs will use force to oppose the establishment of a Jewish state and to this end are training troops in Palestine and other Arab states. Moreover, the United Kingdom has stated repeatedly that it will take no part in implementing a UN decision not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. The British have also declared that when the mandate terminates on 15 May, they will not transfer authority to the UN Commission but will merely relinquish that authority, which would then be assumed by the UN. Thus, without Arab and British cooperation, the Commission will be unable to carry out the task assigned to it.

Even among the Jews there is dissatisfaction over the partition plan. Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, the two extremist groups, have refused to accept the plan and continue to claim all of Palestine (and even Transjordan) for the Jewish state. The Jewish Agency, official representative of the Jewish community, had hoped to obtain a larger portion of Palestine for the new state but has decided to cooperate with the UN Commission. Recruiting and training for Hagana, the Agency's military arm, have been increased, and the terrorist groups will join Hagana in the Arab fight despite their opposition to partition. The Jewish effort, however, will not be sufficient to enable the UN Commission to carry out partition as envisaged by the UNGA.

Since the complete partition plan cannot be implemented, the possible developments in Palestine resolve themselves into three main groups:

(1) *UN attempts to set up a Jewish state by force.*

Again, the UN would be balked by lack of Arab and British cooperation. While the UN might attempt to set up an international police force (which would have to be large and remain in Palestine indefinitely), the US and UK would have to consider the danger of permitting Soviet and/or Satellite troops to enter Palestine, and the USSR would undoubtedly object to any force not including these troops. It is possible that the SC might consider authorizing unilateral aid to the Jews by the member states of the UN, but such a course would be extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would take advantage of the opportunity to increase its influence in Palestine by supporting the Jews, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the SC.

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[1] According to a note in the source text: "The information in this report is as of 18 February 1948, at which time the report was submitted to the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council for coordination. This paper was concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies of the Department of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force on 19 February. On 20 February CIA disseminated an Advance Copy of the coordinated report."

(2) *No action by the UN.*

The UN would suffer a serious loss of prestige if it should wash its hands of the Palestine issue. Moreover, the Jewish-Arab conflict would increase and spread, and the USSR would be free to send troops into Palestine as it saw fit.

(3) *UN reconsideration of the whole issue.*

Reconsideration of the issue could be initiated in several ways. The SC might seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the UNGA recommendations and simultaneously arrange an Arab-Jewish truce. The Arabs would welcome such a step and the Jews would probably have to agree (though reluctantly) since the entire Jewish position is based on UN action. Jewish violence, however, would undoubtedly continue.

Should the issue be returned to the General Assembly, partition could be considered abandoned. Subsequent developments cannot be predicted, but it is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable to the Arabs, who would probably be willing to make some concessions on the basis of the Minority Report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine.

1. *Aims in Palestine After the Partition Recommendation.*

a. *Planned UN Course [sic] of Action.*

When the UNGA voted on 29 November 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, the course of action to be followed was clearly defined. A five-man commission with representatives from Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Bolivia, Panama, and the Philippines was to be organized in New York, together with a sizable secretariat of administrative officials and technical experts. After consultations with the mandatory power, the commission and its secretariat were to proceed to Palestine in the latter part of December 1947. When in Palestine, the UN Commission was to take over administrative responsibility from the UK in those areas from which the latter would progressively withdraw its troops. This withdrawal and the termination of the mandate were to take place not later than 1 August. (The mandatory subsequently announced that the mandate would terminate not later than 15 May.) During this period of transference of authority from the mandatory to the UN Commission, the latter was to cooperate with the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee in the formation of provisional councils of government of the prospective Jewish and Arab states and a Joint Economic Board. The provisional councils in both states were to be established by 1 April. Administrative authority was to be progressively turned over by the UN Commission to these two bodies, which would become the provisional governments of the two new states whose independence would be established not later than 1 October 1948. The UN Commission would also delimit the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states. All these recommendations of the UNGA were to be carried out be the UN Commission with the guidance of the Security Council.

b. *Planned UK Course of Action*

UK plans after the partition recommendation were exactly what they had been throughout the UNGA session. The British stated repeatedly that they would refuse to assist in implementing a UN decision not acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs. They based their stand on the thesis that until the mandate was terminated they were bound by its provisions. On this basis, the UK was determined to retain undivided responsibility for the administration and internal security of Palestine until the mandate was terminated. Thereafter, the UK would retain responsibility in any areas occupied by its military forces until those forces were withdrawn. Finally, the UK stated unequivocally that it would not transfer administrative authority to the UN Commission but would simply relinquish the authority, which would be immediately assumed by the UN. The UK

would not obstruct the efforts of the UN Commission; nor would it participate in the work of the Commission.

c. Planned Arab Course of Action

The UNGA recommendation on Palestine put the Arabs on the defensive, and consequently their plans were largely undeveloped. The very multiplicity of Arab states and of the groups within those states resulted in a spate of different proposals. In spite of these differences, however, the Arabs agreed that a Zionist state could not be tolerated in the Arab world. To prevent the formation of this state, the following general course of action should be envisaged:

(1) To make military preparations, both in Palestine and the Arab states, to prevent by military action the formation and functioning of a Jewish state.
(2) To refuse to cooperate with the UN Commission in any way.
(3) To establish an independent unitary state embracing all of Palestine.
(4) To prevent further Jewish immigration until an immigration policy could be formulated by the unitary state.

Various Arab groups contemplated two additional lines of action. The most responsible and moderate groups considered further action in the UN, while the most extreme and nationalistic groups urged the cancellation of all diplomatic and economic relations with those states that had supported partition. Whole neither of these proposals was generally agreed to, the Arab states sent strong notes of protest to the respective US chiefs of missions.

d. Jewish Course of Action

The Jewish plan of action after the UNGA recommendation was perfectly clear-cut. While the Jewish Agency, the official representative of the Jewish community, had hoped to obtain a larger portion of Palestine, it decided to cooperate with the UN Commission in the establishment of the proposed Jewish state. In the meantime, it planned to build up its internal security forces, train an administrative corps, and propagandize the rest of the world for financial and military assistance against any Arab attempts to prevent the implementation of the UNGA recommendation. The aims, however, of the Revisionists, including Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, were more extreme: to fight both the British and the Arabs and to set up a Jewish state in all of Palestine and Transjordan.

2. *Development of the Situation Since the Partition Recommendation.*

a. UN Activity

From the beginning, the UN had difficulty in carrying out its intended course of action. In spite of repeated urgent appeals by Secretary General Trygve Lie, the members of the UN Commission were not appointed by their respective governments until late in December and did not all reach New York for their first meeting until 9 January. Since then the UN Commission has made little progress for its success was predicated on the assumption that it would receive the cooperation of the Jews, and the Arabs, and the UK. Of these, only the Jews have fully cooperated. The Arabs have flatly refused to have anything to do with the Commission, and the UK's cooperation was considerably restricted by its interpretation of its responsibilities as mandatory power. UK refusal to allow the Commission to enter Palestine before 1 May (two weeks before the termination of the mandate) will make it impossible for the Commission to establish the provisional Arab and Jewish governments by the required date of 1 April. The UK refusal to relinquish any administrative authority in Palestine until after the termination of the mandate has prevented the progressive transfer of authority to the UN Commission. The Commission has also been

compelled to recognize the deplorable security situation in Palestine and realizes that it cannot attempt to carry out the recommendations of the UNGA without an adequate international police force.

b. UK Activity

UK Activity since the partition vote has been twofold. In Palestine the mandatory administration, its police, and the UK forces have been attempting to maintain internal security. They have been hampered by two main factors: (1) evacuation plans have considerably obstructed UK security measures; and (2) the UK desire not to antagonize the Arab states has prevented the implementation of full-scale security measures to repress Arab-Jewish hostilities. In spite of these reservations, UK forces have been impartial in attempting to curb Arab-Jewish hostilities. The major aims seem to have been to prevent general anarchy and full-scale war—at least until the forces themselves have withdrawn.

In the UN, the UK delegates have taken pains to acquaint the UN Commission with the difficulties of the Palestine situation. They have advised the UN Commission on administrative matters, on the question of the projected Jerusalem Trusteeship, and on the setting up of provisional governments. They have refused, however, to assume joint responsibility with the Commission for the establishment of the new states in Palestine or to permit any development which might be interpreted as UK support of one side against the other. On this ground, the UK has refused to open a port on 1 February to unlimited Jewish immigration, as recommended by the UNGA resolution.

c. Arab Activity.

Arab reaction to the UNGA partition plan was prompt and violent. Strikes and demonstrations led to scattered riots within Palestine, and Arab League action was instituted by the Arab states. The sporadic violence in Palestine had developed by the middle of January into more highly organized hostilities. By the beginning of February disciplined Arab bands were operating in different parts of the country, and the Arab Higher Committee claimed to be directing their activities. The nature of Arab activities indicated that until the British withdrawal Arab objectives were limited to: (1) avoiding, if possible, hostilities with the British forces; (2) purchasing and capturing essential supplies such as food, weapons, ammunition, and clothing; (3) disrupting Jewish commerce, transportation, and communications without launching full-scale attacks; (4) recruiting volunteer forces, within and without Palestine, and training them in guerrilla tactics; (5) setting up a unified military command; (6) establishing contact with Arab League channels of assistance. The entire emphasis has been on preparation for the British withdrawal, and the Arab leaders have apparently attempted to hold back their surging followers.

During a series of meetings at Sofar, Aley, and Cairo, Arab League representatives, despite differences of opinion, eventually evolved a program of action. The program, which in several particulars merely approved activities already under way, was immediately implemented and provided that: (1) the partisan movement in Palestine be supported with funds, arms, and men; (2) troops of the Arab states be stationed on the frontier of Palestine as a border watch; and (3) these armies not be sent into Palestine until after the British withdrawal. Funds were immediately raised in all the Arab states. Volunteers from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan foregathered at Qatana in Syria for training; and by the middle of February over 8,000 were known to have slipped, uniformed and armed, into Palestine. Syrian, Egyptian, and Transjordan troops had been moved to the Palestine border; and Iraqi contingents were reported to be moving into Transjordan. Determined efforts were made to obtain arms and ammunition. Syria signed a contract with Skoda, and a first delivery is known to have been made.

While the Arab chain of command has not been announce, the forces will be commanded by former Syrian and Iraqi army officers and experienced guerrilla leaders.

d. Jewish Activity

Having won the initial victory in the acceptance by the UNGA of the partition plan, the Jews concentrated (with some exceptions) on preparing for the new state. In the face of violent Arab opposition, the Jewish Agency immediately undertook: (1) to strengthen the internal defense forces of the prospective Jewish state; (2) to organize and train an administrative corp.; and (3) to cooperate with the UN in implementing the UNGA decision. Recruiting and training for Hagana were increased; and in spite of the fact that the mandatory refused to recognize its legality, it attempted to protect the Jewish community from Arab attacks and also acted as a local police force. In time, Hagana adopted a policy of "active" defense and carried out terrorist raids against the Arabs in similar tactics to those of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang against the UK forces. These two extremist groups continued their war against the British; and although they agreed to fight the Arabs together with Hagana, they refused to accept the partition recommendation and continued to claim all of Palestine (and even Transjordan) for the Jewish State.

3. Possible developments

a. General considerations

Partition as envisaged by the UNGA involves not only the creation of two states (and an international zone) but also economic union between the states. Such a plan cannot be implemented without Arab cooperation, and it is inconceivable that the Arabs will abandon their present violent opposition to partition. To the masses, the fight has become almost a religious tenet; to the governing classes, it has become a political creed which they dare not forsake. The Arabs can never be forced to acquiesce in a Western-sponsored movement which they believe is threatening the twentieth century renascence of their indigenous civilization. With implementation of the complete partition plan hopeless, the possible developments in Palestine resolve themselves into three main groups: (1) UN attempts to set up a Jewish state by force; (2) no action by the UN; and (3) UN reconsideration of the whole issue.

b. UN attempts to set up a Jewish state

(1) Possible British Assistance

An attempt might be made to persuade the UK to alter its current Palestine policy and to permit the foundation of a Jewish militia, to agree to the "progressive transfer" of authority, to allow the UN Commission to come to Palestine earlier than 1 May, to open immediately a "port and hinterland" for Jewish immigration, and to suppress Arab guerrilla activities. However, in view of the UK's serious economic difficulties, its disinclination to antagonize the Arab world, and its consistently "neutral" policy since it turned the whole problem over to the UN last year, the British cannot be expected to change their stand between now and 1 August. Therefore, a Jewish state can be established only in the event that the UN commission is given a police force sufficiently strong to withstand Arab aggression or that the Jews in Palestine are provided with enough military support from outside to overcome Arab opposition.

(2) Great Powers Police Force

An international police force established by the Security Council may be of various types. Obviously, the most effective force would be one composed of units from the armed forces of the five great powers. The USSR can be expected to welcome an opportunity to send its troops to Palestine; France, also, would probably be pleased to set foot once again in the Near East; China, for reasons of prestige, would want to be represented on an international police force but could

scarcely afford to spare any troops from the civil war in China. The UK will almost certainly refuse to contribute. US troops, according to President Truman, will not be sent to Palestine. The dispatch of a force composed only of contingents from the USSR, France, and possibly China would present the UK and the US with the alternatives of exercising the veto or of opening Palestine to Soviet infiltration.

(3) Medium Powers Police Force

A second possibility would be a force made up of contingents from the medium powers, but here again the UK and the US would have to consider the danger of permitting Soviet Satellite troops to enter Palestine. The USSR would probably veto the formation of any force that did not include Satellite representatives. Even if the great powers could agree on a force composed of contingents from the medium powers, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of nations would be willing to contribute adequate forces.

The formation of an international police force will depend, in the last analysis, not on a mere decision of the Security Council but on the willingness of nations to contribute to such a force. It is extremely unlikely that any nation would do so solely to maintain the prestige of the UN. In the present state of international security, probably no nation will send its troops to fight the Arabs in Palestine for the purpose of establishing a Jewish state unless its national interests are threatened by the failure of partition or unless it can hope to enlarge its sphere of influence. The USSR is the only nation that would gain from sending troops into Palestine. Since both the UK and the US have strong strategic reasons for refusing to allow Soviet or Soviet-controlled troops to enter Palestine, it is highly improbable that an international police force will ever be formed.

(4) Assistance to the Jews

The only alternative method, therefore, is for military aid to be sent to the Jews in such quantities that they will be able to suppress all Arab opposition, both internal and external, and set up and maintain an independent state. Such aid might take the form of a volunteer "international" force, or the Security Council could presumably recommend to the other member nations of the UN that the Arab states be boycotted as deliberately resisting a decision of the SC and that the Jewish state be supported with shipments of funds, arms, and ammunition. The UN commission might be retained as a liaison body between the Security Council and the new Jewish state. It could not delineate the frontiers recommended by the UNGA nor could it have any contacts with the Arabs, or establish a special administration in Jerusalem. Thus the entire purpose of the UNGA partition resolution would be distorted from the creation of *two* independent states in Palestine to the organization and defense of *one* state -- the Jewish state.

By sponsoring the formation of an "international" volunteering force, or by relinquishing the initiative and authorizing unilateral action by member states of the UN, the Security Council would recommend a course of action extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would be quick to take advantage of openings related to an SC decision to support the Jews, and thereby extend Soviet strategic influence into Palestine and the Near East, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the Security Council.

b. [*sic*] No action by the UN

If the UN were unable to agree on any action whatsoever, the consequences would be disastrous and appreciably decrease the prestige of the UN. The Jews and the Arabs in Palestine would be completely free to solicit aid from and make alliances with individual nations. It would be practically impossible to localize the conflict; any nation with vital interests in the Arab world would inevitably be embroiled. Since the struggling Jews and Arabs would accept aid from

whatever quarter offered, it is difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, the USSR could be prevented from sending troops into Palestine.

c. Reconsideration by the UN

(1) *General Considerations*

Since the failure of partition is already evident, and in view of the dangers attendant on the establishment of a Jewish state, it appears that the only course open to the UN is to consider the whole issue. For the UN to admit error and to undertake reconsideration would be a momentous step to necessitating considerable moral courage, but such procedure would be quite in line with the general practice of tribunals in permitting reargument where doubt is entertained as to the correctness of the original decision. To comprehend the overriding necessity for such a step, two factors must be understood: (1) that Arab opposition automatically invalidates the UNGA partition recommendations, whose basic assumption is Arab-Jewish cooperation; (2) that even if a Jewish state could be established and defended by force of arms, it would have to defend itself continuously not only against its hostile neighbors but against the resistance of 450,000 Arabs within its own borders until such time as Arab nationalism no longer existed; and (3) that full recourse to all judicial procedures before action is taken would help to establish world confidence in the fairness and justice of the UN as an instrument for world peace.

(2) *Security Council Action*

Reconsideration by the UN of the Palestine issue could be initiated in several ways. The Security Council, after failing to agree on measures to implement partition, may ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legality of the UNGA recommendations. At the same time, it might urge a truce between the Arabs and Jews and designate either the present Palestine Commission or some newly formed Security Council agent to arrange and supervise the truce. Since this step would constitute a completely new development, and one long urged by the Arabs, the Arabs would almost certainly agree to such a truce. Since the entire Jewish position is based on UN action, the Jews would have no alternative but to agree although Jewish violence would probably continue. The Security Council might, on the other hand, refer the question to the Little Assembly or take no action. The proposal for a UN conciliation board, if carried through, would furnish an opportunity for reconsideration without damage to UN prestige.

(3) *General Assembly Action*

Should the Security Council fail to agree on any action whatsoever, the UN commission, even if it agrees to go to Palestine to help the Jews set up their state, would probably report to the Secretary General that the UNGA recommendations could be implemented to only a limited extent. The Secretary General could then refer the issue to the Little Assembly or even summon a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the whole question. (The Little Assembly itself has the authority to summon a special session of the General Assembly.) Once the issue has been returned to the General Assembly, partition could be considered abandoned. It is impossible to predict what new developments would take place, but it is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable to the Arabs, who would probably be willing to make some concessions on the basis of the UNSCOP Minority Report.

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March 5, 1948
5 p.m.

USUN

NEW YORK

WIACT107 3/c

501.BB Palestine/3-448

Careful review has been made of draft statement on United Nations responsibility for Palestine as of May 15, 1948 and of your 242, March 4.

It is our opinion that the essential factor in Security Council's consideration of Palestine problem is whether or not Council will accept plan of partition with economic union recommended by General Assembly last Nov. 29. This question is posed specifically to Council in Par. 1 of US Res. of Feb. 25. You again laid stress on this essential question in your remarks to Council on March 2.

We had thought it preferable to bring this issue to sharp focus in the vote today on US Res. of Feb. 25 and Belgian amendment seeking to delete Para. 1 of that res., dated Feb. 27.

See New York Tel. 242 March 4 501.BB Pales

However, following telephone conversations with USUN we defer to your judgment that it is essential for Council's conciliatory machinery to be used before final decision is taken. We shall be guided by your opinion that issue will mature more naturally in a week or ten days' time and that the conciliatory machinery of the Council will result in showing beyond any doubt whatsoever

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whatsoever that the differing attitudes of the Jews for partition, Arabs against partition, and the Mandatory Power for leaving Palestine, are at present irreconcilable.

Should the conciliatory process reach what seems to be this inevitable conclusion there is still need of a clear-cut decision by the Council ~~mfx~~ on whether or not to accept the requests made of it by the General Assembly. We do not feel it incumbent on the United States to draw its own conclusions after the results of conciliation are known and then to suggest the specific program outlined in your 242. Rather, we feel that the matter should be brought to a vote, not (repeat not) at the instance of the United States but on the motion of some colleague such as Colombia or China. This could be done, for example, in a resolution pointing to the negative results of conciliation as confirming the Council's previous negative vote on paragraph 1 of the United States resolution of February 25.

On such a resolution the United States would abstain on the ground that it did not wish to cast a veto. This would indicate that we were impressed by the facts reported by the Conciliation Committee but would not force us to go on record as voting against partition.

As for the debate in the Council today, on the United States and Belgian Resolutions, you have already been instructed by telephone to indicate

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indicate our strong opposition to the essential aim of the Belgian Resolution which is to delete Paragraph 1 of the United States Resolution. You will point out that a bare ten weeks' interval between now and May 15, the announced date of termination of UK responsibility for Palestine. You will stress that the Council cannot evade a decision on whether or not to accept the requests of the General Assembly's Resolution of November 29.

The approved text of the proposed statement on United Nations responsibility for Palestine after May 15 follows by separate telegram, with certain minor textual changes. You should add the following conclusions:

QUOTE Now that the conclusions have been made clear, what is the next task of this Council?

See Draft of State Statement March 28/48 Austin's speech of March 19/48 at U.N. & March version of this text (p. 3-4) is given at end of his speech (p. 4-7 USB)

By the vote on March _____ it is evident that the Security Council has rejected the requests made of it by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947. It is evident that the Security Council has rejected the partition of Palestine.

As I pointed out a few moments ago, my Government believes that the plan proposed by the General Assembly was an integral plan and, as the Chairman of the Palestine Commission clearly indicated, it would not succeed unless each of its parts were carried out.

The decision of the Security Council has been taken. This decision is contrary to the position which the United States Delegation has

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has taken but as a loyal member of this Council we defer to the will of the majority.

The Security Council now has before it clear evidence that the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and the Mandatory Power are not prepared to implement the General Assembly plan of partition through peaceful means. The announced determination of the Mandatory Power to terminate the Mandate on May 15, 1948, if carried out by the UK, would clearly result, in light of information now available, in chaos and heavy fighting in Palestine. We cannot believe that the UN, the Mandatory Power, or the inhabitants of Palestine could permit such a result. We believe that every possible effort should be made by all concerned to find a peaceful settlement prior to departure of British forces from that country.

The United States believes that the Security Council should ~~should~~ take immediate steps for the maintenance of international peace and security and for finding of a settlement of the Palestine problem. The United States believes that the Security Council should now:

(A) Take all measures under the Charter to ensure that the situation in Palestine shall not become a threat to international peace and security.

(B) Request the Secretary-General to convoke immediately a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of Palestine.

(C) Continue

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(C) Continue its efforts, in consultation with Representatives of the principal communities of Palestine and the Mandatory Power, to ascertain whether there is any basis for agreement on a future government of Palestine which would permit the early attainment of independence by that country.

(D) In the event that the consultation foreseen in (C) above proves without affirmative result, to consider recommendation to the Special Session of the General Assembly that until the people of Palestine are ready for self-government they should be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations.

(E) Request the UK to reconsider its decision to terminate the mandate on May 15, 1948, pending further consideration of the problem by the General Assembly and in order that the United Nations may make further efforts to find a peaceful solution.

(F) Instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its activities pending further recommendations by the General Assembly.

The United States makes these suggestions to the Council because of our deep concern over the prospective course of events in Palestine. As I stated in my remarks to Council on February 24, the United States seeks a solution for Palestine within the framework of the United Nations. That means, of course, that we would be glad to consider any other proposals from any source which might provide an answer for this complicated

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complicated question. We are convinced, however, that whatever is to be done must be done promptly, and that further delay may become synonymous with disaster. END QUOTE.

MARSHALL

Marshall

U
(Cleared with Mr. Lovett)

NEA
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(Abstention)

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NEW YORK

108/9/C

March 5, 1948
4 p.m.

Following is approved text of proposed statement by Ambassador Austin on situation in Palestine after British withdrawal May 15, 1948:

QUOTE In his statement to the Security Council on February 24, 1948, the representative of the United Kingdom said, "My Government are bringing to an end the discharge of their responsibilities towards Palestine under the Mandate and are leaving the future of that country to international authority."

On March 2, 1948, the Representative of the United Kingdom referred, in his statement to the Council, to "whatever procedure the United Nations may decide to adopt with a view to assuming responsibility for the Government of Palestine on May 15th", and concluded with the statement, "finally, I must repeat that the United Kingdom cannot enter into any new or extended commitment in regard to Palestine. Our contribution has already been made over the years and the date of termination of our responsibility is irrevocably fixed."

The status of Palestine will be equivocal because the United Kingdom seeks to give up the Mandate. Article 5 of the Mandate in respect of Palestine provides:

"The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power."

In the

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See Dept of State Bulletin March 28/48. Text in 108 included in Austin's speech of March 19 - pp. 405-07 - [illegible]

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In the premises there is the urgent need for a prompt decision by the Security Council on the General Assembly recommendation as well as an early clarification of United Nations responsibility toward Palestine.

The General Assembly and the Security Council have broad responsibilities in fidelity to the principles of justice and the aims of the Charter to assist in bringing about a pacific settlement of situations and disputes placed before them. The Security Council has specific obligations and powers where it finds a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. I have already dealt, in my statement to the Security Council on February 24 and March 2, with these responsibilities.

The assumption of administrative or governmental responsibility by the United Nations is another matter. If the United Nations is to act as a government, a large administrative task is involved. The Organization itself becomes directly responsible for all phases of the life of the people over whom such powers are exercised. It is a formidable responsibility and a heavy financial commitment is incurred by all 57 Members of the Organization.

The United Nations does not automatically fall heir to the responsibilities either of the League of Nations or of the Mandatory Power in respect of the Palestine Mandate. The record seems to us entirely clear that the United Nations did not take over the League of Nations mandate system.

The League

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The League of Nations Assembly on April 18, 1946, at its final session, passed a resolution which included the following two paragraphs:

"The Assembly

"3. Recognizes that, on the termination of the League's existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will cease to an end, but notes that Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League;

"4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective Mandatory Powers."

At the first part of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, on February 12, 1946, the Assembly passed a Resolution regarding the transfer of certain functions, activities, and assets of the League of Nations to the United Nations. No transfer of functions concerning Mandates was mentioned. The Resolution included the statement that:

"The General Assembly will itself examine, or will submit to the appropriate organ of the United Nations, any request from the parties that the United Nations should assume the exercise of functions or powers entrusted to the League of Nations by treaties, international conventions, agreements, and other instruments having a political character."
Provision

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Revised changes ref March 19 speech.

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Provision was made in the United Nations Charter for the voluntary placing of mandates under a trusteeship system by means of trusteeship agreements between the General Assembly or the Security Council and the states directly concerned, including the Mandatory Power. By such an agreement, the United Nations itself under article 81 of the Charter could become the administering authority for a trust territory. No such proposal has been made by the Mandatory Power with respect to Palestine and no action has been taken by the United Nations itself which would have that result.

New sentence added [ ] We think it clear that the United Nations does not succeed to administrative responsibility for Palestine merely because the latter is a Mandate. Signing the Charter did not commit the signatories to a contingent liability for mandates, to become operative by [the unilateral] decisions of Mandatory Powers to abandon their mandates. new sentence added here

Does the General Assembly recommendation of November 29, 1947 constitute an acceptance by the United Nations of governmental responsibility for Palestine? Let us examine the facts.

On April 2, 1947 the United Kingdom directed the following request to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular Annual Session. They will submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the Mandate and will ask the Assembly

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Assembly to make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine.

"In making this request, His Majesty's Government drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine and to the risk that the General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recommendations at its next regular annual session unless some preliminary study of the question had previously been made under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore request the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly, of the question referred to in the preceding paragraph."

From this it is clear that the question of Palestine came before the General Assembly only as a request for a recommendation. No proposal was made by the United Kingdom to the General Assembly that the United Nations itself undertake responsibility for the government of Palestine.

Following consideration of the question of Palestine in a special session, in a special committee (UNSCOP), and by an Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly at its Second Regular Session, the General Assembly passed a Resolution which recommended "to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations, the adoption

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adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the plan of partition with economic union" set forth in the Resolution. Under the plan, the United Nations agreed, as a part of the recommended general settlement, to undertake administrative responsibilities for the City of Jerusalem. Further, the General Assembly agreed that a commission elected by it would perform certain functions to effect the transfer of responsibility from the Mandatory Power to the successor governments in Palestine. The limited responsibilities of the United Nations set forth in the plan are inseparable from the plan as a whole and are dependent upon the adoption and implementation of the entire plan. This essential unity of the General Assembly recommendation was emphasized by the Chairman of the Palestine Commission in his statement to the Security Council on February 24: Quote from That key ABC statement.

"I have put more stress upon the words 'Plan of Partition as it has been envisaged by the General Assembly', since it is with the implementation of such Plan that our Commission has been entrusted. It is quite natural -- and legitimate -- for interested parties to concentrate their efforts preponderantly -- if not exclusively -- on such parts of the Plan as are intended more especially for their sake.

The Commission

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The Commission is not in such a position; its duty, according to its terms of reference, is to provide for the implementation of the whole Plan which has been conceived by the General Assembly as a whole. . .

"Since the Plan has been envisaged as a whole, the realization and sound functioning of one part of the Plan has been made, in a substantial degree, dependent upon the establishment and functioning of its other parts."

The limited functions which the General Assembly offered to undertake in connection with its Palestine recommendation stand or fall with that resolution.

If it proves impossible to give effect to that resolution, the United Nations will have, on May 15, 1948, no administrative and governmental responsibilities for Palestine, unless further action is taken by the General Assembly.

End of text included in Austin speech

We conclude that a unilateral decision by the United Kingdom to terminate the Palestine Mandate cannot automatically commit the United Nations to responsibility for governing that country. END NOTE.

Conclusion of this statement will be as set forth in D PT's immediately preceding HEACT telegram.

MARSHALL

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Document 22
Clifford Memorandum to President Truman, March 8, 1948

Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford) to President Truman

[WASHINGTON?,] March 8, 1948

It seems to me that much of the discussion about our foreign policy--and specifically the Palestine issue--does not touch the fundamentals of the problem. I am, therefore, taking the liberty of presenting to you my own views.

At the outset, let me say that the Palestine problem should not be approached as a Jewish question, or an Arab question, or a United Nations question. The sole question is what is best for the United States of America. Furthermore, one's judgment in advising as to what is best for America must in no sense be influenced by the election this fall. I know only too well that you would not hesitate to follow a course of action that makes certain the defeat of the Democratic Party if you thought such action were best for America. What I say is, therefore, completely uninfluenced by election considerations.

I

There are some who criticize your actions last fall in actively supporting partition in Palestine. They argue that this embarked the United States on a new policy; that this new policy involves military commitments which we are unable to perform; and that, therefore, we should seek some other solution. This argument is completely fallacious.

Your action in supporting partition is in complete conformity with the settled policy of the United States. Palestine was Turkish territory prior to World War I. It was captured by the Allies. The Balfour Declaration favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", was made November 2, 1917. Its test had been submitted to President Wilson and approved by him before its publication. It was publicly endorsed by the French and Italian Governments in April 1920. The principal Allied powers decided that the mandate for the government of Palestine should be entrusted to Great Britain and that the mandatory power was to be responsible for putting the Balfour Declaration into effect. The substance of the Balfour Declaration has been restated by Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt and yourself. The Balfour Declaration was approved by joint resolution of Congress June 30, 1922. It was reaffirmed in the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924. The Balfour policy was again approved in a declaration by members of the Senate and the House of the 77th Congress, which was submitted to the President t November 2, 1942, signed by 68 Senators and 193 members of the House.

In 1944 both the Democratic and the Republican National Conventions adopted resolutions favoring the establishment in Palestine of "a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth".

Under date of July 2, 1945, a letter was addressed to you signed by a majority of both Houses of Congress, stating "that the time for action is now" and urged "all interested governments to join with the United States toward the end of establishing Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth at the earliest possible time." A letter to the same effect dated July 2, 1945 was addressed to you and signed by the governors of forty of the forty-eight states of the United States. On December 19, 1945, a concurrent resolution was adopted by Congress which resolved that the United States use its good offices towards the establishment of a democratic commonwealth in Palestine.

There are numerous other declarations of policy by the United States Government to the same effect. Your active support of partition was in complete harmony with the policy of the United States. Seldom has any policy of this government been so clearly

and definitely established. Had you failed to support partition, you would have been departing from an established American policy and justifiably subject to criticism.

Partition unquestionably offers the best hope of a permanent solution of the Palestine problem that may avoid war. The policy of drift and delay urged by opponents of partition makes *absolutely certain* the very military involvements that they profess they want to avoid. Your action on partition in no wise [sic] extended the military commitments of the United States. It was a high-minded; statesmanlike adoption of *the one* course of action that may avoid military involvement.

II.

Not only is partition in conformity with established American policy, not only is partition the only hope of avoiding military involvement of the United States in the Near East, but, in addition, partition is the only course of action with respect to Palestine that will strengthen our position vis-à-vis Russia.

One of the most fundamental objectives of American foreign policy is that no aggressive military power shall establish itself on the shores of Western Europe. Germany became a real threat to the United States when she moved to establish herself in Channel ports. Twice we went to war to throw her back from these.

Britain likewise has no desire to see an aggressive military power establish itself in Western Europe. But Britain also has primary interests all over southern Asia and Africa. Britain, therefore, must consider her military position on those continents. Economic exhaustion has necessitated the limitation of her military forces. To compensate for curtailment of her military forces in Asia and the Near East, Britain is deliberately building up an alliance with the Moslem world. Such an alliance, she undoubtedly feels, will give her friendly populations from Pakistan west across Asia Minor and all along the shores of North Africa.

While the British-Moslem alliance is undoubtedly extremely important to Britain, a similar alliance between the United States and the Moslem world is much less important to the United States. Our primary interests demand alliances with the nations to the south of us and along the shores of Western Europe.

III.

Events have proved that, for the present at least, "one world" is impossible of attainment--either within the United Nations or otherwise. Normally, the cohesive force that holds an organization together is opposition from the outside. The absence of such opposition from the outside tends to cause the organization to break into factions. The existence of the Axis military was the cohesive force that held the Allied Nations together during the war. With the military collapse of the Axis, unity among the Allied powers ceased. When all the nations of the world unite in a peace organization, there is no outside opposition. We are in no danger from attack from Mars. Therefore, a world organization tends to break into factions. This is what happened to the League of Nations. It is also happening in the United Nations. The United Nations is now dividing between the Soviet faction and the United States faction.

IV.

The development of factions within the United Nations compels the United States to determine its course of action vis-à-vis the United Nations.

We must admit that the possibility of the United Nations affording adequate military protection to us becomes more and more remote. One course of action that the United States might follow would be to make less and less use of the United Nations

machinery. This would inevitably lead ultimately to the collapse of the United Nations. Such a policy, in my opinion, would be tragic.

In the first place, the United Nations is a God-given vehicle through which the United States can build up a community of powers in Western Europe and elsewhere to resist Soviet aggression and maintain our historic interests. It is the best conceivable mechanism to capitalize on the Marshall plan politically. We can cement alliances immediately through the United Nations mechanisms which could not be brought about by fifty years of diplomacy.

Secondly, a jettisoning of the United Nations would be calamitous to American morale. The American people want peace. They fervently believe that the United Nations offers the best hope for peace. They would go to war to sustain the United Nations as an instrumentality for peace. The cruel fact is that American morale is collapsing right around us today because the American people feel that their government is aiding and abetting in the disintegration of the United Nations--the one great hope of the American people for peace. Nothing has contributed so much to this feeling as Senator Austin's recent statement. In large part, it seemed to be the sophistries of a lawyer attempting to tell what we *could not* do to support the United Nations--in direct contradiction to your numerous statements that we mean to do everything possible *to support* the United Nations.

Not only do the American people see their government failing to back up the United Nation's [sic] position on Palestine but now they hear talk of our entering into military alliances with the powers of Western Europe with no reference to such action coming within the framework of the United Nations. The American people grasped at the United Nations, believing it would save them from being engulfed in World War III. Suddenly, they see what they thought was dry land begin to sink--sink because of what they regard as supineness of their own government.

All of this is causing a complete lack of confidence in our foreign policy from one end of this country to the other and among all classes of our population. This lack of confidence is shared by Democrats, Republicans, young people and old people. There is a definite feeling that we have no foreign policy, that we do not know where we are going, and that the President and the State Department are bewildered, that the United States, instead of furnishing leadership in world affairs, is drifting helplessly.

I believe all of this can be changed.

V.

PROPOSED UNITED STATES POLICY

1. While recognizing that the United Nations will not afford us adequate military protection, we should nevertheless support it to the limit as an instrumentality already in existence which is well-nigh a perfect mechanism for such purpose.

Any military arrangement with Western European powers must be pictured as coming completely within the framework of the United Nations. If this is done, it will receive the support of the American people. If this is not done, we will see an isolationism develop in America that will make any military alliances or intelligent foreign policy well-nigh impossible within the foreseeable future.

2. In order to save the United Nations for our own selfish interests, the United States must promptly and vigorously support the United Nations actions regarding Palestine. We "crossed the Rubicon" on this matter when the partition resolution was adopted by the Assembly--largely at your insistence. A retreat now will be a body blow to the United Nations. We cannot hope to cement alliances in South America and Western Europe if we back out now. Those countries would justifiably discount the value of any commitments we might propose to make in the face of our repudiation of a commitment we only made last November.

3. The British have announced that they intend to withdraw from Palestine by May 15th. Unless affirmative action is taken immediately by both the United States and the Security Council to preserve peace in Palestine, the withdrawal of Britain's military forces on May 15th will be followed by chaos and bloody war.

4. There is no more certain way of having Russia move into the Arabian Peninsula than for us to permit war to develop between the Jews and the Arabs--and this is as certain as the rising of tomorrow's sun, less we move promptly to prevent it. Furthermore, when this happens, Russia can move in unilaterally as the defender of world peace and champion of the United Nations. To permit this to happen would be disastrous.

5. It is argued that our Arabian oil supplies will be imperiled if we support the Assembly's resolution for partition of Palestine. The United States and Western Europe can only get oil from Arabia if there is peace in Arabia. Peace in Arabia can only be maintained by backing up the Arabs or by backing up the United Nations. The time for new solutions or compromises ended when the Assembly adopted the partition resolution. It is utterly unthinkable for the United States now to back the Arabs and openly oppose a decision of the United Nations Assembly, arrived at your own insistence. The only alternative is, therefore, to back up the United Nations so that there will be peace in Palestine.

6. There are those who say that such a course of action will not get us oil, that the Arabs will not sell us oil if we back up the United Nations partition plan. The fact of the mater is that the Arab states must have oil royalties or go broke. For example, 90% of Saudi Arabia's revenues come from American oil royalties. The Arab states have no customer for their oil other than the United States:

a) they must have dollars and can get dollars only from the United States;

b) their social and economic structure would be irreparably harmed by adopting a Soviet orientation, and it would be suicide for their ruling classes to come within the Soviet sphere of influence;

c) Saudi Arabia possesses the greatest oil deposits in this area. King Ibn Saud has publicly and repeatedly refused even to threaten the United States with cancellation of oil leases, despite his dislike for our partition position.

7. America's security and its oil interests in the Middle East depend upon effective enforcement of the United Nations decision on Palestine. In terms of military necessity, political and economic self-preservation will compel the Arabs to sell their oil to the United States. Their need of the United States is greater than our need of them.

8. There are those who say that partition will not work and that another solution must be found. This comes from those who never wanted partition to succeed and who have been determined to sabotage it. If anything has been omitted that could help kill partition, I do not know what it would be. First, Britain, the Mandatory Power, not only publicly declared she would have no part of it, but she has done everything possible to prevent effective action by the Palestine Commission. Next, we have placed an embargo on arms to Palestine, while Britain fulfills her "contract obligations" to supply arms to the Arabs. Thirdly, our State Department has made no attempt to conceal their dislike for partition. Fourthly, the United States appears in the ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a few nomadic desert tribes. This has done us irreparable damage. Why should Russia or Yugoslavia, or any other nation treat us with anything but contempt in light of our shilly-shallying appeasement of the Arabs. [sic] After all, the only successful opposition to the Russian advance has been in Greece and Turkey. You proclaimed a bold policy and stood your ground. The Truman Doctrine, so far, has been the one outstanding success in a disintegrating situation.

In case you are interested, I am sending you herewith a separate memorandum detailing suggestions for action in the Palestine situation.

[ANNEX]

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN PALESTINE

1. *American Security and Peace in Palestine:* American security and our vital interests in the Middle East's oil depend upon peace in Palestine. UN's failure to enforce its Palestine plan will bring bitter warfare between Arabs and Jews. Peace in Palestine depends on firm UN action, which is impossible without American leadership.

2. *American Security and Russian Penetration into Middle East:* UN abdication in Palestine leaves a military vacuum there after May 15 when Great Britain withdraws. Unless UN implements its Palestine decision, Russia may intervene unilaterally in the guise of preserving world peace and defending the UN Charter.

3. *American Security and Middle East Oil:* The Arab States will continue to sell oil to the United States. The Arabs need us more than we need them. They must have oil royalties or go bankrupt. 90% of Saudi Arabia's governmental revenues derive from American oil royalties, and King Ibn Saud has publicly refused even to threaten cancellation of United States oil leases despite his dislike of our partition position.

The Arab States must have dollars, and can get dollars only from the United States. The Arab leaders would be committing suicide to accept Russian orientation.

4. *American Security and Jewish Palestine:* Jewish Palestine is strongly oriented to the United States, and away from Russia, and will remain so unless a military vacuum in Palestine caused by collapse of UN authority brings Russian unilateral intervention into Palestine.

5. *American Security and UN's Palestine Decision:* Collapse of a UN decision taken at the insistence of the United States would cause serious loss of American prestige and moral leadership all over the world. Arab league negation of partition is not only open defiance of UN, but also deliberate and insolent defiance of the United States which vigorously espoused partition.

American self-interest, American military security, American interests in the Middle East oil, and American prestige in international affairs all demand effective implementation of the UN Palestine decision. The most effective way to prevent Russian penetration into the Middle East and to protect vital American oil interests there is for the United States to take the immediate initiative in the Security Council to implement the General Assembly's Palestine resolution.

Document 23

Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Before the Security Council, March 19, 1948.

The Security Council now has before it clear evidence that the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and the Mandatory Power cannot agree to implement the General Assembly plan of partition through peaceful means. The announced determination of the Mandatory power to terminate the Mandate on 15 May, 1948, if carried out by the United Kingdom, would result, in the light of information now available, in chaos, heavy fighting and much loss of life in Palestine. The United Nations cannot permit such a result. The loss of life in the Holy Land must be brought to an immediate end. The maintenance of international peace is at stake.

The United States fully subscribes to the conclusion reached by the four permanent members that the Security Council should make it clear to the parties and Governments concerned that the Security Council is determined not to permit the situation in Palestine to threaten international peace and, further, that the Security Council should take further action by all means available to it to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine.

Under the Charter, the Security Council has both an inescapable responsibility and full authority to take the steps necessary to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine, and a halt to the incursions being made in that country. The powers of Articles 39, 40,41, and 42 are very great, and the Security Council should not hesitate to use them -- all of them -- if necessary to bring about peace.

In addition, my Government believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to maintain the peace and to afford the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, who must live together, further opportunity top reach an agreement regarding the future government of that country.

Document 24
Facsimile of Humelsine Memorandum to the Secretary of State, March 22, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By (RM) NARA, Date

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

March 22, 1948

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Lovett gave me the following statement on Palestine this morning. He asked that a copy of it be passed along to you for your information.

When Clifford called me he took the line that the President said he had never approved the so-called "Mandate Speech" of Austin's, which was submitted to the President and which carried at the end the recommendation for the trusteeship. Actually that document was taken over to Clifford (to be given to the President) by McClintock on March 6, the day after the President returned from his trip. That same day the President called me to come over around noon, and I asked him at that time if he had received the document which we had sent over earlier that morning. He said he had the document and would read it.

Then, as I recall, on Monday the 8th the Secretary took me to the White House to report on two things, ERP and Palestine. At that time I outlined the situation as follows: That on the 5th the Security Council had considered our no. 1 proposal (which was to accept the plan and implement it) and had voted that down. The Security Council then had moved to the remainder of our motion to take up paragraphs 2 and 3 (the consultation part of the thing), but although paragraph 1 had been voted down, that I (Lovett) would not consider this vote-down as a complete rejection. At that time the President asked me what the outlook was, and I said it was bad because we had only gotten 5 votes for implementation of the GA proposal, and our people in New York thought we could not get the 7 votes to pass it. I said that we would have to have an alternative and that

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NND 760050
By NARS, Date

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Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

that was the trusteeship proposal contained in the latter part of the draft statement. The President said we were to go though and attempt to get approval of implementation of the GA resolution but if we did not get it we could take the alternative step. That was perfectly clear. He said it to General Marshall and to me. I came back to the office, and then went to lunch.

When I got back from lunch I told McClintock the President had approved the mandate speech as a second step after we had gotten licked on the other. There is absolutely no question but what the President approved it.

There was a definite clearance there. I stress it because Clifford told me the President said he did not know anything about it.

Humelsine

S/S:CHH:JGC

Document 25
Facsimile of Telegram from USUN to the State Department, March 30. 1948

NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Control 10221

Rec'd March 30, 1948
6:50 p. m.

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: NIACT 349, March 30, 6:20 p. m.

US URGENT

Please transmit following NIACT from Austin for the Secretary at Bogota.

USUN today submitted two resolutions to SC, one calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and truce in Palestine and the other for convocation of special session of GA to consider problem of future government in that country.

Argentine delegation has been under consistent instructions from its government to refrain on all motions concerning Palestine. However, Ambassador Arce is tonight telephoning his Foreign Minister in Bogota to request permission to vote affirmatively on both our resolutions. Arce is strongly in favor on humanitarian grounds of the US resolution proposing a truce and feels that our suggestion for a special session is only means of making progress at this juncture on Palestine problem.

You may accordingly feel that it would be opportune to suggest to Argentine Foreign Minister our view that calling of special session is indeed worthy of support of all members of SC.

While every indication is that Colombian representative will vote affirmatively on both motions, it might be useful if suitable representations were made to Colombian Foreign Office in order that this vote may be assured when Council meets on Thursday, April 1, at 2:30 p.m.

AUSTIN

EHL:WH

NOTE: Relayed Bogota 3/30/48 7 p. m. JRL

501 BB PALESTINE/3-3048

SECRET FILE

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APR 9 1948

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Document 26
Facsimile of Telegram from USUN to the State Department, March 30, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date 7/1/70

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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Control 10224
Rec'd March 30, 1946
7:19 p.m.

FROM: New York
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 350, March 30, 8:20 p.m.

FOR RUSK FROM MCCLINTOCK

Chairman Tsiang adjourned this afternoon's session of SC without calling for a vote on the two US resolutions on Palestine for the announced reason that no further speakers were on his list and that he had agreed with incoming SC President Lopez that it would, therefore, be best to consider matter further at a meeting on Thursday, April 1 at 2:30 p.m. One conjecture for Tsiang's decision was that he feared that while sufficient votes were assured for passage of US resolution on cessation of hostilities and negotiation of a truce, he doubted if the necessary seven votes were at hand to pass resolution calling for special session of GA.

As of this afternoon China, Belgium, France, UK, Colombia, Canada and US were clearly in favor of our resolution on the truce. Argentina was instructed to abstain, the attitude of Syria was problematical although a representative of AHC said he thought Syria would have voted affirmatively, and USSR and Ukraine should be put in the very doubtful column. Again as of this afternoon on resolution to convoke special session, we listed affirmatively votes of China, Belgium, Colombia, Canada, Syria and US, with France, UK and Argentina abstaining and USSR and Ukraine voting no.

USUN recommends that immediate representations be made in London and Paris designed to swing French and UK votes to the affirmative on resolution calling for special GA session.

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PALESTINE/3-3048

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Facsimile of Telegram from USUN to the State Department, March 30, 1948

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NND 760050
By NARA, Date

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[illegible] 350, March 30, 6:20 p.m., from New York.

session. A separate telegram to Bogota makes similar suggestion with respect to Argentina.

Our present impression as to real reason why Chairman Tsiang declined to press for a vote this afternoon was that, as representative of China, he was not eager in event of Soviet veto to interpret parliamentary situation in manner not pleasing to USSR.

AUSTIN

EHL:SP

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Document 27
Facsimile of Telegram Containing Marshall's Response, March 31, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Control 4

Rec'd April 1, 1948
12:38 a.m.

OFFICE OF
AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS
APR 1 1948
DIVISION OF SPECIAL
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

FROM: Bogota

TO: Secretary of State

NO: NIACT Unnumbered, March 31, 7 p.m.

FOLLOWING SENT TO NEW YORK FOR AMBASSADOR AUSTIN FROM CARTER:

Argentine Foreign Minister authorized Dr. Arce by telephone today to support US position. He said he would also telegraph confirmation to Arce.

The Colombian Foreign Office reports that the standing instructions of its delegate are to support US position. They are suggesting to the Foreign Minister that he telegraph Colombian delegate specifically on the two resolutions you submitted. They have not yet confirmed despatch of such instructions but we assume it is being done, and will follow it up.

MARSHALL

MJF:JTP

NOTE: Repeated New York 1 a.m. 4/1/48...FMH

Note: Reference 349 from New York March 30, 1948.

501.BB PALESTINE/3-3148

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APR 9 1948
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Document 28
Facsimile of Telegram from Lovett to the U.S. Embassy, March 31, 1948

UNCLASSIFIED
NND 760050
By NARA, Date

FORM DS-322
7-18-46

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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US URGENT

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LONDON

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Control 7021

March 31, 1948
11 a.m.

NIACT 1099

USDEL understands that UKDEL intends vote for truce resolution in UNSC but to abstain on resolution calling for special session GAUN on Palestine.

DEPT feels that UK would in no way be receding from its present neutral position by voting for resolution calling for special session as the resolution is so worded as not to commit the GA to any particular plan (I.e. Trusteeship or any other plan).

In view of irresponsible Soviet attack on our position (USSR offering no constructive proposals) DEPT feels it most desirable to get the maximum number of votes possible and you should strongly urge that instructions be sent to UKDEL to support US resolution calling for special session.

501.BB PALESTINE/3-3148

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CR CLEARANCE

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LOVETT
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NE:Gmattison/iy
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Mr. Henderson

UNA
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Mr. Rusk

IS
Cleared with
Mr. Bancroft

EUR
Cleared with
Mr. Hickerson

CS/A

3-348

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Document 29
Text of Declaration Adopted by General Zionist Council in Tel Aviv, April 12, 1948

"We have decided, relying on the authority of the Zionist movement and the support of the entire Jewish people, that upon the termination of the mandatory regime there shall be an end of foreign rule in Palestine, and that the governing body of the Jewish state shall come into being.

"The state which the Jewish people will set up in its own country will guarantee justice, freedom and equality for all its inhabitants regardless of religion, race, sex, or land of origin. It is our aim to make it a state in which the exiles of our people are gathered together, in which happiness and knowledge shall prevail and the vision of the prophets of Israel shall illumine our path.

"At this hour, when bloodshed and strife have been forced upon us, we turn to the Arabs in the Jewish State and to our neighbors in adjacent territories with an appeal for brotherhood, cooperation and peace. Let us then build our state together, as equal citizens with equal rights and obligations, with mutual trust and respect, each with a true understanding of the others needs.

"Our lives are dedicated to defending the liberty of our people. If further trials and battles are in store for us, we shall defend with all our might the achievement upon which place our hopes.

"Right is on our side. With us are the hopes of past generations of our people. With us is the conscience of the world. With us are deposited the testament of millions of our martyred dead and the resolute will to live of the millions who have survived. The sanctity of our martyrs and heroes rests upon us, and the God of our Fathers will help us."

Document 30
Facsimile of Telegram from USUN to the State Department, April 15, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS
APR 15 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SPECIAL EMBASSY Control 5541

Rec'd April 15, 1948
11:31 a.m.

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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 449, April 15, 10:45 a.m.

URGENT

RUSK FROM ROSS

Ambassador Austin, Jessup and I called on Chaim Weizmann on his invitation late yesterday afternoon and had a very interesting talk with him for about three-quarters of an hour. Weizmann said he had tried very hard but could not understand the reasons for the "switch" in the US position. Was it fear of the Arabs? Was it oil? Or was it fear of Russia? He said there was no reason whatever to fear the Arabs. They were woefully weak. The Arabs could do nothing with their oil except sell it to the US. Did we fear they would sell it to Russia? If so, what would the Arabs do with Russian rubles? Were we afraid that the Jewish state would be dominated by Russia? There was no possible occasion for such fear. Bolshevik agents had tried very hard in the 1920's to get a foothold in Palestine and had failed miserably. Weizmann went on to say that the Jews were confronted with an extremely difficult psychological problem. They were granted independence in November and independence was withdrawn in April.

Assuming that there were no two-thirds majority in GA for trusteeship, the Jews would have the legal, and if not the legal certainly the moral right to go ahead with their plans to establish the Jewish state.

In response to our questions and comments, he said that the Jews had absolutely no fear of the Arabs and he

elaborated on

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By [illegible] NARA, Date

SECRET

2-4440. April 15, 10:45 a.m., from New York.

elaborated on this by indicating that the Arab states were so disorganized and weak as to constitute almost the military factor of zero.

We made it clear that we felt such action by the Jews would be a mistake from their point of view.

The Senator turned the conversation to the positive side and asked whether the Jews did not feel that their welfare would be far better if trusteeship would get a two-thirds vote in the Assembly.

This led to a discussion of essential Jewish requirements as Weizmann saw them. "If trusteeship would include three essential points for the Jews, namely immigration, land settlement, and economic development, it was wholly conceivable to Weizmann that trusteeship might be beneficial to the Jews, and also provide an opportunity for cooperation of the closest kind between Jews and Arabs, leading in due course to an agreed political settlement."

Weizmann, of course, undertook no commitment with regard to the foregoing but it was clear that his mind is running strongly in this direction.

We did not discuss the question of possible US aid but we did discuss the possibility of UN assistance with particular reference to the specialized agencies, such as the FAO, the World Bank, and the WHO.

In concluding our conversation, the Senator indicated that he would like to deal in his Assembly opening statement with the question of economic development and Weizmann promised to have Eban, who was with us, send us materials on economic development projects.

AUSTIN

DJ:HEM

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Document 31
Facsimile of Memo from Lovett to President Truman (with Attachment), April 21, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

SECRET

2224

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 15, 1948

TO : U - Mr. Lovett
Through: S/S [illegible]
FROM : UNA - Mr. Rusk DR

SUBJECT:

There is attached a suggested memorandum to the President (Tab A) enclosing a telegram from New York on a conversation between Senator Austin and Dr. Chaim Weizmann which I believe will be of great interest to the White House.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached memorandum be ~~initialled~~ signed [illegible] and forwarded to the White House.

CONCURRENCE

NEA Lwy

ATTACHMENT

Memorandum to the President (Tab A)

UNA:DRusk:FR SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

APR 21 1948

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dr. Chaim Weizmann furnished Secretary Marshall with a copy of his letter to you of April 9, 1948.

I believe you will be greatly interested in the attached telegram from our Mission in New York which describes a conversation between Senator Austin and Dr. Weizmann on our trusteeship proposals. The most interesting part of this telegram is found on the second page, where Dr. Weizmann suggests that a trusteeship which would include immigration, land settlement and economic development might provide an opportunity for an agreed political settlement between Jews and Arabs.

[illegible] A. Lovett

ACTING SECRETARY

Attachment:

Telegram 449 of April 15, 1948
from New York

501.BB PALESTINE/4-1548

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CS/A

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APR 21 1948

UNA:DRusk:FR
4/15/48

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Document 31, Page 3
Facsimile of Telegram from USUN to the State Department, April 15, 1948

UNCLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS
APR 15 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Control 5541

Rec'd April 15, 1948
11:31 a.m.

Action: UNA
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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 449, April 15, 10:45 a.m.

URGENT

RUSK FROM ROSS

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Assuming that there were no two-thirds majority in GA for trusteeship, the Jews would have the legal, and if not the legal certainly the moral right to go ahead with their plans to establish the Jewish state.

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elaborated on

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Document 31, Page 4
Facsimile of Telegram from USUN to the State Department, April 15, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By NARA, Date

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2-4849. April 15, 10:45 a.m., From New York.

elaborated on this by indicating that the Arab states were so disorganized and weak as to constitute almost the military factor of zero.

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AUSTIN

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Document 32
Facsimile of Instructions Cable to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Cairo, April 22, 1948

FORM DS-322
7-18-46

UNCLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

Washington
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Control 5409

April 22, 1948
7 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

BAGHDAD
117

Reference is made in this connection (CIRTEL April 22) to assistance which Iraq Govt has informally requested in relation to serious politico-economic situation described EMBTEL 288 April 17. Dept views this situation with deep concern and requests you express our feelings this sense to Regent and other officials with whom you discuss matter adding our hope that situation may soon be alleviated. You should, however, point out that while USGOVT is sincerely desirous of being of assistance, it would be difficult for USGOVT to give consideration to appropriate measures in this respect as long as Palestine question remains unsettled. (Reference last two substantive paras CIRTEL April 21)

Sent to Baghdad for action; repeated to Beirut, 179 127 285 140 449 1445 1345 Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, Cairo, London, Paris and to 243 New York for info.

LOVETT (ACTING)

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501.BB PALESTINE/4-2248

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ACTING SECRETARY

CSAN FILE

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 1947 756939

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Document 33

Facsimile of Memorandum from Loy Henderson to Under Secretary Lovett, April 22, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

TOP SECRET

NEA
Department of State
X 10 JAN 52

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

April 22, 1948

To : George C. McGhee U - Mr. Lovett
Assistant Secretary

Through : S/S-[illegible]

From : NEA - Mr. Henderson

Subject : Suggestion that the Secretary Return at Once to Washington to Devote Major Portion of his Time to Palestine Problem.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB - 6 1950 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

867N.01/4-2248

In a little more than three weeks, unless some change can be effected in the situation, the British will abandon their mandate and will relinquish responsibility for law and order in Palestine. There is no necessity to enlarge upon what is likely to happen in the Middle East if the British wash their hands of Palestine before some kind of arrangements can be effected for the maintenance of law and order in that country.

The National Security Council decided some time ago, after considerable deliberation, that the security of the Middle East was vital to the security of the United States. The developing situation in Palestine threatens the security of the United States and world peace. Any kind of an international arrangement which we may effect for preserving world peace on a basis which would be compatible with the security of the United States is lacking in substance so long as the cancerous Palestine situation continues to develop unchecked. We are not likely to make much headway in the atmosphere of indecision and confusion which envelops the United Nations at the present time unless Palestine is tackled by us at once dramatically and energetically as one of our most vital and urgent international problems.

028832

The present policy of the United States Government with regard to Palestine is two-fold: 1) The United States will act on the Palestine question only as a Member of the United Nations. The United States will accept no unilateral responsibility and will take no unilateral action in this situation. 2) The United States is now supporting the Security Council's call for a truce in Palestine and believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established by the General Assembly which would provide interim governmental machinery in Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15

and

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and which would be without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and without prejudice to the eventual political settlement for Palestine.

In dealing with the Palestine problem through the United Nations we must face this problem on at least four fronts:

1. We must persuade the more moderate Jews in this country to break the hold which a minority of extreme American Zionists now has on American Jewry so that Jewish leaders in this country, instead of continuing to push Palestine Jews into an extremely nationalistic position, will endeavor to impress upon them the importance of assuming a reasonable and moderate attitude of cooperation with the Arabs.

2. We must make the Arab leaders, particularly those of the Arab League and of the Arab countries, understand that unless they on their part are willing to adopt a conciliatory and reasonable attitude of cooperation with the Jews, the security and prosperity of the whole Middle East will be gravely threatened.

3. We must sternly insist that Great Britain and other democratic powers join us wholeheartedly and energetically in an effort to find a peaceable way out of the Palestine impasse and point out to them that our failure in this respect may well undermine the security of the Western world.

4. We must impress upon both Republican and Democratic leaders, including Presidential candidates and members of Congress, the gravity of the Palestine problem and endeavor to gain their cooperation in seeing that the Palestine problem is no longer to be treated as a football of domestic politics, but as a matter seriously involving the security of the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A procedure along the following lines is recommended, subject, of course, to the approval of the President:

TOP SECRET 1. That

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1. That you suggest to the Secretary that as soon as he can do so without seriously risking the success of the Conference, he leave Bogota, announcing that he is returning to the United States to devote a major portion of his time and energy to the Palestine problem.

2. That the Palestine problem again be considered by the National Security Council as a matter of urgent national importance and that a firm, clear-cut decision be taken with regard to it which meets with the approval of the President and the Secretary.

3. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary have a conference or a series of conferences with leaders of Congress and the two political parties in order to remove Palestine from domestic politics and to give it its rightful place as a dangerous and difficult international problem. The support of these leaders for the decision taken by the National Security Council should be solicited.

4. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary call a conference of the outstanding leaders of the Jewish Community in the United States in order to obtain their support for our policy as developed by the National Security Council. Their cooperation should be requested to the end that the Jewish Community in the United States do its utmost to prevail upon the Jews in Palestine to adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude. The influence of Americans of Italian origin exerted in the Italian elections is an example of what might be done along this line.

5. That he talk both in Washington and in New York with representatives of the Western Powers in order to obtain their cooperation with regard to Palestine and that he send personal messages on the subject to Bevin and other key persons.

6. That he impress in personal conversations upon representatives of the Arab countries in the United States the fact that the Arab world will face political and economic disaster if the Palestine situation develops into mass fighting, and that

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-4-

unless the Arabs adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude, such fighting involving an increasing number of peoples and nations is likely to take place. These talks should be followed up with appeals to key Arab leaders abroad. These appeals should be of a friendly but stern nature.

7. Every effort should be made to explain through the press, radio, public addresses, etc., our position to the American people and to gain public support. We should abandon our present defensive attitude and take the offensive in a confident and courageous manner, calling upon all loyal citizens to back up the policy of the Government in an effort to achieve bipartisan support.

Lwh

NEA:LWHenderson:mw
4/22/48

EUR
Approved by
Mr. Hickerson

UNA
Approved by
Mr. McClintock

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Document 34
Memorandum by Mr. Robert McLintock ot the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), April 22, 1948

Memorandum by Mr. Robert McLintock ot the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

Top Secret [Washington,] April 22, 1948.

The following comments present a preliminary view and are offered on my own responsibility as I have not had an opportunity to discuss them with Mr. Rusk:

1. On the basis of the initial reception of our trusteeship suggestion it is apparent that the delegations in New York City are distinctly lukewarm. They await concrete evidence of our willingness to send troops to Palestine to maintain a temporary trusteeship unless there is implementation by the United States, to say nothing of other powers.

2. Ambassador Douglas reports in his #1672 today (attached) that an agreed truce by the Arabs and Jews is most unlikely; that, in the absence of agreement between the parties, the proposal for trusteeship will require the use of substantial force against either the Arabs or Jews to impose an unacceptable regime.

3. The Australian Delegation announced yesterday that it would today introduce a resolution (copy attached) which, in effect, would reaffirm the recommendation of November 29, 1947, for the partition of Palestine. The Australian resolution does not indicate by what means this recommendation can be carried out. It is much to be doubted whether the Australian resolution could muster a two-thirds vote of the members of the United Nations. However, it is possible that the Australian resolution, in light of the fact that there will be many abstentions on the vote, may receive a majority in Committee 1 of those delegations which do vote.

4. As indicated in my earlier memorandum to you, the French Representative, Ambassador Parodi, has strongly urged that something be done to save Jerusalem. It seems probable that this will strike a respective chord in the United Nations and elsewhere. Measures to protect Jerusalem will be popular measures; they will be highly attractive to the Jews, who are concerned for their 100,000 fellows now cut off in the capital city, and they will give the impression to the world that the United Nations is "doing something" about Palestine. The chances are strong, therefore, that the basic Palestine problem will presently be placed to one side in favor of immediate measures for the security of the Holy Places in Jerusalem or, in other words, Jerusalem itself. A copy of the French resolution on Jerusalem is attached herewith.

5. I have a strong hunch that if the Jerusalem enclave, as traced on the map which I sent you this morning, is established by the General Assembly and if the other Powers subscribe forces for its protection, the Palestine problem may well be on the road to a more or less automatic solution. If the enclave were defended against the admission of refugees from without (which is a valid point raised by Mr.Henderson in his memorandum to you of April 19), the partition of Palestine along the lines of ethnographical boundaries would come about almost automatically except for the two cities Jaffa and Haifa, each of which have large segments of both Jewish and Arab inhabitants.

6. It seems to me that, not receding from our present position in favor of trusteeship (which gives us leverage in both directions with either the Arabs or the Jews), we might find it convenient to go along with the French suggestion for special measures in behalf of Jerusalem; secure, on the basis of a crusading contribution, the dispatch of a fairly numerous group of armed contingents from the United Nations members for the protection of Jerusalem, and then sit down to let nature take its course. A further step at this Assembly would be, in light of our proposal for a temporary trusteeship, to move the suspension pending further developments of the Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947. An additional and necessary step would be an agreement by Great Britain, the United States, and France, under United Nations auspices, to maintain a naval patrol of the Palestinian coasts to prevent illegal immigration, while at the same time

undertakings should be given by the Arab States to prevent immigration from the land frontiers of Palestine.

7. Although prophesy is perilous, it is possible that the establishment *of a hard core of* security from Jerusalem to the sea would bring about a *de facto* partition of Palestine from the Jewish State centered on Tel Aviv and extending north along the coast to almost, if not including Haifa. I should not care if Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt took over the rest of the country.

Document 35

Facsimile of Reporting Cable from Jerusalem to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1948

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By [illegible] NARA, Date

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 4 - 1948
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

CORRECTED COPY
5/3/48 6:04 p.m.
CORRECTION UNDERSCORED

Control 402

Rec'd May 3, 1948
10:33 a.m.

Action: NEA
Info:
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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 523, May 3, 9 a.m.

PRIORITY

Palestine Government is disintegrating rapidly and work is at standstill in those government offices that are still open. The general situation is likewise deteriorating with lawlessness increasing.

Jerusalem is witnessing the exodus of large numbers of its Arab population. The Egyptian Consul has advised Egyptian nationals to leave Palestine as soon as possible but he is confronted with the same problem as we, namely that there is no way to evacuate them safely from Jerusalem. The Arabs have blocked the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road effectively for some time by destroying it for several hundred yards in the hilly country near Bab el Wad.

Although there is considerable fighting in and around Jerusalem casualties are not high. The British estimated that in a recent pitched battle in the suburbs of Katamon the Arabs fired 250,000 rounds of ammunition. Jewish casualties were but 5 wounded. The Arabs usually get the worst of these encounters although they occasionally ambush a group of Jews and decimate them. British troops rarely intervene in these clashes unless their lines of communication are affected.

In presence of several Arab colleagues, the Lebanese Consul told me that the Palestine Arabs had lost the war, owing to unexpected Jewish organization, discipline and training, and that the Arab legion could not save the situation without assistance from other Arab states.

WASSON

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Document 36
Facsimile of Telegram from U.S. Mission to the UN to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1948

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Authority NND 760050
By [illegible] NARA, Date

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Control 448

Rec'd May 3, 1948
12:39 p.m.

FROM: New York

TO : Secretary of State

NO : 554, May 3, 11:50 a.m.

DC/R

PRIORITY

FOR LOVETT FROM RUSK

Following is summary of major points covered in conversations which I had with Fawzi Bey (Egypt) and Prince Faisal (Saudi Arabia) yesterday morning. I was accompanied by Kopper during each conversation. During conversation with Faisal, Hafiz Wahba and Ali Reza were present.

1. In both conversations I reviewed in brief my conversations with the President. I emphasized that there was no change in US policy in spite rumors to contrary. Securing of truce is still our main objective.

2. It was also pointed out that President and Secretary were keenly interested in obtaining a truce and are ready at any time to do what they could to achieve this goal.

3. Both Fawzi Bey and Faisal were told that US would direct its policy to support a truce and against either party which opposed or obstructed truce or violated it once it had been arranged and agreed upon.

4. Question of immigration dominated both conversations. Underlying theme of both Fawzi Bey and Faisal was that Arab states could not acquiesce in any arrangement which

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-2-, # 554, May 3, 11:50 a.m. from New York

permitted over 1,500 displaced persons to enter Palestine per month. Fawzi Bey was slightly more flexible on this question when he again suggested possibility of Arab acquiescence to entry of 20,000 per year for a period of three years. This is at rate of slightly less than 1,700 per month. As a result I have distinct impression that it will be most difficult to gain Arab acquiescence to anything like rate of 4,000 during period of truce. I told Fawzi Bey and Faisal that we were concerned about establishing control over the character of immigration into Palestine. SC Truce Commission had been suggested as possible machinery for controlling immigration in view of apparent hopelessness of agreement by Arabs and Jews on this point.

5. Both Fawzi and Faisal seemed rather skeptical over any advantage being derived from immediate SC cease-fire order. However, they did not discuss it offhand.

6. Fawzi Bey wondered whether something drastic might be done at this time such as the suspension of GA for 10 days and establishment of "tight body" to study truce. During this period no military advantages would be sustained. Further it would be necessary to return to the status quo anti-bellum. The immigration quota of 1,500 per month could be continued. I pointed out that such a step would raise the question of the suspension of the November 29 resolution by the GA. Fawzi Bey said that if May 16 came without anything constructive having been done, spiraling difficulties would ensue. It might then become necessary for Arab states to assist Arabs in Palestine. This would not, however be for purpose of annexing any part of Palestine or simply to fight Zionism, but to establish law and order as depositories of a trust until UN or some other constituted authority could take over. I told him any such situation would raise grave questions for all of us and that our present efforts should be directed to the prevention of the situation.

7. In conversation with Faisal I emphasized our concern over security position in Near East and long-standing cooperation and close ties between Saudi Arabia and US.

Faisal stated

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-3-, #554, May 3, 11:50 a.m. from New York

Faisal stated Arabs were more anxious than anyone for peace in Near East. Arabs would have been more than glad to continue cooperation with US if they were sure US was really interested in Middle East as a whole. Arabs, however, had lost faith in American after American action in support of partition and Zionists. Hope rose somewhat when US appeared to recognize moral obligation to friendly governments in Middle East and to peace. However, during recent weeks the Arabs had not been impressed with our presentation of trusteeship proposals or of content of proposals. Faisal stated draft trusteeship terms worse in some respects that partition. Cited provisions on (A) powers Governor General, (B) immigration, (C) land policy, and (D) citizenship.

8. Reference truce proposals, Arabs are skeptical that truce might be used to calm situation down until time when gates can be opened to Zionists.

9. Faisal categorically asked what final position US was re partition of Palestine. I replied that on February 24 US had under difficult political circumstances declared it had reached conclusion that as a matter of principle the UN could not impose by force a political recommendation of the GA such as the November 29 resolution. I said further that the US will act with respect to Palestine only through the UN and will not act unilaterally. I would not be frank, however, if I did not say that the President considers partition a fair and equitable solution for Palestine, subject to the conditions for UN action contained in the charter and subject to our determination not to take unilateral action. US, however, would be happy to support any arrangement which was acceptable to the two communities of Palestine.

10. Faisal asked whether US believed that it was to its own interests to see Jewish state established in Palestine. I replied this would depend on character of political situation and characteristics of state. If it were clear that such a state would be at war permanently with Arab

world or would

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Facsimile of Telegram from U.S. Mission to the UN to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1948

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-4-, # 554, May 3, 11:50 a.m. from New York

world or would serve as base for hostile elements, US obviously would not consider it to her own interests to see such state established. Faisal said that Arab states could not ever accept Jewish state. It would be an abcess to the political body of the Arabs. I added that we did not believe a Jewish state would necessarily have the characteristics mentioned and that US interests might not be prejudiced in the sense indicated.

11. Faisal strongly advised us not to ask Arab states or representatives to be more lenient lest we provoke suspicions of true US intentions. Some had recently received indications from their governments that they had gone too far on the truce proposals. Fawzi had remarked earlier that reaction of Arab governments to truce proposals was not too imaginative.

Detailed memoranda of conversations follow.

AUSTIN

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Document 37
Memorandum by John E. Horner on the Future of Palestine, May 4, 1948

Memorandum by Mr. John E. Horner[1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] MAY 4, 1948

FUTURE OF PALESTINE

At the present stage, trusteeship as a concept for the solution of the Palestine problem seems virtually to have been abandoned by almost all delegations. Present thinking appears largely to be limited to the possibility of realizing a truce in all of Palestine, a minority also believing in the feasibility of accompanying such a truce with the establishment of a "neutral regime" of an undefined nature. With the exception of some Latin American delegations, little hope presently is held for implementing a UN regime through the use of armed forces.

Many delegations, particularly those from Western Europe and the British Commonwealth, remain distrustful of US policy with respect to Palestine. They see our policy as oscillating between one based upon considerations of our own long-term interests in the Near and Middle East and a policy deriving its force from the requirements of the domestic political situation. Thus these delegations feel it unwise to commit themselves to support us lest we would suddenly commit an about-face, leaving them in an untenable position.

Obviously, an ideal US policy on Palestine would seek to reconcile our long-term Near East interests, which may best be defined as keeping that area out of the Russian grasp, with domestic political considerations, namely the necessity for the administration not unduly to antagonize the Jewish minority in the US. In seeking to find such a policy, we thus far seem to have succeeded only in antagonizing both Arabs and Jews, creating mistrust for our consistency in the minds of thinking European nations, and in placing ourselves, only eleven days prior to the scheduled ending of the British mandate, in a position where we have no tenable solution to offer.

The advantages of a partition scheme for Palestine, recommended by the General Assembly on November 9, 1947 are various. If it could have been carried out by peaceful means, that is, had it been acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, it would have offered a relative permanent solution to the problem. Furthermore, it is in consonance with domestic political requirements, and has the added advantage of meeting the humanitarian feelings of those persons who have been concerned with the sorry plight of disseminated Jewry. However, partition, as it was developed last November, seems most unlikely to be acceptable to the Arab League and hence cannot be regarded as promoting the stabilization of the Near East.

Similarly, the establishment of a unitary state in Palestine, even on a cantonal basis, would meet with adamant refusal of the Jews to cooperate. Its advantages include the fact that it is acceptable to Arabs and in general would promote US objectives in the Near East.

The third solution up to yesterday promoted by the US delegation at the Special General Assembly, was that of a temporary trusteeship. That solution was not only absolutely unacceptable to the Jews but is basically contrary to the aspirations of the Arabs. Furthermore, it could not even be regarded as a solution, since it would merely postpone the day of reckoning. In any event, as yesterday's events seem clearly to have

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[1] Advisor to the United States Delegation at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly; regularly attached to the Office of European Affairs. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. V, pp. 898-901.

shown, trusteeship, as a concept, has met with little active support on the part of other delegations, including many wholly friendly to American objectives in general.

The British proposal put forward in a speech yesterday by Creech Jones was little more than a vague call for a "neutral administration", designed to hold the fort in Palestine. It is difficult to appraise it since it is couched in such vague terms as to hardly be a proposal at all. Whether it is intended to provide for administration by the UK, the US and France, the remaining allied and associated powers, it is not yet clear. If it is, and France and the UK are preparing to join with the US in sending armed forces to Palestine, it may offer a way out. On the other hand, such a regime would suffer from the disadvantage of being outside the UNO system, and its implementation undoubtedly could be accomplished only with a certain amount of bloodshed. In general, it is hard to see wherein such a regime would offer any material advantages over the trusteeship proposal already in effect rejected.

There is one further possibility of a Palestine solution which, I understand already has been considered and, for reasons with which I am not familiar, rejected by the Department. That proposal in effect calls for the annexation by the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan of that part of Palestine which the November 29 scheme had intended to be a separate Arab state. Its most obvious advantages would seem to be (1) that it would be acceptable to the Jews, (2) that it probably would be acceptable to King Abdullah, (3) that it is not basically incompatible with the November 29 recommendation, (4) that it offers a relatively permanent solution, (5) that it would create a viable Arab state in the enlarged Trans-Jordan thereby achieving the objectives of the economic union proposal of November 29, (6) that it would effectively eliminate the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and his followers, and, most important, *it would face up to the inescapable fact that a Zionist State already is in being in Palestine.*

A primary objection to this proposal is that it would tend to break up the Arab League, presumably aligning the Hashemites against the other members. In this regard it is believed that the Arab League essentially is held together only by the Palestine issue and that it would tend to break up in any event. Should Abdullah, supported by Iraq, accept this compromise solution, it seems highly unlikely that warfare would develop since the remaining Arab states do not possess armed forces comparable either to the Arab Legion, or Haganah. I understand that relations between the Jewish Agency and King Abdullah have always been good and thus a solution agreeable to both would be likely to promote a stabilized situation in the Near East.

It may be argued that the accomplishment of such a compromise solution would create increased hostility towards the U.S. on the part of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and The Lebanon. Whether such hostility would be lasting is open to question, firstly, because the regimes in those countries seem largely to be dominated by conservative elements not at all certain to remain indefinitely in power, and secondly, because Moslem aspirations could be at least partially satisfied through the incorporation of Arab-Palestine into Trans-Jordan.

Undoubtedly there would be charges of power politics leveled at the United States. However, these can be expected for almost any solution arrived at and in any event would come mainly form the Soviet bloc.

How to accomplish such a compromise solution, assuming it is considered desirable, clearly is a question of major importance. Whereas the US, before the calling of the present Special General Assembly on Palestine, might have espoused such a solution openly, our best tactics at the moment would seem to be to remain in the background. I understand from Rabbi Silver that in all probability such an arrangement could be made directly between the Jewish Agency and Abdullah. If that is the case, the US would have two principal immediate tasks, (1) to make plain to both parties, in confidence, that we favor such a solution and (2) to make certain of British concurrence. Assuming agreement is reached between Abdullah and the Jewish

Agency, and the British are agreeable, Trans-Jordan forces would on May 16 occupy that part of Palestine set aside by the November 29 resolution as an Arab state. A proposal could then be introduced into the General Assembly calling for approval of a plebiscite in the Arab section of Palestine on the question of union with Trans-Jordan. That plebiscite might be supervised by the UN and presumably would result in a victory for Trans-Jordan, since the alternative, a separate Arab state, presumably would have little appeal to Arab nationalists. An additional consideration in this regard is the fact that Trans-Jordan was part of the original Palestine mandate and thus there is a natural bond between the Arabs in Trans-Jordan and those remaining in the present Palestine.

To make this solution more attractive to the Arabs and at the same time more lasting, it is suggested that an exchange of population between Trans-Jordan and the Zionist state should take place, using as a precedent the similar exchange between Greece and Turkey which followed World War I. Obviously this would consist in the main of the movement of Arabs to Trans-Jordan, and generous financial assistance would have to be provided to resettle them there. In addition UNO or the US alone might offer economic inducement such as a Jordan Valley Authority and other long-range and large-scale projects designed to increase the amount of arable land available for settlement. With these additional measures it should be possible to create two ethnically separate states which would have their origin in agreement between the two groups.

There remains the problem of Jerusalem, which might be solved in either of two ways. Preferably this city might be made a condominium of Trans-Jordan and the Zionist state. However, if no agreement could be reached on this point, it would still be possible to establish it as a permanent UNO trusteeship.

It appears to the writer that in the context of present conditions and the short remaining time, the proposal outlined at length above is the only one now capable of settling the Palestine question and at the same time preventing the Soviets from exploiting the present inflamed situation to their advantage. No doubt it will meet with numerous objections, particularly on the part of those in the Department concerned with Near Eastern matters, but it is also true that any solution thus far advanced has serious shortcomings. Unlike these others, the present proposal, if it can be accomplished expeditiously, would effectively keep the Soviet Union out of this vital area, while being satisfactory to Zionist and relatively so to the Arabs.

JOHN E. HORNER

Document 38
Memorandum from Ernest Gross to Under Secretary Lovett, May 13, 1948

[ANNEX]

Memorandum by the Legal Advisor (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1948.

RECOGNITION OF SUCCESSOR STATES IN PALESTINE

The possibility exists that the Jewish Agency for Palestine will proclaim a Jewish state in part of Palestine on May 15, 1948, and that the Arab Higher Committee will at the same time proclaim an Arab state for all of Palestine. The present memorandum considers from the legal point of view what the attitude of the United States should be toward recognition of one or both of these states and their respective governments. It is assumed, for present purposes, that the United Nations General Assembly will not repeal its Palestine resolution of November 20, 1947; if the General Assembly were to do so, presumably its action would be taken under circumstances of a truce and provisional settlement for Palestine which would obviate the proclamation of any new state in Palestine with a new government.

Recognition of a new state.

If Jewish and Arab states were proclaimed in Palestine, the problem of recognition in relation to them would be first a problem of recognizing the existence of a new state or states--a question separate from the extension of diplomatic recognition to a new government. Premature recognition of a new state's existence within the territory of a previously existing state is wrongful in international law because such recognition constitutes an unwarranted interference in the affairs of the previously existing state. The present memorandum is limited to consideration of the legal question, and does not concern the political question whether the existence of a new state ought to be recognized. If the United States is legally free to recognize the existence of a new state, it is entirely a question of policy whether recognition shall be given or not.

We have now to consider whether recognition of the existence of any new states in Palestine would constitute an international tort against any previously existing state. This inquiry calls for a determination concerning the legal status of Palestine just prior to the proclamation of any new states in that country. The whole territory of Palestine, including the Trans-Jordan, was detached from the former sovereign, Turkey, in the World War I peace settlement. A Class "A" mandate for Palestine, under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, was conferred on Great Britain by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The mandatory power was given general powers of administration over Palestine. The mandate could be altered by Great Britain with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, or could be terminated by completion of the tutelage of Palestine by Great Britain and the grant of full independence to the people of Palestine as contemplated in Article 22 of the League Covenant.

On April 2, 1947 Great Britain asked the General Assembly to consider the question of the future government of Palestine. This request could lead either to a recommendation by the Assembly to the mandatory on the manner in which Palestine's tutelage should be completed and full independence granted, or to an act of consent by

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[1] This text is the later of two versions found by the editors in the Department of State files. The earlier version of May 10, which constituted the original annex to Gross' memorandum of May 11, is not printed. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol V, pp. 960-965.

the General Assembly to alteration of the mandate terms.[2] It is possible to interpret the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 as constituting either of the two actions just mentioned. When Great Britain first asked the General Assembly to examine the Palestine problem, the request appears to have been made with a view to securing a General Assembly *recommendation*. Later, at the regular 1947 session of the Assembly, Great Britain announced that the mandate would be terminated and that Britain would not take the undivided responsibility for implementing any solution which was not agreed to by both Arabs and Jews, thus implying a changed British theory concerning the nature of the action sought from the General Assembly. On either theory, the mandatory power and Great Britain together were competent to make a legally effective political settlement for Palestine. By virtue of the Assembly's passage of the resolution and Great Britain's "acceptance" of the plan, these authorities appear to have made a legal disposition for the future of Palestine.

The Palestine plan contained in the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 provided for termination of the mandate, provisional arrangements for administration, and subsequent emergence of two independent states and an international territory (the City of Jerusalem); the partition of Palestine was to be accompanied by economic union. The working out of this Plan required the active functioning of the General Assembly's Palestine Commission. That body has now suspended its political operations, and the Plan cannot be carried forward without a resumption of activity by the Commission (including the designation of provisional councils of government).

On May 15, 1948 the mandate for Palestine will end, pursuant to the provisions of the Plan; at that time Great Britain will withdraw its mandatory administration, even though other steps contemplated by the plan are not being taken and even though Great Britain herself has failed to take some important measures called for by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. Under these circumstances, British abandonment of the mandate may be a breach of Great Britain's international obligations; but as a practical matter the mandate would nevertheless be terminated. According to the plan, the Palestine Commission was to be legally responsible for the administration of Palestine upon termination of the mandate, pending transfer of authority to the successor governmental agencies. If the Commission after May 14 is suspended, or is paralyzed and makes no effort to administer Palestine, the question must be asked whether any other authority can have legal capacity to carry on with the governing of Palestine.

At this point we must consider the role of the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers. It was these powers which allocated the Palestine mandate to Great Britain after World War I. Possibly they retained some residuary rights of disposition over Palestine after the mandate was granted. If such rights persisted, they might be asserted in the event that the mandate ended abruptly without provision for a future political settlement. Such might be the case if the General Assembly before May 15, 1948 repealed its resolution of November 29, 1947 and no other legally effective disposition of Palestine should be made by the Assembly and Great Britain. But in the absence of such repeal by the Assembly of its resolution, it seems particularly doubtful that the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers could assert any residuary rights.[3]

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[2] The mode of devolution of League of Nations functions and powers to United Nations organs is not discussed in the present memorandum. It is the opinion of this Office that the General Assembly could decide to exercise the power--formerly held by the Council of he League of Nations--to consent to an alteration of the Palestine mandate. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] Apart from the legal aspect of this matter, it appears highly unlikely from the political point of view that the United States, United Kingdom, and France would assume responsibility for the government of

We are then faced with the situation where the only agencies claiming to have governing powers over Palestine are organizations within that country.[4] The law of nations recognizes an inherent right of people lacking the agencies and institutions of social and political control to organize a state and operate a government.

Article 22 of the League Covenant provided

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

Palestine was covered by this Article, later being made a Class "A" mandate. Just what constituted the "communities" referred to in Article 22 was not made clear. Quite evidently Palestine as a whole was not *a community*, as is shown by the fact that the mandatory in 1946 detached the Trans-Jordan from Palestine and gave it independence. The Palestine mandate instrument referred specifically to "communities" and in a manner so as to make clear that the principal religious communities of Palestine--Jewish and Arab--were intended by the reference.

There is, of course, in the background of the mandate and of the League Covenant, the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 by the British Government, declaring in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. When the Council of the League of Nations gave its approval to the Palestine mandate so that the instrument could become effective, the Council in its approving resolution cited the agreement of the Principal Allied Powers that Great Britain "should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers . . ."[5] It is therefore apparent that the disposition of Palestine by the competent Powers after World War I included a provision having the nature of a trust, in favor of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This was to be, however, without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of existing communities in Palestine. One of the ways in which this trust might be carried out would be through the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The existence of this trust together with the inherent right recognized in international law afford a legal basis for the formation of a state and government by the Jewish community in the areas of Palestine which that community occupies.[6] Such action would also have the moral sanction of the partially implemented disposition of Palestine made by the mandatory and the United Nations General Assembly in the Partition Plan. Similarly, the Arab Community would be entitled to organize a state and government in the areas of Palestine which it occupies.[7]

It should be noted that the proclamation of a state and government by either community during the current special session of the General Assembly would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 (d) of the Security Council truce resolution of

---

Palestine in their role as the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] The present memorandum does not discuss the question of the power of the Security Council to take action under the United Nations Charter in the form of assuming provisional administration over Palestine. [Footnote in the source text.]

[5] The relationship of the United States to the Palestine mandate was set forth in the Anglo-American Convention of 1924. [Footnote in the source text.]

[6] In this connection, the Jewish Agency for Palestine occupies a special position in relation to the Jewish community under the terms of the mandate instrument. [Footnote in the source text.]

[7] Questions concerning doubtful areas, in dispute between the communities, would have to be adjusted. In this matter the Partition Plan would naturally provide a basic guide. [Footnote in the source text.]

April 17, 1948. This resolution does not bind legally either community nor would it bind the states and governments proclaimed, since none of these are or would then be members of the United Nations.[8]

The same resolution called upon governments "and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above, and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals and weapons and war materials". This provision, binding upon members of the United Nations, might be construed to cover the recognition of any new states in Palestine during the special session of the Assembly.

One may conclude, therefore: (1) the United States probably should not recognize the existence of any new state in Palestine during the special session, unless the Security Council should repeal its April 17 resolution; (2) the United States, after the special session, will be legally free to recognized the existence of either an Arab or Jewish unitary state for all of Palestine in the absence of consent by the communities, since to do so would contravene obligations and rights arising out of the provisions of the League Covenant, the mandate instrument, the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, and the principles of the law of nations regarding self-determination of peoples.

Recognition of a new government.

In any situation where the United states is free under international law to recognize the existence of a new state, the determination of whether diplomatic recognition should be accorded to a particular regime as the government of that state is entirely a question of policy. United State policy in this matter has been set forth in a paper of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS 24), dated March 15, 1948,[9] which was subsequently approved. Relevant Policy Planning Staff recommendations are attached at Tab A.[10]

Certain criteria, relating to the character of the government under consideration, have in the past been employed in deciding on the granting or withholding of recognition. These are:

(a) *de facto* control of the territory and the administrative machinery of State, including the maintenance of public order;

(b) the ability and willingness of a government to discharge its international obligations;

(c) general acquiescence of the people of a country in the government in power.

In Tab B[11] of this memorandum there are collected a number of illustrative instances in American history.

ERNEST A. GROSS

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[8] It is possible that compliance with the April 17 resolution would be made one of the criteria in passing on applications of the new states for membership in the United Nations. But it is questionable to what extent this would affect consideration of the applications, both communities and the states bordering Palestine have frequently violated the Security Council truce resolution. [Footnote in the source text.]

[9] Vol. IX, p. 17.

[10] Not printed.

[11] Not printed.

Document 39

CABLE ADDRESS
JEWAGENCY

הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

2210 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.
ADAMS 5411

May 14, 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REPLY DRAFTED BY EPSTEIN
MAY 14 MAY 14 1948 NO. FILED
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FILE COPY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the provisional government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations.

Very respectfully yours,

Eliahu Epstein

Eliahu Epstein, Agent
Provisional Government of Israel

ee/mf

VVL

Mlo

CSV

8/7-1548 10/5-1948

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Document 40
Facsimile of Telegram from the State Department to Arab Posts, May 14, 1948

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US URGENT

TO

CERTAIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS

NIACT

For your secret info and for such precautions as you may consider it necessary to take this Govt may within next few hours recognize provisional Jewish govt as de facto authority of new Jewish state.

Send to following posts:

MISSIONS

Cairo
Jidda
Baghdad
Basra
Beirut
Damascus

CONSULATES

Alexandria
Port Said
Dhahran
Jerusalem
Haifa
Aden

867N.01/5-1448

A/MUS

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NEA:LAHenderson:rw 5/14/48

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CLASSIFICATION

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Document 41

Press Release Concerning the Recognition of the Government of Israel, May 14, 1948

This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional Government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new ~~Jewish~~ State ~~state~~. Israel.

Harry Truman

Approved
May 14, 1948.

6.11

Document 42
Mass Demonstration Announcement in *The New York Times*, May 15, 1948

Salute to ISRAEL

Tomorrow Evening, Sunday, May 16

Citizens of New York will back up the valiant defenders of the Jewish State at a great

MASS DEMONSTRATION

in

MADISON SQUARE GARDEN

at 8:00 P. M. (Doors open at 6:00 P. M.)

SPEAKERS

Mrs. ELEANOR ROOSEVELT
Sen. ROBERT A. TAFT
HERBERT H. LEHMAN
HENRY MORGENTHAU, Jr.
Dr. CHAIM WEIZMANN
MAYOR WILLIAM O'DWYER
Dr. STEPHEN S. WISE
Brig. Gen. JULIUS KLEIN

Members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency For Palestine

Dr. ABBA HILLEL SILVER
Dr. EMANUEL NEUMANN
RABBI WOLF GOLD
HAYIM GREENBERG
Mrs. SAMUEL W. HALPRIN

Admission Free *Admission Free*

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 Madison Avenue New York 17, N. Y.

Document 43
May 15, 1948 Article from *The New York Times*
Reprinted with permission of The New York Times

THE STATE OF ISRAEL

"Accordingly we, the members of the National Council, representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the Zionist movement, met together in solemn assembly, by virtue of the natural and historic rights of the Jewish people and of the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, hereby proclaim the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called Israel."

In these words, addressed to the nations of the world from the seaport city of Tel Aviv, itself a living testimonial of the industry and deep faith and burning zeal with which much that was barren land has been transformed into a thriving modern civilization, do the pioneers who have long sought "a national home" in Palestine announce their intention to fill the vacuum created by the surrender of the British Mandate with the creation of an independent state, "based on precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew prophets."

Their proclamation comes in an hour of confusion in the councils of the nations still struggling to find a peaceful solution of this problem. It comes in a time of peril for themselves. Hostile armies, unreconciled to a solution which involves creation of an independent Jewish State, and mobilized for the maintenance of what they believe to be the integrity of Arab soil, are poised upon three frontiers. The prospect of a hard and possibly a long-continued struggle lies ahead. The degree of aid that may be forthcoming from the United Nations is unknown. But no one can question the courage or the high purpose of this act of self-assertion, or doubt that Partition, long discussed, long challenged, long postponed, is now a living fact. Confirmation of this is implicit in the prompt recognition of the new state by the Government of the United States.

Document 44

May 15, 1948 Article from *The New York Times*

Reprinted with permission from The New York Times

Recognizing the Realities in the New Palestine

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

What will happen now in Palestine? No more will the Judean hills echo to the shrill sound of Scottish bagpipes or the bugles of the Irish Fusiliers. Gone are the uniforms and installations, the overlay of English language and custom, which for a quarter of a century have both blurred and deepened the lines between the old villages and the new colonies but have never succeeded in giving this strange and stubborn land the look or character of a British outpost.

The High Commissioner was piped aboard his departing cruiser yesterday in the Bay of Haifa to the sad and inappropriate strains of "The Minstrel Boy." The British withdrew as ceremoniously as they entered the country after the first world war. But they left behind them in Haifa a Jewish city under complete Jewish control. They left the Arab city of Jaffa, deserted by all but a small fraction of its population, in Jewish hands. They left a Jewish army and a large, vigorous and determined Jewish population. Louder than the salute of guns fired in his honor, Sir Alan Cunningham might have heard from the shore the triumphant shout of a new nation proclaiming its independence as the land of Israel.

The British Role

President Truman's surprise move in immediately recognizing the new state does more than anything to give it reality and to emphasize the difference between the Palestine problem of today and that of yesterday. This act nullifies our previous policy, including the trusteeship plan rejected yesterday in the U. N. Assembly and will decisively influence the attitude of the rest of the world.

Recognized by the United States, Israel is now a political entity. Whatever may be said of British rule, the fact is that this new state took root, grew, prospered and attained its present position and power under the Mandate. The shadow and the dream outlined in the Balfour Declaration became a reality in this period. History may accuse the British of failing to bring the rival claimants to the land into the administration and forcing them to work together. If the country is now swept by a full-scale war, the British will be blamed for throwing off responsibility and pulling out before there is any authority to take their place. But the record will also say that a nation was born and grew to the fighting age with British aid and under British protection. This was the force that really pushed them out.

Jewish Action

It is the fact that stumped the United Nations. For this nation now exists. Nearly all the territory allotted to them in the U. N. partition plan is occupied and controlled by the Jews. Fully half the 400,000 Arabs in the Jewish zone, not including the population of Jaffa, which is in Arab territory, have fled. As soon as the British evacuated, the Jews began to fight for Jerusalem. In the six months since November, they have put partition into effect.

There is no point now in going back to old controversies on the clashing rights of Jews and Arabs in Palestine, or the wisdom of the Zionists in putting all the emphasis on nationalism and the state. They have created a state, and they have also created an Arab League, and although this is divided by internal dynastic rivalries and has yet to demonstrate military strength, it represents the formidable long-term danger the land of Israel has to face in the opposition of the Arab world. The Arabs, invading yesterday from Egypt, are just beginning to fight, and even if they should prove easy to beat by a well trained and disciplined army of men battling for their lives, they will be hard to live with.

They have to be lived with. This is as potent a reality as the birth of a Jewish state. All other phases of the problem could be debated as long as the third party in the Palestine triangle stood between the other two. Today the problem is different. The grim prospect is that Arabs and Jews will be left "on their own" to slug it out—with immeasurable damage to human life, to the country, to the chance of economic and human cooperation that takes priority in every plan of settlement.

Grounds for Hope

Palestine will not be the same again. It will be a long time before it can be a place of peace. But if the Arabs can only forget their grievance and resign themselves to the irrevocable, if the Jews can only think of tomorrow, there is a basis of negotiation in the realization that neither side will be able to gain a permanent victory. Both have something to gain by partition—the Palestinian Arabs independence from the neighboring Arab states and a share in the developments the Jews must push to be self-supporting; the Jews the end of guerrilla war and a guarantee of future safety.

Washington's second-thought argument against partition, now superseded by a third thought, was that it could not be applied without fatal consequences. Yet if it could be worked out by agreement, it is easy to see that the two states would be bound in time to something approaching the bi-national system that men like Dr. Magnes have long advocated. Anyway, there is no turning back to the status quo ante. Like the United States, the United Nations and the divided people of Palestine have to recognize present realities.

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Document 45
Facsimile of Memorandum from Henderson to Lovett, May 16, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : U - Mr. Lovett DATE: May 16, 1948

FROM : NEA - Mr. Henderson

SUBJECT: The Reply to Mr. Epstein's letter of May 14

FW 867N.01/5-1448

In order to complete the record on recognition, Mr. Epstein's letter to the Secretary of May 14 should be answered and in our opinion the answer should also be dated May 14.

We should reply to this letter since we understand that it is the basis of the statement of the President that recognition of the provisional government had been requested.

In drafting this reply we have taken the following into consideration:

1. In order that it may be clear why the announcement and our letter are dated May 14, whereas the mandate did not terminate until May 15, and that there may not be any misunderstanding as to the time of recognition, the letter of reply should show the exact moment at which recognition took effect, namely the moment of issuance, 6:11 p.m., Washington time or 12:11 a.m. May 15, Palestine time.

2. Epstein should be given no title in our communication to him since we have not as yet been informed officially as to who are members of the government of the new State, or that Mr. Epstein is qualified to speak for the new State in Washington. We have apparently taken the position that Mr. Epstein, as a representative of the Jewish Agency up to 6 p.m. May 14, had the right to speak for the Jewish Agency and the coming successor of the Jewish Agency, the Provisional Jewish Government. We do not as yet know officially what his capacity and title are after 6 p.m., and will not know until we have been informed.

3. We have limited the reply to an acknowledgment of the letter and to a statement as to the time and substance of the President's announcement, because we do not consider it suitable to go any further in communicating with a person whose representational position has not as yet been clarified. We have not, for instance, indicated whether by granting de facto recognition to

the provisional government

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the provisional government of the state of Israel we recognize the boundaries of the new state to be identical with those set forth in Mr. Epstein's letter to the Secretary. At the appropriate time we might desire to indicate that our de facto recognition does not necessarily mean that we recognize that the frontiers of the new Jewish state are the same as those outlined in the recommendation of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, that those boundaries had been determined upon with the understanding that there would be an economic union of all Palestine and a special international regime for Jerusalem.

It seems to us that the new government of Israel should give us further information with regard to its composition, purposes, structure, etc. This matter, however, will be made the subject of a special memorandum.

L.W.H.

NEA:LWHenderson:trf

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Document 46
Facsimile of Letter from Under Secretary Lovett to Eliahu Epstein, May 14, 1948

Original handed to Mr Epstein on his call at the Department today. Loy Henderson May 17, 1948.

May 14, 1948

Dear Mr. Epstein:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 14, 1948 and to inform you that on May 14, 1948 at 6:11 p.m., Washington time, the President of the United States issued the following statement:

"This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof.

"The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel."

Sincerely yours,

V. C.

DIRECTION OF RECEIPT MAY 14 1948 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Eliahu Epstein,
2210 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington 8, D.C.

MAY 17 1948

NE:Wilkins:trf NEA UNA

FM XG Tru Off

PAH

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Document 47
May 16, 1948 Article in *The Washington Post*
© The Washington Post

State Of Israel

President Truman's haste in recognizing the de facto authority of the provisional government set up in the new Jewish state in Palestine caused temporary consternation in the United Nations General Assembly and surprise throughout the world. That reaction did not, however, reflect upon the good sense of the recognition itself. Diplomats were shocked because the United States so suddenly flip-flopped from a policy of confusion and indecision on Palestine to a positive act taken in unprecedented haste. Apparently, too, the United States' own representatives in the Assembly were utterly unprepared for this feat of recognizing the State of Israel 20 minutes after it came into being. Regardless of the merits of any particular action that is taken, this erratic manner of conducting our foreign policy costs the United States dearly in terms of prestige and world leadership.

There seems to be only one extenuating fact about the Administration's rather shocking series of somersaults in dealing with the Palestine issue. Since the General Assembly favored partitioning of the Holy Land last November, the Administration has been working on the problem solely through the U. N. No agreement could be reached in the Security Council on the creation of an international force, and each flimsy expedient that has since been proposed has failed to win U. N. support. In recognizing Israel, the United States acted wholly on its own responsibility, thus suggesting at least that the Administration is eager to close the chapter of futile vacillation on the international front and meet the realities of the present in a decisive manner so far as that can be done within the realm of national action.

Senator Vandenberg hit the nail on the head when he said that the President's action "takes account of the reality that no other authority can fill what otherwise would be a cruel and dangerous vacuum in this area of Palestine." The Jewish state is an accomplished fact and the only alternative to anarchy. Its declaration of independence issued at Tel Aviv evidences a strong determination for survival, but also a promising restraint. Social and political equality are pledged to all citizens "without distinction of race, creed or sex." Peace and amity are offered to all neighboring states and people. And "the State of Israel is ready to contribute its full share to the peaceful progress and reconstitution of the Middle East." That moderation is highly commendable, and we hope that it will be reflected in the actions of the new state no less than in its words.

Peace in the Near East is now unquestionably dependent upon the Arabs' sense of realities. It would be naive to ignore the clash of traditions and culture when the dynamic Jews develop a state alongside the Arabs' feudal civilization. But the new order can work to the advantage of both if there is the will to seek peaceful accommodation. To that objective the energy of all men of good will should now be devoted.

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Document 48
Facsimile of Memorandum of Conversations Drafted by Under Secretary Lovett, May 17, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 760050
By RDB NARA, Date

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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THE UNDER SECRETARY

Returned to S/S (7/8/57) MKB

May 17, 1948

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867N.01/5-1748

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

On Friday afternoon following lunch Mr. Clifford told me that the President was under unbearable pressure to recognize the Jewish state promptly.

He recalled that on Wednesday afternoon previously I had vigorously attacked the proposals then advanced by the President's advisers that the President should make a statement at his Thursday press conference promising recognition, etc. He stated that he felt the State Department criticisms had been persuasive and that the fact that General Marshall and I had opposed it had caused the President to change his mind and agree to a "postponement of recognition".

Clifford indicated that the most persuasive arguments were the fact that, by stating in advance of any request from the Jewish Agency that he would recognize the state, it would place this country in the position of being a sponsor and increase responsibility thereby; that while the UN special session was still considering the matter, this act by the President would be a grave breach of propriety and would be labelled a doublecross; that the boundaries were unknown and the President would be putting this country in the position of buying a pig in a poke without knowing who the Government was or anything about it. Clifford said the President was impressed by these facts as he had been, but that at six o'clock Friday night there would be no government or authority of any kind in Palestine. Title would be lying about for anybody to seize and a number of people had advised the President that this should not be permitted. The President had decided to do something about recognizing the new state if it was set up but that he would agree to wait until the request had been made and until there was some definition of boundaries. He would postpone the decision to the last until he was satisfied that the interests of this country would be adequately protected if such a step were taken. He asked the State Department to recommend language to put into effect recognition in the event the

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NARA, Date

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President decided upon it. He said that the White House had been informed that an appeal would be made for immediate recognition by the new state, which had been proclaimed that morning and which, according to information given the White House, proposed to live within the conditions of the November 29 General Assembly resolution and to restrict its claim to the borders therein defined.

I replied to Mr. Clifford that the legal paper the Department had provided him with indicated that there was, strictly speaking, no legal bar to recognition. However, indecent haste in recognizing the state would be very unfortunate for some of the reasons I had mentioned on Wednesday. I therefore urged the President to delay action for a day or so until we could confirm the details of the proclamation. Clifford replied that he felt sure we would have adequate details to indicate a recognition of the provisional government but that the timing of the recognition was "of the greatest possible importance to the President from a domestic point of view". I said that it was hard for me to believe that one day could make so much difference, and emphasized especially the tremendous reaction which would take place in the Arab world. I mentioned specifically that we might lose the effects of many years of hard work in the Middle East with the Arabs and that it would jeopardize our position with the Arab leaders and would probably bring our missions and consular representatives into personal jeopardy. Mr. Clifford replied that we should take every precaution against that and that he would hope that we could get messages out in time to forewarn the personnel and inform them of the situation.

I said that we also ought to notify the head of our UN delegation, Senator Austin, and the British, French and Belgian Governments in advance, and asked if the President could not withhold the decision until the next day so that we could be sure that the messages would get through in time. Clifford said that the President could not afford to have any such action leak and that we should try to insure against it. I told him that it was manifestly impossible to time messages to arrive in a distant capital when we did not know when the decision would be made. Clifford said that he hoped the final answer would be given us in the late afternoon and that they were awaiting the formal request, which he again repeated they were sure would be received.

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NND 760050
By NARA, Date

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Telephone conversations continued during the afternoon on the subject and the White House was apparently advised by phone that the message was on its way. The general sense was given me by Mr. Clifford and we started to prepare a statement for Mr. Ross to use in connection with our continuing efforts on the truce. The language to be used in the White House release was arrived at at a final conference in the middle of the afternoon in the Department prior to notice of the President's decision but based on the assumption that it would be in favor of recognition.

After the completion of this, sometime about 5:30, I called Mr. Clifford and told him that the General Assembly was in session and was winding up, and that it was our guess that it would be over by around ten o'clock that night. I asked him if he would endeavor to delay the announcement until after the General Assembly, but he said again that time was terribly important and that he did not feel that the President would do this although he would discuss it with him. I reminded Clifford that we had to have time to get the message to Senator Austin and asked him to let me know as soon as the final decision was reached. Mr. Clifford was with the President at the time and said that he would call me back after they had talked it over.

About twenty minutes to six I was told that the President was going to make the announcement shortly after six o'clock and that it was all right to call Senator Austin and tell him of the action. Mr. Rusk called the Senator about a quarter to six and gave him the information. The various cables had been released on the basis of this action being possible so that they had gone out some time before.

In this memorandum of conversation I have omitted, for the sake of brevity, the long arguments back and forth throughout the afternoon. My protests against the precipitate action and warnings as to consequences with the Arab world appear to have been outweighed by considerations unknown to me, but I can only conclude that the President's political advisers, having failed last Wednesday afternoon to make the President a father of the new state, have determined at least to make him the midwife.

Robert A. Lovett

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Document 49
May 18, 1948 Article in *The Washington Post*
© The Washington Post

Washington Calling

By Marquis Childs

Stormy Israel

NO ISSUE in many years has so confused the average American as the issue of Palestine. One obvious reason, of course, is that policy-makers in Washington have themselves appeared to be overwhelmed by confusion.

There are other reasons, too. The ordinary citizen has sensed that a deep injustice has been done to the Jews, who have seen a whole series of promises broken. But at the same time a current of conflicting propaganda has made for doubt and uncertainty.

Among the Jews in this country the divisions are deep. The terrorist acts of the Stern Gang in Palestine have alienated some sympathy for those who failed to realize that this is a tiny minority in a people struggling mightily to maintain discipline under conditions of desperate provocation.

At least a half dozen times the United States has taken positions that no one was prepared to back up. That is the primary reason why so many people feel they cannot find any reason in the welter of headlines about Palestine. The most conspicuous example, of course, was partition, which came about because of United States pressure. But when the full implications of this move were apparent, then the United States backed down, or, to put it more accurately, the little group in the State and Defense Departments that had all along opposed partition succeeded in getting it nullified.

IT IS this background that raises doubts about President Truman's sudden and dramatic move in according recognition to the new state of Israel. The move was a bold one. It should hearten the embattled Jews now defending what they have for 30 years considered their homeland.

But the decision for partition was also a bold one. If recognition is to be merely a gesture, then it can be worse than empty.

After all, the United States "recognized" Loyalist Spain all through the desperate years when that duly constituted government was being destroyed with the help of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Materials of war were going to Germany while an embargo kept them from the Loyalists in Spain.

The test will come in the meaning of recognition. Will the Arabs continue to have access to arms from the outside while an embargo prevents the Jews at the head of a duly constituted state from buying the materials they need in this country or elsewhere?

The very fact that one can talk of the conflict in these terms is to show how great is the peril to the peace of the world. In spite of the talk of invading Egyptian and Syrian armies, there is a comfortable assumption that the forces of the Arabs will not be too great for the forces of Israel to withstand. But that has almost too easy a sound.

THUS FAR, it is true, the Arabs have seemed so divided and so impotent that those who built them into a powerful bogey must feel more than a little foolish. But if they move with a unified and powerful force, the threat to the peace of the Near East and in fact, to the world will be great. Those within the United Nations who have been forced to stand by while constructive policy has been sabotaged and the prestige of the U. N. dangerously and perhaps fatally weakened will then be able to say, "I told you so."

There will, however, be small satisfaction in that. An ever-spreading war will call for positive action if it is not to continue to spread and once again stir a general conflagration.

In the murky atmosphere of election-year Washington, there are all sorts of rumors about Palestine. From influential policy-makers come dark hints of pressure and the threat of exposure.

If it were possible to have a fair and honest inquiry, the public would be served. But that is quite obviously impossible. So we will continue to get a barrage of warring propaganda.

Now and then a shaft of truth cuts through the murk. Such is the *Collier's* article by Jorge Garcia Granados, Guatemala's delegate to the U. N. He tells of the intrigues, in which important Americans participated, to sabotage partition. It is a wretched story, full of shame and humiliation.

The only real hope is in the strength of the new state and the pioneering people who have created it. They have shown, long before Israel came into formal being, remarkable powers of resistance and endurance. Perhaps in the face of their unyielding resistance, a decent settlement will be possible, one that recognizes the rights and promises that go back for three decades.

Preventing Delinquency

May we not do a better job in preventing juvenile delinquency?

Should there not be a ban placed on the showing of movies about robberies and gangsters, especially to children? Why sell pistols and tommy guns to children, therein teaching them the use of real guns as soon as they can secure them?

Why not limit or ban the sale to juveniles of books about murder and crime?

As parents, should we not pay more attention to the activities of our children, pal with them and their friends, help develop their spiritual life by seeing that they attend the Sunday school and church services, and supervise their reading and recreational life more closely?

BENJAMIN H. MILLER.
Washington.

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Document 50
USUN Cable to the Secretary of State, May 19, 1948

Form [illegible]

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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15 - Bancroft please call me.

ACTION COPY

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Control 6186

Rec'd May 19, 1948
2:54 p.m.

Action: UNA
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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 674, May 19, 2:15 p.m.

FOR MARSHALL FROM AUSTIN.

For your personal information and that of the Department, the following appraisal of the present position of the US in the UN is transmitted with a view to its utility in framing further instructions for the guidance of the Mission in regard to the Palestine case and other political issues in the SC, the IC, and in the next session of the GA.

It is our best estimate recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel last Friday evening has deeply undermined the confidence of other delegations in our integrity and that this is a factor which the Department will want to keep in mind in the immediate future and for some time to come.

The following is our estimate of the way in which a large number of delegations view the sequence of events in the special session of the GA culminating in the announcement of our recognition of the Provisional Government:

1. Recognition constituted reversal of US policy for truce plus trusteeship as urged in special session of GA and, in later stages, US compromise resolution laying stress on truce plus mediation;

2. Concerning efforts to secure truce, both in SC and in informal truce negotiations, we had heavily emphasized that there should be no action of a political character which would alter the status quo or prejudice the rights, claims or positions of either Arabs or Jews. This was generally understood to apply primarily to the establishment of the Jewish state.

501.BB PALESTINE/5-1948

JAD

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-2- #674, May 19, 2:15 p.m., from New York.

Jewish state. SC truce resolution which had our strong backing included appeal to all governments to take all possible steps to assist in implementation of truce;

3. In carrying through this truce program under instructions which we understood had highest clearance, we persuaded other delegations of correctness of our position and induced them to come forward and carry a large share of the burden. They thus became publicly identified with our position;

4. The feeling is that although the Jews had not accepted the truce they disregarded the admonitions of the SC, violated spirit of truce effort, and prevented conclusion of formal truce. US immediately not only condoned but endorsed those violations, thus striking heavy blow at prospect of concluding any truce and equally heavy blow at prestige and effectiveness of SC and UN generally;

5. US by its immediate act of recognition of the Provisional Government, violated the terms of the SC truce resolution;

6. The consequence of foregoing is a lack of confidence in the integrity of US intentions and disbelief of further statements of future US intentions and policies;

7. This attitude in turn leads to strong desire to avoid being committed to any US position which might be reversed without notice;

8. As a further consequence, other governments feel the necessity of recapturing their own freedom of action to make spot decisions instead of supporting us or relying on UN, since this appears to them to be current US attitude;

9. An important contribution to foregoing attitude was failure of US to inform or consult before announcement of final step. We had developed here closest and most friendly relations large number other delegations which desire to support our foreign policies not only in UN but generally. We had kept each other informed, working out mutually acceptable points of substance, strategy, and tactics. Method by which US recognition action was taken without prior notice or consultation deeply offended many of those who had collaborated closely with us;

10. With two or three exceptions our closest and most consistent supporters among other delegations, while expressing friendly personal feeling are manifestly mistrustful of continuing cooperation on basic questions of policy

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- #674, May 19, 2:15 p.m., from New York.

or strategy, or even of tactics.

It, of course, was to be anticipated that the delegations of the Arab states would be particularly bitter, but the reaction of other delegations such as those of Canada, China and a number of the Latin American states is not based on the merits but is due to a feeling, frankly expressed by them, that they have been double-crossed.

With particular reference to our immediate policy on Palestine and specifically the resolution which we have introduced in the SC calling for action under Chapter VII, the situation in our estimation is that if we press this to a vote it will not receive more than three or four affirmative votes. Delegations of governments which are generally well-disposed and friendly feel that a finding of breach of peace under Article 39 is unrealistic unless sanctions, if necessary, will be assured. In this connection delegations are completely mistrustful of our readiness to participate in sanctions. Current newspaper comment concerning possible US action on the existing arms embargo is an element mentioned by other delegations as contributing to their mistrust.

In the long run, of course, identity of interest between the US and various other governments will tend to outweigh current reactions, but it will take time to diminish current attitude of distrust. This means that positions taken by the US on a variety of topics may continue to be viewed with suspicion, and that other delegations will not be inclined to support us for fear that a change in our position will leave them vulnerable. We must, I feel, exercise particular care not to advance major proposals on political issues, particularly in the SC, without careful previous canvassing of delegations here. In many cases our objectives might best be obtained through support of proposals introduced by other delegations. In general, I believe we should be responsive to indications of fear of Russian expansion on the part of many delegations, and their underlying conviction of identity of interest with us.

AUSTIN

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Document 51
Letter from Dean Rusk to the Historian's Office of the State Department, June 13, 1974

P740066_0003 MICROFILMED

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
SCHOOL OF LAW
ATHENS, GEORGIA 30602

June 13, 1974

Dr. William M. Franklin
Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing a letter very close to the draft you were good enough to prepare. I did telephone Clark Clifford, and he confirmed that he was indeed the person who called me at 5:45 p.m. on the afternoon of May 14, 1948.

You are entirely free to use the attached letter in the "Foreign Relations" series if you wish to do so. It contains a little of the informal color which so rarely crops up in official documents.

Cordially yours,

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

HISTORICAL OFFICE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
JUN 21 1974
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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#1 Lafayette Square
620 Hill Street
Athens, Georgia 30601
June 13, 1974

Dr. William M. Franklin
Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Dr. Franklin:

This is in further reply to your letter of April 24, in which you ask about some of the events in which I participated relating to the recognition of Israel by the United States on May 14, 1948.

The General Assembly was in session that day. About 5:45 that afternoon I got a call from Mr. Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman, telling me that the State of Israel would be declared at 6:00 p.m., that the United States would recognize Israel immediately and that the President wished me to inform our Delegation at the United Nations. I said, "But this cuts across what our Delegation has been trying to accomplish in the General Assembly under instructions and we already have a large majority for that approach." Mr. Clifford replied, "Nevertheless, this is what the President wishes you to do." I thereupon telephoned Ambassador Warren Austin, who had to leave the floor of the Assembly to take my call. He made a personal decision not to return to the Assembly or to inform other members of our Delegation -- he simply went home. My guess is that he thought that it was better for the General Assembly to know very clearly that this was the act of the President in Washington and that the United States Delegation had not been playing a double game with other Delegations.

Just after 6 p.m., a member of the New York Delegation called me to find out what it was all about. I had thought it was Phil Jessup, but he has informed me that it was not he who called. Perhaps it was Jack Ross. Meanwhile, Mr. Jessup's colleague Francis Sayre had gone to the podium, and, in effect, said he didn't know anything about the American recognition of Israel. A few minutes later Mr. Jessup returned to the Assembly (which was then in pandemonium), read the press ticker, and confirmed that it was in fact correct.

When I use the word pandemonium, I think I am not exaggerating. I was later told that one of our U. S. Mission staff men literally sat on the lap of the Cuban Delegate to keep him from going to the podium to withdraw Cuba from the United Nations. In any event, about 6:15 I got a call from Secretary Marshall who said, "Rusk, get up to New York and prevent the U. S. Delegation from resigning en masse." Whether it was necessary or not, I scurried to New York and found that tempers had cooled sufficiently so that my mission was unnecessary.

I cannot vouch for this, but there was a story later that some of Secretary Marshall's friends had told him that he ought to resign because of this incident. He was reported to have replied, "No, gentlemen, you do not accept a post of this sort and then resign when the man who has the Constitutional authority to make a decision makes one. You may resign at any time for any other reason but not that one."

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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